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CHAPTER 1 
Field of investigation and Research problem 
  
Field of investigation and Research problem 
2 
The importance of statistical information in doctor-patient communication 
Increasing emphasis has been placed on the way doctors communicate risk to patients 
(Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones, 2003; Calman, Bennett, and Coles, 1999; Gigerenzer and 
Edwards, 2003; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin, 2007; Paling, 
2003). Indeed, clinicians are increasingly recommended- even mandated by law- to help patients 
make informed-medical decisions by paying more attention to risk counselling (Weinstein, 
1999; Schwartz, Woloshin, and Welch, 1999). Since the Seventies, the paternalistic doctor-
centred model of the physician-patient communication (in which the physician was chargeable 
with the decision of which information was relevant, and had the sole decision making 
responsibility) has been progressively abandoned for a more patient-oriented approach, until a 
deliberative model (shared-decision approach) has become customary in most of the advanced 
countries (Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992). In the latter model, the physician‘s role resembles that 
of a friend or teacher, whose main aim is ―to help the patient determine and choose the best 
health-related values that can be realized in the clinical consultation. To this end, the physician 
must delineate information on the patient‘s clinical situation and then help elucidate the types of 
values embodied in the available options‖1 (p. 2222). In this new relationship-centred approach, 
patients as well are asked an active role both in the definition of the health problems they face, 
and in the evaluation of possible solutions.  
Following a progressive acquisition of a prerogative state, the patient has become the 
main entitled holder of her/his wellbeing, and as such s/he ought to be provided with all 
necessary means to actuate a conscious decision in matters of health. For these reasons, doctors 
and technical health staff have the duty of ensuring that every choice is active and conscious, 
that informed consent is reached on all medical risks and on the selected practices to contrast 
these risks (Santuososso, 1996). As Hall et al. (2007, p. 564) have maintained, ―This is 
particularly evident in the context of genetic counseling, with a summary of 51 national and 
international guidelines for genetic counseling emphasizing the importance of patient autonomy 
and non-directive information giving in this context 
(http://www.eurogentest.org/web/info/public/unit3/guidelineswp12.xhtm, accessed on 
02.10.2006)‖. Moreover, this right of acquiring information has been not only identified as 
important to patients (e.g., people with cancer disease), but also as one of their primary unmet 
needs, especially concerning that of quantitative information like probabilities of risky events 
(Feldman-Stewart, Kocovski, McConnell, Brundage, and Mackillop, 2000). In order to take a 
decision concerning their health, people might need to know the frequency of occurrence of a 
given outcome in their population of reference (for example, how many people out of the total 
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 Not far from this idea is the concept of ―libertarian paternalism‖ advocated by Sunstein and Thaler 
(2003) for private and public institutions that should affect behavior in welfare-promoting directions 
while also respecting freedom of choice. 
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of those going vacating in a tropical country each year did contract malaria despite having been 
vaccinated against it). In agreement with this unmet need, for instance, Feldman-Stewart et al. 
(2000, p. 228) reported from one of their studies that ―four of the top five items (of 59) identified 
by men with early-stage prostate cancer as necessary for their treatment decisions concerned the 
chances of a particular event ‗happening‘‖.  
The inclusion of statistical facts on the condition of interest or on the treatments 
available to cure it, in a risk message does not only represent an inescapable step of a medical 
communication carried out in accordance with the guidelines in force, but the important value of 
numbers in communications of statuses and actions entailing uncertainty has been also 
recognised by health communication and cognitive psychology scholars. It seems, that 
mentioning the likelihoods in a numerical format can increase trust and belief in and comfort 
with the risk information (Gurmankin, Baron, and Armstrong, 2004). Some studies indeed 
found that statistical information increases comprehension (Marteau, Saidi, Goodburn, Lawton, 
Michie, and Bobrow, cited in Visschers, Meertens, Passchier, and de Vries, 2009). However, it 
has been widely questioned whether patients really understand and ultimately use these values 
(see the literature on people‘s general innumeracy, e.g. Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, 
Schwartz, and Woloshin, 2007, or Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer, 2001). 
When they are explicitly asked, patients say that they like verbal labels more than 
numbers. Verbal labels (e.g., ―rarely‖, ―sometimes‖, ―often‖, and so on) are viewed as more 
easy to use and more natural than numerical information (e.g., Brun and Teigen, 1988; 
Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, and Kemp, 1993). However, due to their imprecise nature, verbal 
labels cause more variability in risk perception than the other type of format (i.e., numbers), 
both between and within the respondents (Gurmankin et al., 2004). Indeed, the interpretation of 
qualitative expressions of risks varies greatly, with wide ranges in the meanings or numerical 
values attributed to verbal descriptions of risks across individuals (e.g., Ohnishi et al., 2002) and 
across contexts (e.g., Mazur, 1990; Mazur and Merz, 1994). That side-effect has led some 
authors (e.g., Burkell, 2004, but also Edwards, Elwin, and Mulley, 2002) to urge that verbal 
expressions of probability should be avoided, and to state, that risk information is better 
imparted with numerical expressions, provided that professionals help ―[...] turning raw data 
into information that is more helpful to the discussion than the data‖ (Edwards, Elwin, and 
Mulley, 2002, p. 827). 
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The subjective character of “objective” numbers: Biases in judgement and 
decision making 
Albeit the apparent objectivity of their character, raw numbers are not exempt from 
issues of multiplicity of interpretation. Several numerical formats can be chosen to express a 
given probability of an outcome- the most common of these being percentages (e.g., 5%), 
single-event probabilities (e.g., 0.05), frequencies
2
 (e.g., 5 in 100), and absolute frequencies 
(e.g., 600); selecting one of those rather than another in risk communication is not without 
consequences. Research by Brase (2002) in a direct comparison of these expressions found that 
individuals felt them different in the degree of clarity and how easy they were to be understood; 
in particular, frequencies
3
 (―simple frequencies‖, as he termed them) were in the first position, 
that is, the simplest and clearest among formats judged, followed by percentages (i.e., relative 
frequencies), and then by absolute frequencies based on very large reference classes, while 
single-event probabilities were in the last place (as they were perceived as the hardest to be 
understood).  
Format effects trace back to the pioneering work summarised in Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), demonstrating the crucial role of the superficial format in 
which information is presented for its assessment, and for the decisions elaborated on its basis. 
Through all their works on experimental observations, Kahneman and Tversky proved 
systematic deviations from what theoretically expected according to the ―format invariance 
principle‖4 argued by supporters of the classical economic theory. In other words, they showed 
that even those changes in the options, that from the point of view of the apparently ―perfectly 
rational agent‖, could be considered irrelevant would instead move her/him away from the 
optimal decision, namely that theoretically predicted by the normative model. For example, as 
―framing effect‖5 illustrated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), simply altering the frame (in 
positive/negative terms) of a scenario can change preferences for one course of action rather 
than another, even if the options have quantitatively identical outcomes. In the studies on the 
                                                          
2
 Frequency can be deﬁned as ―the rate at which something happens, for instance the number of times it 
happens in a particular period of time‖ (Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary, 1996), or ―the 
number of times an event or character occurs in a given sample.‖ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006). In 
the case of the present thesis, the sample of the last definition mostly consists of a certain group of people.  
3 
These findings are consistent with studies of statistical reasoning, which indicate that frequency 
presentations facilitate understanding of data (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 
1998) due to the suggestion that evolution and experience have been equipping people better to 
understand probabilistic information expressed as frequencies in a population, rather than as probabilities 
for an individual. In fact, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) argued that frequencies are the natural way in 
which people think about probabilities. However, results of studies investigating the same issue have not 
been consistent, hence existent research does not establish the superiority of frequency formats. 
4
 Such property implies that every economical agent behaving in accordance with axioms of the Utility 
Theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) will not modify her/his preferences on the basis of the 
presentation format of a choice problem. 
5
 Framing itself can be defined as ―presenting ‗logically equivalent‘ information in different ways‖ 
(Wilson, Purdon, and Wallston, quoted in Edwards and Elwyn, 2001, p. i11). 
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Asiatic Disease Problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), two groups of participants were asked 
to role-play to be asked to find the best solution to face a strong epidemic, and having to choose 
between two urgency sanitary programs. One of them guaranteed a partial albeit sure result, 
while the other had a given likelihood of solving completely the problem, but could also be a 
complete failure. The problem was presented in two versions, namely in one the outcomes were 
described in terms of people saved, while in the other in terms of victims. Despite according to 
the invariance principle no differences had to be expected in participants‘ choices, results 
showed an inversion of preferences from one version to the other. Indeed, in the version 
expressed in terms of saved people, the majority of participants preferred the sure option, while 
on the contrary, in the version where the consequences of the program were described in terms 
of lost lives, the majority of participants expressed a preference for the risky option. Thus, 
authors‘ work showed that individuals did not chose on the basis of a rational assessment of 
options -i.e., in terms of their expected value, as predicted by Utility Theory (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1947), but were instead prone to the influence of minor details (like the framing of 
options) of the problem description. 
 The investigation of the ―satisficing‖6 (Simon, 1979) rather than optimal behaviour, 
observed in the experiments of Kahneman and Tversky has been progressively extended to 
judgments under uncertainty of various events in diverse areas of everyday life. The research 
has been re-named the ―heuristic and biases‖ program, ―a territory that Herbert A. Simon had 
defined and named—the psychology of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1979)‖ (Kahneman, 
2003, p. 697). The portrait of the average individual resulting from such experimental analyses 
is that of an agent rarely following formal statistical rules in making decisions outside the 
laboratory. Rather, it is that of an individual whose evaluations, instead of being the result of 
formal and extensive algorithmic processing, are often based on a restricted number of 
simplifying heuristics. These ―rules of thumb‖ are successful most of the times, in other words 
they guide to an effective solution of problems by helping individuals reducing the complexity 
of certain issues (see, for instance, Gigerenzer, 2008). The same rules, however, can sometimes 
induce in errors, named biases by scholars. Heuristic processing, therefore, is ―positive‖, may 
reveal highly adaptive, especially when decisions are being taken in situations that are changing, 
uncertain, and dynamic. However, a wrong interpretation of this approach has been circulating 
for several years, where the use of heuristics has been identified as error-prone and leading to 
some systematic predispositions, namely the above mentioned biases. 
Even objective numbers are subjected to heuristic evaluations. As such, while is true 
that rules of thumb applied to their evaluation might in some cases lead to the same result of 
                                                          
6
 Nobel laureate Herbert Simon coined the phrase ‗satisficing‘ to describe a decision making process that 
takes the shortcut of defining what is acceptable and then settling on the first alternative that meets those 
minimum requirements. It is a blended word combining satisfy with suffice, meaning that you sacrifice 
the best alternative for one that adequately satisfies (i.e., suffices) your demands at the current time. 
Field of investigation and Research problem 
6 
formal calculations (but with advantages in terms of time and resources), it is inevitable that in 
other cases they lead to some distortions.  
Similarly to other superficial features, the numerical presentation format used in 
probability communication has been advocated as a determinant characteristic capable of 
influencing people‘s judgments and decisions in situations of uncertainty. In other words, it has 
been recognized that even numerical presentation of a probability is subjected to ―framing 
manipulations‖. Its effects have been intensively studied in disciplines like decision making 
psychology (for a review of the effects of numerical and other formats in probability 
communication, see Visschers, Meertens, Passchier, and de Vries, 2009)
7
.  
 
Communicating numerical information in health-care: The importance of studying 
format effects 
In the applied field of health-care, the issue of which numerical format is best to express 
a probability has a decisive importance from the point of view of informed choices, and of that 
of bringing about reductions in risky health behaviour, for instance. The point then is defining 
the term ―best‖. Three features must be considered at least: best understood (i.e., analytically 
meaningful), useful for judgment and decision making (i.e., affectively meaningful), best to 
reduce people‘s reckless health behaviours. 
As stated above, communicating risk is not a choice for doctors but it is a mandatory 
act. Many are the areas of health care in which professionals need to provide risk information to 
patients to enhance their decisions; consider, for instances, some of the examples reported, 
among others, by Burkell (2004, p. 201): ―Women making decisions about hormone 
replacement therapy to treat menopausal symptoms‖, as they ―must understand and weigh the 
reduced risk of osteoporosis, cardiovascular disease, colorectal cancer, and Alzheimer's disease 
against the increased risk of breast cancer, myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular disease, and 
thromboembolic disease‖; ―Men choosing among options for the treatment of localized prostate 
cancer‖, as they ―want to know the likelihood of side effects associated with the treatment 
options before making their decision‖; or, ―participants in genetic counseling programs‖, as they 
―must understand the risks associated with treatment and the meaning of a positive test result to 
make informed decisions about genetic testing‖. Not only, another case in which health 
professionals ought to communicate probability of a certain negative health-related outcome 
happening to laypeople is, for instance, that of the probability that a specific pattern of 
behaviour (e.g., smoking) will lead to a particular health problem (e.g., lung cancer).  
                                                          
7
 The issues analyzed included, to quote only the most discussed, a) the difference between numerical and 
verbal expression of probability; b) the frequency/ percentage debate; c) the presentation of absolute or 
relative risk information, d) the hard comprehension of cumulative probability information; e) the effects 
of employing a visual aid to represent the risk on its perception. 
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Moreover, nowadays the number of situations in which health-care practitioners (i.e., medical 
doctors, nurses or medical attendants, or technical assistants like, for example, radiologists) 
must communicate risks has grown extraordinarily. Unbelievable advances in medical sciences, 
in understanding the human genome, beside the identification of the genetic errors indictable for 
diseases, are on the one hand making the human being feel safer, but on the other hand are 
leading to an increase in number for the situations endowing a certain degree of risk that ought 
to be communicated. Such apparent oxymoron corresponds to the idea, that if we have gained a 
much better knowledge on the mechanisms regulating our body thus making us able to better 
pursue health welfare, on the other hand the number of conditions and possible diseases we 
should be tested for has expanded incredibly, making us somehow potentially ―more at risk‖. 
Furthermore, an additional factor adding up to the number of risky situations is represented by 
the increasing use of biochemical, imaging, and genetic screening tests that all provide 
probabilistic information.  
In all those situations, determining the effects that different numerical information 
related to risk and presented by health care professionals have on people‘s understanding of 
probability, their judgments (e.g., Ancker, Senathirajaha, Kukafka, and Starren, 2006; Cuite, 
Weinstein, Emmons, and Colditz, 2008; Feldman-Stewart, Brundage, Van Manen, and Svenson, 
2004; Lipkus, 2007), and even behavioural intentions (e.g., Marteau, Kidd, Cook, Michie, 
Johnston, Slack, et al., 1991) is of crucial importance. 
 
Object of investigation: A specific format effect in risk communication of prenatal 
genetic testing results 
Among features deemed responsible of biases in perception, specific object of study of 
the present dissertation has been the use of different ratio
8
 formats in risk communication of 
prenatal diagnosis results. In particular, work has focused on the possible influence that those 
expressions of the probability related to screening9 for Down syndrome could have on 
prospective parents‘ perceptions. While for a brief general outline of the peculiarities regarding 
the context of decision (i.e., antenatal screening for Down syndrome) we refer to the paragraph 
here following, for what concerns the elucidation of what is meant with ―the use of different 
                                                          
8
 From the strictly mathematical point of view, the concept of ―ratio‖ is broader than that of ―fraction‖, as 
while a fraction always illustrates a ―part to whole‖ relationship (e.g., 3/4), ratios can be used to denote a 
much larger set of relationships, such as part to part (e.g., 3 : 1) and whole to part (e.g., 4 : 3). Despite the 
present object of interest would have been more appropriately described by the term ―fraction‖, the term 
―ratio‖ was chosen to refer to it since most of the relevant literature on the phenomenon at study appeared 
to have used that expression, e.g., ―Ratio-bias‖ (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). Thus, by ratio formats we 
meant, verbalized frequency expressions like, for instance, ―1 in 5‖, ―3 out of 10‖, or ―2 out of every 20‖. 
9
 Broadly talking, ―Screening is a systematic attempt to identify from apparently healthy individuals, 
those at high enough risk of a specified disease to warrant further action. Those in the high risk group are 
offered interventions which are either too expensive or hazardous to be provided without such prior 
selection.‖ (Green, Hewison, Bekker, Bryant, and Cuckle, 2004, p. 1) 
Field of investigation and Research problem 
8 
ratio formats‖ the next sentences will do. When one wants to express a given probability (e.g., 
10%) through a ratio format, s/he can in principle state it by means of several equivalent ratios, 
whose numbers at the numerator and denominator will hence be (comparatively) both smaller or 
larger (i.e., N in N*X, or N1 in N1*X, or N2 in N2*X ...and so on). To exemplify, one can say, 
that a person has a 1 in 10 probability of having a child with Down syndrome, or, for instance, 
that such person has a 10 in 100 probability of having a child with Down syndrome. Does 
choosing one expression (i.e., 1 in 10, or N in N*X) rather than the other (i.e., 10 in 100, or N1 
in N1*X, for instance) make any difference in terms of how those values are perceived by the 
receiver of the communication, in the specific, the person at risk? Answering such question was 
the main aim of the present work. 
Research originated from both a theoretical and a practical question. From a theoretical point, 
studying format effects is one way to validate theories on how the mind processes information 
about risks. These theories will be described in Chapter 2. From a practical side, format effects, 
as said before, have concrete consequences on judgments and decisions of individuals regarding 
health issues, therefore their effect could be used to promote health care. 
 
The specific case of Down syndrome 
Antenatal screening offers the possibility of preventing the birth of infants with serious 
congenital abnormalities, such as neural tube defects, Down syndrome, chromosome 
abnormalities, genetic diseases and other conditions (such as spina bifida, cleft palate, Tay 
Sachs disease, sickle cell anaemia, thalassemia, cystic fibrosis, and fragile x syndrome). The 
purposes for prenatal diagnosis are not only, as commonly thought, to give the parents the 
chance to abort a foetus with the diagnosed disabling condition, but also, in case they want to 
carry the pregnancy to full term, to enable timely medical or surgical treatment of a risky 
condition before or after birth; moreover, to give prospective parents the chance to ―prepare‖ 
psychologically, socially, financially, and medically for a baby with a health problem or 
disability, or for the likelihood of a stillbirth. Also, having this information in advance of the 
birth means that healthcare staff has the possibility to better prepare itself for the delivery of a 
child with a health problem.  
Among the large range of chromosomal anomalies, Down syndrome is the most 
common, with an estimated frequency of 1 in 600 live births (Antonarakis, Petersen, McInnis, 
Adelsberger, Schinzel, Binkert, et al., 1992). This disease, which often implies impairments of 
the cognitive ability and physical growth problems for the baby, raises many questions for 
prospective parents such as how to cope with the waiting, how to cope with a special needs 
child, what about the baby's siblings and relatives, and so on. Antenatal screening for Down 
syndrome consists in the estimation of the woman‘s risk of having a Down syndrome 
pregnancy. Apart from nuchal translucency, it can be calculated for each woman based on her 
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age and any combination of maternal serum markers: she will be described as screen positive if 
her risk value exceeds a specified cut-off value (normally, 1 in 250/270). If an elevated risk of 
chromosomal or genetic abnormality is indicated by the non-invasive screening test, a more 
invasive but diagnostic technique may be employed to gather more information (e.g., 
amniocentesis or Chorionic Villus Sampling).  
Despite accepting or declining prenatal screening should be the result of an informed 
choice, namely one based on ―relevant information‖ and ―consistent with the decision-makers‘ 
values‖ (van den Berg, Timmermans, Knol, van Eijk, de Smit, van Vugt, et al., 2008), it is often 
not so. For instance, in their study on a sample of 1159 pregnant women offered either maternal 
serum screening test or the nuchal translucency measurement, van den Berg and colleagues 
found that only 68% of the choices could be defined actually ―informed‖. Indeed, women 
interviewed frequently showed lack of one (or even both) of the dimensions common in all 
definitions of informed choices, that are sufficient knowledge (i.e., of, broadly speaking, 
―characteristics of condition for which screening is being offered, characteristics of the 
screening test, and implications of the possible test results‖, ibid., p. 322), and value 
inconsistency (i.e., ―disagreement between the abstract ideals guiding their behaviour and the 
actual behaviour itself‖, ibid.). Counseling a couple about the Down syndrome screening result 
in a simple yet comprehensive way is a particular challenge for many health care providers. 
Indeed, a critical question is whether pregnant women and her partner have an adequate grasp of 
the numerical information delivered, and yet several studies have demonstrated women‘s poor 
understanding of Down syndrome screening (Eiser, 1998; Godyer, Barratt, and Irwig, 2000; 
Thornton, Hewison, Lilford, and Vail, 1995). 
Thus, in order to favour sound decisions, it is first of all necessary to understand how future 
parents form a subjective probability judgment out of raw numbers. Hence, studying effects of 
superficial presentations in communication on patients‘ assessments and intentions to act is of 
vital importance. Analyzing the influence of the ratio formats expressing the probability of 
having a Down syndrome-affected child on prospective parents‘ perception of the probability 
can disclose effects of determinant relevance for people‘s life. 
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The initial part of this chapter will briefly review the ―risk as analysis and risk as 
feelings‖ theory on how human beings comprehend risk (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and 
MacGregor, 2004) on which basis the investigation was grounded. Then, the thesis will start 
focusing on the specific issue of research, namely how the use of superficially different but 
mathematically equivalent ratio formats (e.g., N in N*X or N1 in N1*X) affects the magnitude 
perception of the probability which those ratios convey.  
With this aim, first of all the existent research will be briefly summarised, which 
focused on the impact that the type of ratio format (1 at the numerators vs. other formats) used 
for probability presentation has on its comprehension, particularly when related to a medical 
domain.  
 Afterwards, research will be reviewed, that analysed the effect of ratio format on 
perceived probability and decision making. Indeed, starting in the 1990s, various empirical 
studies considered whether different ratio formats denoting the same objective probability -e.g., 
1 in 10 vs. 10 in 100, or more generally ―1 in X‖ vs. ―N in (N*X)‖- could impact choice and 
subjective evaluations. These studies delivered contrasting results.  
On the one hand, mainly Prof. Seymour Epstein and colleagues suggested that people tend to 
neglect denominators, preferring for example a lottery offering a 10 in 100 chance of winning to 
another offering a 1 a 10 chance of winning. That phenomenon, dubbed the ―Ratio-bias‖ effect 
(e.g., Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994; Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole, 1995) under the Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory (CEST, Epstein, 1991, 1993) and attributed to the prevalence of the 
experiential system over the rational one, has been instead ascribed to a ―denominator neglect‖ 
under Fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna, 1991). The ability of such phenomenon to influence people‘s 
behaviour in different fields of application will be illustrated in Section 1 of the present chapter. 
On the other hand, Yamaguchi (1998) suggested that when people are asked to evaluate a threat, 
whose probability is kept constant, they tend to rate the threat as less probable when the number 
of individuals at threat increases, for example if it will affect 10 persons in 100, rather than 1 
person in 10. That phenomenon, dubbed the ―group-diffusion‖ effect, seemed to suggest that 
people neglect numerators rather than denominators, in single ratio presentation. Group- 
diffusion effect will be illustrated in Section 2 of this chapter. 
No connection between these two sets of theories postulating opposite tendencies had been 
established until Price and Matthews‘s work (2009). The latter will be briefly analysed in the 
conclusive part of the chapter. 
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Risk as analysis and Risk as feelings 
 
Recently, a comprehensive theory on how human beings perceive and evaluate risk has 
been formally elaborated by Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004) in the wake of 
dual-process approaches of thinking, knowing, and information-processing in cognitive 
psychology (Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Kahneman and Friederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996), and 
modern theories of neuroscience (e. g., Damasio, 1994). A growing volume of researches and 
findings is increasingly being emphasizing the existence of two different essential ways in 
which individuals would comprehend risk, namely an ―experiential‖ way- also addressed as 
―System 1‖ by Khaneman (2003) and scholars- and an ―analytic‖ way- also addressed by some 
as the ―rational‖ system (e.g., Epstein, 1991) or the ―deliberative‖ system, and by others as 
―System 2‖, see Kahneman (2003) and scholars10. Both systems would be fundamental for risk 
processing and evaluation: while the analytic system uses normative rules and formal logic, as 
well as algorithms and probability calculus, the experiential system uses intuition, instincts, gut 
feelings, and emotions (for a review of properties of the two systems, and of the different 
interpretation of their facets, see section 1.1.2 and beginning of section 1.1.3 of the present 
chapter). Both systems would be continually active, and constantly interacting in what has been 
characterized as ―the dance of affect and reason‖ (Finucane, Peters, and Slovic, 2003; see also, 
Slovic et al., 2004). Anyway, the prevalence (for several reasons, which will be tackled 
throughout the present work) of one way of reasoning over the other can influence the type of 
―answer‖ given by our mind to information and problems. 
According to Slovic and colleagues, and similarly argued by Kahneman (2003), and Reyna 
(2004), not only the experiential system is the default system, necessary even to guide the 
analytic system to work properly (i.e., to ―do the right thing‖), but it also possess elements of 
rationality at same strength of the analytic system. In other words, the experiential system 
would be the basic fundamental way in which human beings encode and evaluate information. 
This interpretation is, however, very recent. Indeed, after a period (i.e., with the neoclassic 
approach) in which only analytic thinking was considered legitimate object of research, exactly 
because of being the ―epitome of rationality‖ (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 313), emotions11 re-gained 
                                                          
10 Otherwise differently stated, all the terms referring to one of the two systems will be used 
interchangeably to denote that system in the present thesis. When a specific theory will be described, 
instead, the terms used will be those employed by the author/s. 
11
 A commonly accepted definition describes emotion as a vast disposition to answer that can include a 
linguistic measurable behavior, organized actions and a (somatic and visceral) physiological system of 
support for those events. Emotions intervene in evaluative and decisional processes, and can be broadly 
classified into immediate and anticipated emotions, the first ones further subdivided into integral (i.e. 
related to the object of evaluation/decision) and incidental (i.e. not related to it). All these types of 
emotions are supposed to play a role in the judgmental and choice behaviors, in other words 1) to cover 
an informative function (affect as information); 2) to be an instrument guiding attention (―a spotlight‖); 3) 
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the role they should always have been entitled to, namely that of being one of the most 
important determinants of perception and behaviour. Previously, emotions were deemed as 
interfering with reason (hence somehow lowering the quality of the reasoning process).  
In decision making, the revival of attention for the role of emotions approximately 
coincided with the conceptualization of ―the affect heuristic‖, a mental shortcut consisting in 
reliance on the affective feelings
12
 generated by a stimulus for evaluation and decision 
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, 
2004). Authors incorporated the affect heuristic in their view of individuals‘ information-
processing about risk (e.g., Slovic et al., 2004). The way in which affect heuristic works can be 
approximated as follows: in evaluating a situation, people would form mental images (that are 
influenced, sometimes even determined, by individual differences and by the type of task); such 
images have connotative emotions, namely conscious or unconscious tags associated with 
objects and events representations from the past, negativity or positivity of which the person 
would consult in order to gain an evaluation of the stimulus. The affect rule of thumb would 
substitute the systematic analysis of each of the stimulus attributes, thus increasing rapidity and 
automaticity of the process which, indeed, are also typical features of affective responses. As 
other mental shortcuts, the affect heuristic would be employed particularly in those situations 
where decision is very difficult (because, for instance, the individual does not know the 
necessary rules to address the problem considered, or does not possess the abilities to do so), 
where temporal limits impede a complete analysis of all the features of the situation (i.e., time 
constraints), or where the information available is not sufficient. As in other cognitive domains, 
judgments and evaluations about risk are strongly related to affect. Indeed, even in probability 
judgments, the affect experienced or imagined during information-processing may serve as a 
cue for the assessment of the probability magnitude (this point will be addressed again in 
Section 3 of Chapter 3). Such assessment, anyway, might be influenced even by the degree to 
which the ratio format is understood, an issue that will be examined in the next section. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
to work as a guide to decision (affect as motivation and as ―common currency‖), see Peters, Lipkus, and 
Diefenbach (2006).  
12 The concept of ―affect”- i.e., a ―faint whisper of emotion‖ (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, 
2004, p. 312)- on which this heuristic is based has been explained by authors as ―the specific quality of 
‗goodness‘ or ‗badness‘ 1) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) 2) demarcating 
a positive or negative quality of a stimulus. Affective responses occur rapidly and automatically […]‖ 
(ibid.) 
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What is known on comprehension of different ratio formats 
 
Doctors use the “1 in X” format more than “N in NX” formats 
Frequency formats are extensively used in communications about risk. For instance, in a 
study by Michie, Lester, Pinto, and Marteau (2005) on the transcripts of 115 U.K. genetic 
consultations, 47% of the 492 risk expressions conveyed by practitioners were numbers (the 
remaining 52% were words, i.e., verbal probability statements); among those, the large majority 
was constituted by so- called ―probabilities‖ (i.e., proportions or rates) rather than percentages 
(32% vs. 15%). Anyway, studies also reveal, that among ratio formats genetic risk is more 
frequently expressed as population size required for 1 expectant event (e.g., 1 in 8) than in what 
is considered the customary scientific format by experts in the field, namely rates of events per 
unit of population exposed to the risk, commonly 100 or 1000 (e.g., 12 in 100, in Miron-Shatz, 
Hanoch, Graef, and Sagi, 2009). Miron-Shatz and colleagues, for instance, stated that conveying 
prenatal screening test results in a ―1-in-N‖ format in written communications (i.e., e-mails) to 
women is ordinary practice in Israel.  
The preference of genetic counsellors for proportions with a numerator of 1 and shifting 
denominators in the expression of risks (e.g., 1 in 200 instead than 5 in 1000, for a .005 
likelihood) has been found not to represent the implementation of a rule drawn from scientific 
literature attesting advantages of such format in any aspect supposed to improve the 
communication of risk. Rather, such inclination results from health practitioners‘ spontaneous 
attempt to make the population size statistics more understandable to the public (Hook, cited in 
Grimes and Snively, 1999). Despite health professionals‘ good intentions, some evidences seem 
to disprove their conventional wisdom that laypeople understand proportions better than rates, 
arguing instead for a facilitating effect of the customary scientific format over population size 
required for 1 expectant event. Such evidence will be briefly reviewed, and the issue of 
comprehension examined, in the next paragraph. Nevertheless, it is apparent that both formats 
are employed, as the following examples can show. For instance, in a report of the probability 
figures that a 37-year-old woman should weight in order to be able to make an informed 
selection about prenatal tests (i.e., between a screening test for chromosomal anomalies and a 
diagnostic test), Gates (2004) implicitly affirmed that what she named ―probabilities‖ (i.e., ―1 in 
X‖ expressions) and ―frequencies‖ (i.e., ―N in 1000‖ expressions) are the two normal ways of 
presenting statistics adopted in landmark epidemiologic studies of the prenatal diagnosis field. 
The same idea- leaving apart taxonomy issues (i.e., authors define ―1 in X‖ formats as 
―proportions‖, and ―N in 1000‖ as ―rates‖) - is found in Grimes and Snively (1999).  
Are there differences in the way individuals understand 1 in X formats and N in NX formats? 
This issue will be object of analysis of the next paragraph. 
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The advantage of rates over proportions in facilitating the performance of 
mathematical operations in medical decision making 
Few studies have sought to determine which formats make it easier for laypeople to 
perform operations of the kind that might arise in medical decision making. Most of them have 
investigated only a single (but fundamental) operation: the ability of identifying which out of 
two probabilities is larger. One informative example is represented by the study of Grimes and 
Snively (1999), where that skill was assessed when the probabilities were expressed either as 
rates of disease per unit of population exposed to the threat (in that case, per 1000 people) or as 
proportions with 1 at the numerator and shifting denominators. To this aim, researchers 
presented women in numerous Obstetrics and Gynaecology outpatients clinics with a 
questionnaire asking, among other unrelated questions, to circle the higher out of two 
probabilities of having a bladder infection- both probabilities were expressed either in so-called 
rates (i.e., frequencies with a 1000 denominator: 2.6 in 1000 and 8.9 in 1000) or in so-called 
proportions (i.e., the population size required for the expected event, that is a frequency with a 
1-in-n format: 1 in 112 and 1 in 384)
13
.
 
Each individual assessed both formats, but the order in 
which they appeared was randomly varied to avoid sequence effects. Participants correctly 
identified the numerical risk expressions conveying the larger magnitude in 56% (1-in-n format) 
and 73% (rate format) of cases, thus showing a significant higher comprehension of rates than 
of proportions- the number of ―don‘t know‖ answers was always around 20% showing that 
many women did not understand either format. Superiority of the rate format was consistent 
across all primary languages, age groups, and levels of education of participants tested in the 
study. 
The result was confirmed on a more representative sample constituted of laypeople 
(both women and men) by van Vliet, Grimes, Popkina, and Smith (2001). Using the same 
experimental design, and the same probability expressions of the previous study, but this time 
referred to the risk of Down syndrome, researchers replicated the finding of a superiority of the 
rate format on the 1-in-n format in terms of accuracy; its advantage on the other format (76.2% 
vs. 72.3% correct answers, respectively) was nevertheless slightly lower than that found by 
Grimes and Snively.  
In another investigation, where percentages were tested apart from rates and 
proportions, the 1-in-n format confirmed its problematic character as it showed as the one 
creating most difficulties for the performance of mathematical operations of the types that might 
be encountered in discussions of risk (Cuite, Weinstein, Emmons, and Colditz, 2008). In that 
                                                          
13
 The risk values corresponded to the rates of Down syndrome at birth at the maternal ages of 35 and 40 
years, respectively. Nevertheless, the scenario involved was that of cystitis instead of trisomy 21 to avoid 
generation of anxiety in respondents.  
Chapter 2 
 
17 
study, three waves of individuals (in total: 16,133) recruited online on a cancer-related site 
voluntarily took part in the research. Each wave received two experimental problems- each of 
which required the performance of one out of six mathematical operations (Wave1: compare 
and halve; Wave2: triple and add; Wave3: trade-off and sequence)- both expressed in one of the 
three formats under study (i.e., %, 1-in-n, and rate). All questions were presented as if they were 
hypothetical statements pronounced by a physician. In most cases, in risk levels used for each 
type of problem, probabilities were of an exactly equal size or nearly the same in the three 
formats (e.g., 1 in 24, 4 in 100, and 4%)
14
. A significant main effect on performance (i.e., 
answer accuracy) was detected for the type of format on all risk operations. Despite there was 
not one single format being best for all the six operations, each of them was best for at least one 
operation. The 1-in-n format was significantly better than the percentage format for the compare 
operations, but similar to the rate format (two results both in conflict with Grimes and 
Snively‘s). However, when scores were averaged across all operations, the 1-in-n format 
performed worse than the other two. Indeed, the mean accuracy rate for the 1-in-n format was 
only 45%, a significantly smaller result than the one obtained for frequency (55%), and than that 
obtained for percentage (57%) - the two were very similar.  
Further confirmation of laypeople‘s difficulties with the 1-in-n format can be retrieved 
also in results of semi-structured interviews and correspondence with twenty women who had 
contacted Support after Termination for Abnormality (SAFTA), a British registered charity 
supporting parents who have foetal abnormalities diagnosed (Green and Statham, 1993). Among 
these women, who overall reported a high degree of anxiety before and after having received 
results of serum-screening for Down syndrome or amniocentesis results, at least eight had 
difficulty in applying a 1-in-n risk to their own pregnancy. The difficulty in grasping the 
meaning of 1-in-n expressions has been showed even in a study that reported individuals‘ 
preference for a combined percentage and frequency scale rather than a 1-in-n scale (Woloshin, 
Schwartz, Byram, Fischhoff, and Welch, 2000). Among available scales, the 1-in-n scale was 
judged as the hardest to be used. This last consideration, summed up with both the proved 
higher difficulty found with 1-in-n formats in performing operations normally required in health 
decisions, and with people‘s preference for other formats, made Woloshin and colleagues 
suggest medical personnel to avoid the 1-in-n format in risk communication.  
Anyway, as documented in the first part of this section, doctors and health-care professionals 
appear to make large use of such format. Hence, an analysis of the effect that different ratio 
formats expressing a probability have on people‘s perceptions of the probability itself, becomes 
then of crucial importance. Studies performed, as well as theories that have been put forward to 
                                                          
14
 The risk value used in the ―1-in-n‖ case was sometimes approximated so not to require harder 
calculations than the other two expressions. 
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account for individuals‘ irrational evaluations, will be analysed in the next two sections of the 
present chapter. 
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SECTION 1. 
When 10 in 100 is higher than 1 in 10: Results in favour of neglect of 
the denominator 
 
1.1 Explanations and experimental evidences under main theories  
 
1.1.1 The different number of counterfactual alternatives prompted 
The first research (chronologically) arguing for different evaluations of a ratio 
according to the magnitude of the numbers employed at its numerator and denominator can be 
considered that of Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1989). These authors observed a systematic 
tendency in their study participants to ―[...] judge the same probability of an unlikely event as 
lower when the probability is presented in the form of a ratio of smaller rather than of larger 
numbers‖ (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994, p. 820). Their work was based on Kahneman and 
Miller (1986)‘s Norm theory whose proposers had claimed, that the judgment of an event‘s 
―normality‖ (i.e., the judged degree of its occurrence in a given population) would reflect its 
capacity to evoke representations of similar events. In other words, according to Kahneman and 
Miller the easier it is for the individual to mentally simulate alternative ways to that event‘s 
occurrence (i.e., to produce post-outcome counterfactual thinking), the less normal, namely the 
less distributed, that event must be in the population of reference. Conversely, theorists foresaw 
that the more difficult it is to mentally simulate other ways in which an event could have 
occurred, the more normal (i.e., likely to happen) that event must be in the population of 
reference.  
Interestingly, Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland demonstrated that this capacity to evoke 
representations of similar events is influenced by the superficial format used to describe the 
probability of the event. In particular, authors showed, that the magnitude of the numbers used 
to express the probability of the event mattered, with smaller numbers prompting a higher 
degree of counterfactual alternatives than larger ones in the mind of the perceiver. They found, 
that participants did judge the probability of a given event as more normal (therefore more 
probable) when conveyed through smaller absolute numbers (which as a result were judged as 
less normal). In the studies, participants were required to express how suspicious they were that 
the occurrence of the improbable event described in the scenario- each study examined a 
different scenario- had happened by chance. Perceived suspiciousness showed to vary on the 
basis of the size (smaller/larger) of the numbers used in the ratios to communicate the event 
probability, despite the mathematical equivalence of these expressions. More precisely, in line 
with the normality hypothesis, participants gave higher rates of suspiciousness for the 
occurrence of an improbable event when its probability had been expressed through a ratio of 
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smaller numbers than when it had been expressed through a ratio of larger numbers (between-
subjects design). For instance, in Study 1, the scenario was, 
 
Imagine that you have a young child who loves chocolate chip cookies. Imagine further 
that you buy your cookies in packages that include oatmeal as well as chocolate chip cookies. 
Your child‟s practice is to go to the cookie jar and select the chocolate chip cookies, leaving the 
oatmeal ones to go stale. One day you think of a strategy to cope with the situation. You tell 
your child to close his eyes before he reaches into the jar, taking whichever cookie he grabs. He 
agrees to this and heads to the kitchen and the cookie jar. The jar contains 1(10) chocolate chip 
cookie(s) and 19(190) oatmeal cookies. Shortly, he comes back, exclaiming that he did just what 
you said and he selected a chocolate chip cookie. (Miller et al., Study 1, p. 583) 
 
 Participants expressed higher judgments of suspiciousness that the child in the scenario 
had peaked when he could successfully draw one of the favourite cookies from a jar if the latter 
had been described as containing 1 of the favourite cookies (and 19 of the non-preferred type) 
rather than 10 of the favourite cookies (and 190 of the non-preferred type), despite the 
equivalence of the proportions of the preferred biscuits in the two jars. Results can be read as 
showing, that people thought that the child‘s chance to have extracted one of the desired cookies 
without peeking was larger in the case of the urn containing 10 desired cookies out of 200 than 
in that of the urn containing 1 desired biscuit out of 20. Nevertheless, looking in detail at the 
experimental material, it must be noticed that participants‘ judgment did not actually refer to a 
ratio expression (e.g., 1 out of 20) where one of the two terms (i.e., the numerator) conveyed the 
instances of the event occurring (1, in the example) and the other (i.e., the denominator) the total 
number of possible events (e.g., 20). Rather, such evaluation had stemmed from an odd 
evaluation
15
. Actually, out of the five studies, only three (Study 3, 4, and 5) employed 
experiential stimuli asking participants to evaluate a ratio, while in the case of Study 1 and 2, 
the comparison between the absolute instances of the event occurring (e.g., 1) and those of the 
event not occurring (i.e., 19) was made explicitly salient. Thus, it could have been the case that 
the mental representations elicited in the two sub-groups of studies in Miller, Turnbull, and 
McFarland differed- three reasons supporting this affirmation are considered here below.  
First of all, the mental operation normally prompted when evaluating an odd could be a 
comparison between favourable and unfavourable chances (e.g., 1 against 19); instead, that 
prompted in the case of a ratio could reasonably be the comparison between the positive chance 
of the event occurring and the total of cases (e.g., 1 out of 20). Secondly, the two messages 
might differ in terms of the effort required to the reader to build up a comprehensive picture of 
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 ―1 chocolate chip cookie and 19 oatmeal cookies‖ is an odd expression. 
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the possible occurring outcomes and their respective chances. Indeed, while in the ―odd-
communication‖ version of the problem, people are explicitly given descriptions of both sides 
of the coin
16, in the ―ratio-communication‖ version only one of those descriptions is provided17. 
What these observations point at is, as Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole (1995) have observed in 
their article, that only the type of stimuli used in Study 3, 4, and 5 of Miller and colleagues‘ 
work can be considered as properly in line with later research on the Ratio-bias phenomenon 
(see 1.1.2). Thirdly, some other factors could intervene to influence the degree of suspiciousness 
for the unlikely event occurring that not necessarily would be involved in the probability 
assessment of the magnitude of the same probability. 
 
 
1.1.2 Experiential over rational system prevalence: Ratio-bias literature (CEST 
Theory) 
 Taking a start from the aim of proving experimentally the dual nature of their new 
information-processing system theory (Epstein and Pacini, 1999), research on the so-called 
―Ratio-bias effect‖ (Denes- Raj and Epstein, 1994) has been flourishing during all the nineties 
even independently from its original aims, up to the point to acquire a reason on its own. 
Indeed, the expression ―Ratio-bias” was coined by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994, p. 820) to 
refer to the systematic tendency to ―[...] judge the same probability of an unlikely event as lower 
when the probability is presented in the form of a ratio of smaller rather than of larger numbers‖ 
(for the first time described by Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland, 1989). The appearance of such 
systematic tendency has later been attested with written vignettes illustrating improbable 
outcomes (e.g., Alonso and Fernández-Berrocal, 2003; Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole, 1995), but 
mainly through a game of chance created for the specific purposes of the research (e.g., Denes-
Raj et al., 1995; Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992; Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a). Through the game, 
participants‘ choice between two options was demanded. Each option consisted in an urn 
containing balls in two colours (e.g., some white and some red), and described
18
 as offering a 
given numerical probability of winning (or losing) associated with the withdrawal of a ball of 
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As it will be highlighted throughout the next paragraph (i.e., 1.1.2), this happens in many stimuli 
employed in empirical studies under CEST approach. 
17
 An additional operation is required to those people who want to figure out the other ―side of the coin‖; 
in other words, imagining the complementary event to that described requires the person to compute the 
probability that the event will not occur, i.e. the difference between the total possibilities and those 
favourable to the event whose chances had been originally described. The requirement of additional 
mental operations could have significant consequences on the way the message is elaborated (depending 
on, for instance, participant‘s degree of motivation, her/his abilities to compute, or the amount of 
available time) hence this operation could be performed or not. This, in turn, will likely influence the 
answer given to the task. 
18
 If we exclude the only case where participants took part to the game in the laboratory (i.e. Kirkpatrick 
and Epstein, 1992, Study 3), in all other cases participants read a fictitious scenario describing the two 
options in written format. 
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one specific of the two colours (e.g., the red one). Alike in those other studies that have been 
classified as ―heuristic‖ problems (Reyna and Brainerd, 2008; for a distinction between 
―heuristic‖ and ―non-optimal‖ problems, see the same source), urns offered the same proportion 
of balls of either colour, but they differed in the total number of balls of each colour they 
contained, with one urn (described as the ―large‖ one, in some studies) displaying a larger 
number of balls than the other (the ―small‖ one). As an example of the typical game of chance 
proposed to participants, the following scenario illustrates: 
 
Imagine that someone is presented with two bowls of folded tickets. One bowl 
contains 1 ticket marked “winner” and 9 blank tickets. The other bowl contains 
10 tickets marked “winner” and 90 blank tickets. The person must draw one 
ticket (without peeking, of course) from either bowl: if he/she draws a ticket 
marked “winner” he/she wins $8.00, otherwise he/she wins nothing and the 
game is over. 
Even though the odds are identical for the two bowls, research shows that 
many people have a distinct preference as to which of these bowls they would 
rather draw from. Which bowl do you think most people choose in this 
situation? 
(Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992: Exp. 2, p. 539) 
 
As it is even openly remarked in the scenario, options in the problem offered an identical chance 
(.1) of withdrawing the target item. The rational answer would have been indifference toward 
the two urns, but that answer was generally achieved only when participants answered from 
their own point of view (i.e., ―self-perspective‖), or from the point of view of a ―completely 
logical person‖ (see Amsel, Close, Sadler, and Klaczynski, 2009; Epstein and Pacini, 2000-
2001). Instead, when answering from the point of view of ―the average person‖ (e.g., 
Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992) or in other words, of ―most people‖ (e.g., Denes-Raj, Epstein, 
and Cole, 1995; Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a), individuals tended to express a preference for the 
bowl offering a larger absolute number of winning tickets- in the example above, the 10/100 
one
19. Overall, findings supported Epstein and colleagues‘ predictions, as the self and logical 
perspectives always resulted in prompting a similar, mostly unbiased, answer (i.e., no 
preference between the two urns) while the others-perspective made the bias occurr (see Alonso 
and Fernández-Berrocal, 2003- for the heuristic pair; Denes-Raj et al., 1995- Study 3; Epstein 
                                                          
19 The device of eliciting people‘s choices according to multiple views had been adopted in this and other 
studies with the explicit aim of making the dissonance among people‘s thoughts evident, with choices 
made under the prevalence of the rational self mirrored in personal and logical person‘s choices, and 
those made under the prevalence of the actual self mirrored in other people‘s choices (because people 
would not feel the exigency of presenting themselves as rational, in the latter cases). 
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and Pacini, 2000-2001, for standard instructions- i.e., textual without visualisation ; Kirkpatrick 
and Epstein, 1992; Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a except the lose condition in self perspective).  
The interesting point is, why would people manifest a systematic irrational tendency to prefer 
the option whose probability of success is stated in ratios of larger numbers, to another option 
whose probability of success is, instead, stated in ratios of smaller numbers, despite having 
understood the two options mathematical equivalence? The explanation offered by scholars 
referred to the CEST (Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, Epstein, 1991, 1993, 2003) relating 
such bias to a prevalence of ―feelings‖ over ―reasoning‖. On the basis of study participants‘ 
feedback after the task completion, authors described the bias as resulting from the rational 
understanding of the mathematic equivalence of the options in the scenarios, but at the same 
time the subjective (experiential) feeling that the odds described by the ―large‖ urn were more 
favourable than those described by the ―small‖ one20(e.g., Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992). CEST 
is the ―dual process‖ theory comprehensively developed by Epstein, such theory, in line with 
the other so-called ―dual system‖ approaches in judgement and decision making (e.g., Chaiken 
and Trope, 1999; Kahneman and Friederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996) assumed the existence of two 
alternating modes of thinking, an experiential and a rational one
21
. The attributes of the two 
system, listed in Table 1 as reported by Epstein (2003), can be summarised in author‘s words as: 
operating ―in a manner that is preconscious, automatic, rapid, effortless, holistic, concrete, 
associative, primarily nonverbal, and minimally demanding of cognitive resources‖ (Epstein, 
2003, p. 5) for what concerns the experiential system, and operating ―in a manner that is 
conscious, analytical, effortful, relatively slow, affect-free, and highly demanding of cognitive 
resources‖ for what concerns the rational system (Epstein, 2003, p. 6). The two systems, 
operating in parallel and sometimes interacting, would not always be synchronous, but 
occasionally would let their inherent qualities become apparent to people, who instead normally 
are only aware of what appears to them to be a single process. According to authors, when the 
experiential system becomes robustly engaged and prevails on the rational one (either because 
the latter did not intervene to correct possible dissonant tendencies, or because, despite 
intervening, the appropriate rule to the situation had been bypassed, or instead could not be 
retrieved), Ratio-bias would occur. A more detailed description of the principles determining the 
irrational tendency is contained in the section above. 
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 Indeed, authors (e.g., Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a) considered that commonly experienced contradictory 
sensation whose arousal is spontaneous and hard to contrast as a clear evidence for the existence of the 
two distinct ways of information- processing inside the same person hypothesised under CEST (i.e., 
experiential and rational ways of information-processing). 
21
 Contrary to the mainstream trend in dual theories considering the rational system as more advanced 
than the experiential one, and similarly to Fuzzy-Trace Theory (see, e.g., Reyna and Brainerd, 2008), 
under CEST the experiential system had been described as having a much longer evolutionary history 
than the rational system, and as such as not essentially flawed (see, instead, e.g., Chaiken and Trope, 
1999, Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996).  
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Table 1 
Comparison of the experiential and rational system attributes (Epstein, 2003) 
 
 
Features of the experiential system causing Ratio-bias 
Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole (1995) explained the bias as due to two attributes of the 
experiential system, i.e., the ―concretive principle‖, and the ―small-numbers effect‖; a third 
facet, the ―affirmative-representation principle‖, was further added to their theoretical 
explanation to account for people‘s choice behaviour when a negative outcome was involved 
(Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a). For what concerns the first principle, in authors‘ words (p. 307), 
―[…] the experiential system encodes and better comprehends numerosity than ratios because 
single numbers are more concrete than relations between numbers‖. Thus, the concretive 
principle would be responsible for people‘s strong tendency to be overly influenced by absolute 
numbers rather than by ratios, because of their more concretive nature (congruent with the 
concrete way in which experiential system would represent information). This facet is in line 
with what foreseen by the numerosity heuristic (Pelham, Sumarta, and Myakovsky, 1994), 
Experiential system Rational system 
1. Holistic responding  1. Analytic responding  
2. Automatic, effortless processing  2. Intentional, effortful processing  
3. Affective processing: Pleasure- or pain-
oriented (what feels good or bad)  
3. Logical processing: Reason-oriented (what is 
rational)  
4. Associative connections  4. Logical connections  
5. Encoding of reality in concrete images, 
metaphors, and narratives  
5. Encoding of reality in abstract symbols, 
words, and numbers  
6. More rapid processing: Oriented toward 
immediate action  
6. Slower processing: Oriented toward delayed 
action  
7. Slower, more difficult changes: Changes with 
repetitive or intense experience  
7. More rapid, easier changes: Changes with  
strength of argument and new evidence  
8. More crudely differentiated constructs: 
Broad generalization gradient, stereotypical 
thinking  
8. More highly differentiated constructs  
9. More crudely integrated and less coherent 
networks: Dissociative, emotional complexes; 
context-specific processing 
9. More highly integrated and coherent 
networks: Context-general principles  
10. Passive and preconscious experience of 
events: We are seized by our emotions  
10. Active and conscious experience of events: 
We are in control of our thoughts  
11. Self-evident validity: “Experiencing is 
believing”  
11. Need of justification via logic and evidence  
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according to which people attribute a judgment of quantity (or probability) to a stimulus on the 
basis of the number of units into which the stimulus is divided, without completely taking into 
account determinant variables like the size of the units. In the case of Ratio-bias, the tendency to 
focus on absolute numbers rather than ratios could have lead participants to perceive the 
probability as higher when presented in larger rather than smaller numbers, as individuals would 
concentrate mainly on numerators (10 > 1) without taking enough account of the reference 
population out of which their value is expressed (100, 10). 
In the second principle posited by scholars (i.e., the small-numbers effect) it is assumed, that the 
experiential system comprehends smaller numbers better than larger ones, because the former 
are more concrete than the latter, in the sense they are easier to visualize, a conventional test of 
concreteness (Paivio, 1991). Advocates of the CEST explanation (e.g., Pinto-Prades, Martinez-
Perez, and Abellán-Perpiñán, 2006) had been again called Pelham and others (1994)‘ findings 
upon as proofs in favour of the fact that probability conveyed in (comparatively) smaller 
numbers would be easier to interpret than that in (comparatively) larger numbers. In such an 
experiment, participants were required to express their preferences for one out of two lotteries: 
one where all individuals received one ticket or one in which all individuals received 10 tickets. 
Results indicated that people had a preference for the ―large‖ lottery (the one where they 
received 10 tickets) if they were told the number of participants was 1 million, but they did not 
show preferences for either lottery if the number of participants they were communicated was 
only two people. It appeared as when the lottery was described through lower numbers ―they 
(could) better realize that the chances are the same in both lotteries‖ (Pinto-Prades et al., 2006, 
p. 120).  
For what concerned the third principle of the experiential system responsible for Ratio-bias, 
instead, some actual evidences exist in support of their authors‘ explanation. That principle 
would explicate people‘s behaviour in those situations where a negative event is involved (e.g., 
the possibility to lose some money in association to the withdrawal of a red jellybean, in the 
case of the game of chance). In such instances, authors affirmed, that people would normally 
reverse their focus of attention compared with those situations involving a positive outcome- in 
the study of Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992), a large number of participants reading a scenario 
entailing losses, indeed, reported to have focused on the desirable white jellybeans rather than 
on the undesirable red ones during the decisional process. Authors claimed this shift of attention 
would happen for in general affirmation is more concrete than negation: ―[…] the experiential 
system can more easily encode positive representations (e.g. drawing a desirable white 
jellybean) than negative ones (e.g., not drawing an undesirable red jellybean)‖ (Pacini and 
Epstein, 1999-a, p. 310).  
Furthermore, Pacini and Epstein also suggested and tested a supplementary effect (i.e., 
―the experiential-learning principle‖) which induces people to judge the numerical probability 
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of events occurrence from the representations encoded in the experiential system, namely 
generalisations from past emotionally significant experiences (Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992). 
For instance, authors argued, that because life is full of experiences in which, when facing the 
probability of ―1 in a large number‖ of a given event, that event does not occur in fact (e.g., 
statistics on winnings at the lottery), people might have learned to classify the corresponding 
expressions as conveying the probability of an event that rarely takes place. Hence, people 
would judge the probability in an ―1 in X‖ format (where X is a sufficiently large number) as 
smaller than the equivalent one conveyed in ratios of larger numbers (i.e., a format not making 
use of small numbers like 1 in the numerator). This principle is of particular relevance for the 
empirical work that will be illustrated in the present dissertation, hence it will receive further 
attention, especially in the conclusive chapter.  
The mechanisms through which the three principles illustrated would interact to produce the 
Ratio-bias effect have been elucidated with clarity under the CEST theory, and will be reviewed 
in the following section. 
 
Outcome valence, probability value, and effect intensity 
 The two main latent facets of the experiential system (i.e., the concretive principle and the 
small-number effect) have been described by authors as always operating conjunctively, but at 
the same time their visible responses are depicted as determined by their net effect (Pacini and 
Epstein, 1999-a). In particular, when related to a positive outcome (e.g., winning something), 
for low probabilities (e.g., 10%) both principles would work in the same direction inducing 
people to favour the large urn over the small one, as in the former target items have a 
numerosity advantage in the large urn- i.e., a greater number of winning balls is contained- plus, 
coherently with the small number effect, the associated probability format would convey less 
clearly for the experiential system the idea of a low probability than the one associated to the 
small urn. On the contrary, for high probabilities (e.g., 90%), the two facets would pull in 
opposite directions, with the large urn favoured by the numerosity principle, while the 
description of the small urn more clearly transmitting the idea of a high probability of the event 
occurrence (Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a). When related to a negative outcome (e.g. losing 
something), the effect would reverse, in line with the shifted focus of attention (i.e., the risk of 
drawing a jellybean of the undesired colour equals to the complementary probability of drawing 
a jellybean of the desired colour), thus determining a weak bias in favour of selecting the large 
urn when the event probability is low (e.g., 10%), and a strong Ratio-bias effect when the event 
probability is high (e.g., 90%). These assumptions on people‘s tendencies were tested in an 
experimental study (Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a) that adopted the urn and balls game of chance, 
with participants assigned either to a positive (win) or to a negative (lose) condition, and the 
probability of withdrawing a red ball (10-30-50-70-90%) was varied within-subjects. As an 
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example, the 30% condition read: ―Consider a condition in which there are 30% red jellybeans 
in both trays. That is, there are 3 red jellybeans and 7 white jellybeans in the small tray, and 
there are 30 red jellybeans and 70 white jellybeans in the large tray‖ (Pacini and Epstein, 1999-
a, p. 314). Participants asked from which tray they (and most people) would prefer to select a 
jellybean (small/ large/ no preference) generally confirmed the bias in others-perspective, with 
the relationship between probability magnitude and size of the effect represented by a negative 
linear trend in win conditions. Ratio-bias effect was significant for probability values of 10, 30 
and 50%. A positive linear trend was found, instead, in lose conditions. Ratio-bias effect was 
significant for probability values of 50, 70, and 90%. Despite from a self-perspective the effect 
showed the same trend, differences in people‘s declared choices did not reach significance for 
most probability levels in win conditions, but they did reach it in lose conditions, with a 
significant preference for the option stated through ratios of large numbers for probability 
values of 50, 70, and 90% (Pacini and Epstein, 1999-a).  
 
 
1.1.3 Denominator neglect as an inclusion illusion: Fuzzy-trace theory 
 The paternity of the discovery of those tendencies that like Ratio-bias are due to a 
neglect of the denominator, has been openly claimed by theorists of the ―Fuzzy-trace‖ approach: 
―The ratio-bias phenomenon is a rediscovery of the same phenomenon that occupied researchers 
in the probability judgment literature beginning in the 1970‘s (for the most recent review of that 
literature, see Reyna and Brainerd, 1994)‖ (Reyna and Brainerd, 2008, p. 95). That 
phenomenon, generally dubbed ―denominator neglect‖ 22, refers to, in Okan, Garcia-Retamero, 
Cokely, and Maldonado (in press, p. 6)‘s words, ―people‘s tendency to pay too much attention 
to numerators in ratios (i.e. the number of times a target event has happened) and insufficient 
attention to denominators (i.e. the overall opportunities for it to happen; Reyna, 2004; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2008)‖. 
 Similarly to CEST (and other dual-process theories), Fuzzy-Trace Theory of reasoning, 
or the ―New Intuitionism‖ as its founders have sometimes defined it (e.g., Reyna, 2004; Reyna 
and Brainerd, 1995) postulated the existence of two parallel modes of representing information
23
 
about the world in memory, namely, a vague qualitative intuitive gist-based one and a detailed 
quantitative verbatim one. Under this approach, though, it is further maintained that people have 
a preference for reasoning and performing decisions on the basis of the vague gist of 
information even in those cases in which verbatim (e.g., quantitative) detail of the it is 
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 Or ―numerosity effect‖ as dubbed by Reyna and Brainerd (2008, p. 96). 
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 In opposition with most dual theories of reasoning and decision making, but similarly to CEST theory, 
intuitive thinking is generally considered a) more advanced than rational thinking under this approach, 
and b) more typical of adult age than of childhood, and c) characteristic of experts rather than novices 
(Reyna and Brainerd, 1994). 
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remembered. More precisely, individuals would normally favour to operate as closely as 
possible on categorical gist, namely, on the least precise representation that can be used to 
accomplish the task at hand. The logic of this preference would reside in its ―economical‖ 
nature ―[…] from an evolutionary perspective, in that many routine tasks requires only a fuzzy 
representation‖ (Wolfe, 1995, p. 86). Indeed, as Wolfe précised, ―Just because subjects can 
discriminate differing quantities, and can act on those discriminations, it does not follow that 
problems are invariably solved by processing information at the highest possible resolution‖ 
(Wolfe, 1995, p. 86). According to authors under this approach, the explanation of Ratio-bias 
would reside exactly on the fuzzy processing preference just described. Ratio-bias would be 
nothing else than a reasoning error occurring from the wrong comparison of numerical parts to 
numerical wholes (Brainerd and Reyna, 1990; Reyna, 1991), likewise the other problems 
defined as ―inclusion illusions‖ (e.g., base-rate neglect, the conjunction and disjunction fallacy, 
or overestimation of small probabilities). Indeed, Reyna (quoted in Barbey and Sloman, 2007, p. 
258) observed that ―problems in the inclusion illusions family have two-dimensional structures, 
with one dimension (the subset-subset) being salient and easy to process and the other (the 
subset-superordinate set), which is crucial to solution, being obscure‖. Denominator neglect 
would be a product of the structure of information, as ―processing focuses on the subset 
mentioned in the question, the superordinate set recedes, and the question appears to involve 
nothing more than...a subset-subset comparison.‖ Because of the nature of the structure, indeed, 
―Subsets disappear whenever the mind focuses on the superordinate set and the superordinate 
set disappears whenever the mind focuses on the subsets‖ (Reyna, 1991, p. 325). 
In the original version of the prototypical task used to study ―inclusion illusions‖ (i.e., 
Piaget‘s class-inclusion problem, see Piaget and Inhelder, 1951/1975), children until the age of 
ten (and adults in some cases) offered a display of seven cows and three horses and asked to 
report whether there were more cows or more animals in the display, generally erroneously 
indicated cows as more numerous. Those authors supporting the Fuzzy-Trace Theory of 
reasoning maintained the effect being created by overlapping classes as a ―minor mental book-
keeping confusion rather than a fundamental flaw in reasoning and memory‖ (Reyna and 
Brainerd, 2008, p. 95). This new view contrasted with both what theorist of information-
processing had been arguing (i.e., that people‘s difficulty resides in general human working 
memory limitations), and with what Piaget and neo-Piagetians had been claiming about 
children‘s reasoning skills on the task (i.e., this type of errors would be due to a lack of logical 
competence). Indeed, findings have been brought which demonstrated, that children are able of 
grasping both the roles of numerator and denominator, and can perform a combination of both 
information in probability judgments (e.g., Acredolo, O‘ Connor, Banks, and Horobin, 1989; 
Offenbach, Gruen, and Caskey, 1984, cited in Reyna and Brainerd, 2008); therefore, the logical 
deficit hypothesis could be discharged. On the other hand, proofs of an absolute independency 
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of the occurrence of the bias from memory capacity both in adults and in children (Brainerd and 
Knigma, 1985) made it possible to reject the memory dimension claim.  
 
Some empirical evidences in Fuzzy-Trace theory: Developmental studies 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory was informed to a great extent by developmental studies on 
probability judgment. Three of such studies will be described here.  
In the study by Fischbein, Pampu, and Manzat (1970), six out of the eighteen trials employed 
involved the comparison between options whose probabilities were equivalent despite being 
expressed by means of numerators and denominators of different magnitudes. Participants (i.e., 
preschooler children) were presented with two sets (―boxes‖) of marbles in two colours (target 
and non-target). The proportions of target and non-target balls was the same for both sets, but 
the overall quantity of balls differed in the two cases, with one set having a higher numerosity 
than the other. This game of chance is very similar to CEST game of chance. Participants had to 
indicate which option (set) they believed offered the greatest chance of drawing a marble of the 
target colour. Sets could either be comparatively ―small‖ (i.e., 2/4 vs. 1/2; 3/1 vs. 6/2; 4/2 vs. 
2/1) or ―large‖ (4/8 vs. 2/4; 6/2 vs. 12/4, 8/4 vs. 4/2). Authors could compare participants‘ 
performance in Ratio-bias-type pairs (same probability in the options) with that in the other 
pairs (different probability in the options): results indicated a higher number of uncorrected 
answers (i.e., below average) in the Ratio-bias-type pairs than in the others. Such higher degree 
of errors was explained in terms of the perceptual difference between the two boxes in the 
Ratio-bias-type pairs, one of which offered more target instances than the other (in absolute 
terms)
24
. Probably, participants instinctively draw a representation of the problem akin to the 
following: ―urn A contains more winning balls than urn B‖, which would then translate in a 
choice of the larger urn (A), in line with the Ratio-bias effect.  
 The second study informing Fuzzy-Trace Theory that is described here (i.e., Acredolo, 
O' Connor, Banks, and Horobin, 1989), originated in the consideration that Hoemann and Ross 
(1982)‘ attribution to children of a lack of those abilities necessary to perform correct fraction 
calculations before the formal operation period could instead be the result of the methodology 
used by authors to assess those abilities. Such methodology, i.e., Piaget and Inhelder ―choice 
paradigm‖ (1951/1975), consisted in asking children to choose between one out of two jars 
containing a mixture of target and nontarget items on the basis of the best chance of getting a 
target item on a random draw. In Acredolo and colleagues‘ view, such procedure was either 
incapable of detecting children‘s accurate employment of those skills, or could have 
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 Nevertheless, results of this study should be taken with caution remembering that they were obtained 
under three rather different conditions. For instance, in one case the three possible answers, i.e. left box, 
right box, or same chance in either boxes, were three and the participant‘s performance was reinforced 
after each trial; in another case, the necessity to estimate the chance of winning by relying on something 
else than the number of target cases was emphasized.  
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discouraged the use of such abilities while instead prompting alternative decision rules, like 
simply comparing relative numerators. When a different methodology was adopted, i.e., 
Anderson‘s Functional measurement procedure or information integration technique (Anderson, 
1980), Acredolo and colleagues could show that children in fact possess the capacity to 
integrate two relevant stimulus dimensions in order to evaluate a third one. That methodology, 
originally used by its developer for other purposes, was adapted to demonstrate that even 
concrete operational children have an excellent quantitative grasp of the roles of numerators and 
denominators (and the way they should combine) in probability judgments. More precisely, in 
the first study presented by Acredolo and colleagues, children had to estimate on a simple visual 
non-numeric scale the probability of drawing a target jellybean from a bag containing either 1, 
2, or 3 jellybeans of that colour and a total of 6, 8 or 10 jellybeans (they were exposed to each of 
the combinations of numerator and denominator across three replica). Results returned correctly 
ordered distribution of estimates by participants, demonstrating that children took into account 
both variations in the numerators and in the denominators: ―with denominators held constant, 
higher estimates were assigned as the number of target items increased, and with numerators 
held constant, lower estimates were assigned as the total number of items increased. An 
appropriate multiplicative integration of cues was observed in the experiment‖ (Acredolo et al., 
1989, pp. 936-937). Nevertheless, children demonstrated to be more influenced by variations in 
numerator than by variations in denominator. Such result could be nonetheless attributed to the 
nature of the task, given that numerator changes had been made very salient relative to changes 
in denominator. Therefore, a second study was ideated to correct for possible problems, by 1) 
giving equal salience to numerators and denominators, i.e., making them vary randomly across 
trials; 2) offering a larger selection of numerators and denominators values so that more critical 
cases were present in which the ratio with larger numerator had actually a lower probability (in 
this cases, the absence of errors would have confirmed that children were influenced by both 
numerator and denominator). In the computer-administered task, displays of planters were 
presented containing (2, 3, 4, or 5) flowerpots and(6, 8, or 10) pots in total; children had to 
assess the probability of a bug falling on a pot containing a flower. The evaluated probability 
was expressed on a continuous visual scale similarly to the first study. Results confirmed that 
children responded to changes in both numerator and denominator, showing even a more 
appropriate weight of both values than in the previous experiment: the majority of participants 
integrated those quantities at least additively, with a large number of them even 
multiplicatively
25
.  
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 Analyzing children‘s performance on those displays presenting fractions (3/6, 4/8, 5/10) whose true 
probabilities were equivalent (= .5) shows higher probability in two out of the three cases, i.e. rather for 
5/10 than for 3/6 (t(59) = 2.35, p < .05), and for 4/8 rather than for 3/6 (t(59) = 2.60, p < .05), but not for 
5/10 than for 4/8 (n.s.). In these types of displays, whose paired comparisons are similar to the between 
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A further demonstration that children hold the capacities to assess probabilities 
considering both values at the numerator and at the denominator in an exact way (despite 
sometimes not showing those capacities in their performance) has been provided in the 
unpublished study by Callahan (1989). Author employed grouped trials of two-choice problems 
presented in a computer task: young participants had to decide from which of two buckets 
holding different quantities of two visually different types of balls (i.e., target and nontarget) 
they wanted to select in order to obtain the best chance of drawing a target (i.e., winning) ball. 
Author proved that the majority of younger children used an ―Only Winner‖ strategy, in other 
words either a ―Most Winners‖ strategy (i.e., they considered only the winner balls in each 
bucket, and selected the bucket offering the higher number of those independently from the 
proportion of winner to loser balls) or a ―Fewest Winners‖ strategy (they considered only the 
winner balls in each bucket and selected the one offering the lower number of those, a result 
difficult to explain). Therefore, children tended to focus on what could be considered the 
relevant part of the information displayed to them, i.e., the value at the numerator of the ratio. 
Nevertheless, the strategy sophistication was related to age with older children displaying less 
confusion and using (correct) proportional reasoning to a greater degree than younger ones. This 
finding about children‘s tendency to focus on the value at the numerator is completely in line 
with the concept of denominator neglect mentioned above for Fuzzy-Trace Theory. 
 
Robust denominator neglect in the evaluation of health-related outcomes 
(Yamagishi, 1997-a) 
 Fuzzy-Trace Theory has been argued as explaining also Yamagishi (1997-a)‘s results. 
Yamagishi studied probability perception of health outcomes expressed through frequencies 
with the purpose of investigating an implication from the results of other two studies he 
performed in 1994 (Yamagishi, 1994-a, -b). In the experiment of 1997-a, participants were 
asked to evaluate the mortality rates of well-known causes of death (see Yamagishi, 1994-a, -b) 
expressed in frequencies, varying both the magnitude of the population frame (Range: Wide, out 
of 10,000; or Narrow, out of 100) and the percentage incidence rate (Frequency: Smaller or 
Larger) within-subjects. The four conditions resulting from the experimental design- all 11 
negative events expressed in SW (Smaller frequency Wide range, e.g., 1,286 in 10,000), LW 
(Larger frequency Wide Range, e.g., 2,414 per 10,000 people), SN (Smaller frequency Narrow 
range, e.g., 12, 86 in 100), and LN (Larger frequency Narrow Range, e.g. 24, 14 in 100) 
formats- were accessed in four separate sessions 7 days apart one from the other.  
Results showed that ratings of risk (―How risky this appear to you?‖) on a 26-point Likert scale 
whose extremes were labelled as ―no risk at all‖ and ―maximal possible risk‖ were 
                                                                                                                                                                          
presentation of Ratio-Bias problems in single evaluation, reliance on the magnitude of numerators to 
estimate probabilities is detected as more prevalent than in others displays.  
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systematically greater in LW than in SW conditions, that in turn were greater than those in LN 
conditions, to end with the lowest evaluations for ratios of SN conditions. The phenomenon 
appeared to be robust as was present across mortality causes (p < 0.05, for 7 out of 11 causes) - 
see Table 2. When performing separate pair wise comparisons, in many cases the irrationality of 
participants‘ judgments resulted surprising when considered from the pure statistical point of 
view. For example, it appeared that cancer was rated as riskier when described as ―killing 1,286 
out of 10,000 people‖ than as ―killing 24.14 out of 100 people‖, despite the first probability is in 
fact exactly half as big as the second one.  
Yamagishi‘ s findings, in line with a total neglect of denominator, have been explained 
by the author with the combination of two cognitive mechanisms, i.e., the concurrent sensitivity 
to the rote frequency and the insensitivity to the total number expressed in the magnitude of the 
population frame, as manifestations of ―anchoring and adjustment‖ and ―base-rate neglect‖, 
respectively. As a consequence of the first tendency, people would start their assessment with a 
given reference point (i.e., anchor) suggested by the formulation of the problem (i.e., plausibly, 
the integer number of deaths), and would then adjust its evaluation until a plausible estimate is 
reached. However, the adjustment would tend to be insufficient (namely, not to take enough 
count of the denominator) because of its effortful nature, thus would stop once a plausible 
solution is found (Epley and Gilovich, 2006). Instead, as a consequence of the second tendency, 
i.e., base-rate neglect (Khaneman and Tversky, 1973), people would ―[…] underutilize relevant 
information about population statistics [reference statistics] and instead over utilize other salient 
information [the number of deaths per year] (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973)‖ (Yamagishi, 
1997-a, p. 497; information in squared brackets by the writer).  
As claimed by Price and Matthews (2009, p. 445) these results could be also ascribed to 
―the amount of attention drawn to the denominator versus the numerator of the relevant ratio‖ 
(p. 445). Indeed it has to be noted that in Yamagishi‘ s study, participants were informed about 
the denominator (or base rate) at the beginning of the session only. The instructions read as 
follows, ―Shown below is a list of causes of death. For each cause, the number of people who 
die of the particular cause is estimated. The estimation is the number of deaths per 100 people in  
the public every year. For each cause, please rate how risky it appears to you.‖ As suggested by 
Reyna and Brainerd (e.g., 2008), when including the members of a smaller category (e.g., 
people expected to die) in a larger category (e.g., people exposed to a disease) is inherently 
difficult, the numerator would be easily remembered and processed, while the denominator 
would be neglected. The lack of repetition of the denominator in Yamagishi‘ s study may have 
affected participants‘ judgments, giving rise to the denominator neglect effect.  
Finally, the last feature of the study making an extension of its results hard for the case at study 
in the present thesis (i.e., Down syndrome), is the absence of a weight for the possible influence 
of the severity of the cause on probability evaluation, a feature that will instead be controlled in 
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the experimental studies presented in the present work. Because of that, in Yamagishi‘ study it 
is not possible to completely rule out an explanation in terms of diverse weight attributed by 
participants to the different lethal events.  
 
Table 2 
Mean perceived probability for the 11 death causes according to each of the 4 within-
subjects exp. conditions in Yamagishi (1997-a) 
 
  
 Ratio condition  
Death causes LW SW LN SN F 
Asthma 459[/10,000] 
5.62 
87[/10,000] 
3.95 
4.59[/100] 
3.00 
0.87[/100] 
3.13 12.37*** 
Bronchitis 524[/10,000] 
6.52 
107[/10,000] 
4.90 
5.24[/100] 
3.63 
1.07[/100] 
3.60 14.04*** 
Cancer 2,414[/10,000] 
12.21 
1,286[/10,000] 
10.79 
24.14[/100] 
8.69 
12.86[/100] 
8.19 14.66** 
Heart diseases 2,394[/10,000] 
11.75 
1,512[/10,000] 
11.35 
23.94[/100] 
8.33 
15.12[/100] 
8.31 13.90*** 
HIV 1,255[/10,000] 
10.02 
735[/10,000] 
9.35 
12.55[/100] 
7.33 
7.35[/100] 
6.73 13.12*** 
Homicide 1,373[/10,000] 
10.23 
487[/10,000] 
7.25 
13.73[/100] 
6.69 
4.87[/100] 
6.13 18.80*** 
Influenza 585[/10,000] 
6.02 
141[/10,000] 
4.77 
5.85[/100] 
3.44 
1.41[/100] 
3.33 10.38*** 
MVA 1,798[/10,000] 
10.81 
893[/10,000] 
8.37 
17.98[/100] 
7.88 
8.93[/100] 
7.81 8.69*** 
Pneumonia 755[/10,000] 
6.44 
196[/10,000] 
4.33 
7.55[/100] 
3.90 
1.96[/100] 
3.85 14.17*** 
Suicide 930[/10,000] 
7.15 
376[/10,000] 
5.65 
9.30[/100] 
4.85 
3.76[/100] 
4.61 10.19*** 
Tuberculosis 590[/10,000] 
5.60 
157[/10,000] 
4.12 
5.90[/100] 
3.58 
1.57[/100] 
3.77 8.07*** 
             *** p=.001, **p=.05 
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Denominator neglect in the evaluation of safety in oral contraceptive use (Halpern, 
Blackman, and Salzman, 1989) 
 A further study supporting denominator-neglect is that of Halpern, Blackman, and 
Salzman (1989). They investigated probability perception of a side-effect associated with oral 
contraceptive use (i.e., death due to a circulatory disorder- ―abnormal blood clotting, heart 
attack, and stroke due to haemorrhage‖, ibid., p. 255). The numerical risk was presented in six 
different formats between-subjects: four base-rate information formats- i) frequencies (―1 in 
12,000 die‖), (ii) natural frequencies framed in a positive format (―99,991.7 out of 100,000 will 
not die‖), (iii) natural frequencies framed in a negative format (―8,3 out of 100,000 die‖), (iv) 
percentages (―.0083% probability of dying‖)- and two relative information formats - (v) relative 
ratio (―4.15 times greater risk of death‖) and (vi) relative percentages (―415% greater risk of 
death‖). All formats conveyed an equivalent numerical information. Formats differed, apart 
from in being either positively or negatively framed, also in that the last two (compared to the 
other four) did not convey base-rate information. In other words, for the last two it was not 
possible to calculate the expected frequency of occurrence of the event described. Participants 
were asked to express the probability of the side-effect occurring relative to the probability of 
11 other events (e.g., dying of the flu, getting divorced, bus collision with a train, having an 
appendectomy) on 7-point Likert scales whose extremes where ―death due to circulatory 
disorder much less likely than this one‖ and ―death due to circulatory disorder much more likely 
than this one‖. Researchers supposed that people would experience difficulties both in 1) 
evaluating a base-rate information format, given that it ―conveys little that is meaningful and 
useful because consumers have no first-hand experience with base-rates of this magnitude as 
they cannot detect the incidence of such low-probability events‖ (Halpern, Blackman, and 
Salzman, 1989, p. 253), and 2) in assessing a relative information format, due to its intrinsically 
ambiguous nature. Due to those reasons, they predicted that ―oral contraceptive safety 
assessments would be determined by the absolute size of the number presented- the only 
interpretable information left when you disregard the information format‖ (Halpern, Blackman, 
and Salzman, 1989, p. 253). In other words, they expected that, not differently from what had 
been described in Yamagishi (1997-a), people would have put in execution a rule of thumb 
according to which 1) they would have ignored the format in which the numerator was 
embedded, and 2) they would have simply estimated its magnitude in a fuzzy way (i.e., a 
classification of the kind of, for instance, ―small‖ for numbers lower than 10 and ―large‖ for 
numbers higher than several hundred). Results corroborated authors‘ hypothesis in that 1) when 
the base-rate information was given, events were systematically perceived as less probable than 
when such information was not given (i.e., in the case of a relative format); moreover, 2) people 
ignored the difference between the two relative formats, focusing as expected on the absolute 
magnitude of the numbers (415 > 4,15). Both findings went in the direction of a neglect of the 
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information contained (explicitly or implicitly) in the denominator. Nevertheless, the specific 
hypothesis formulated on the evaluations of two of the formats, i.e., i) and iii) that are expressed 
in ratio between smaller and larger numbers (the hypothesis read, ―Because differences between 
very large numbers are difficult to comprehend, respondents attend to the more meaningful and 
smaller foreground numbers in assessing safety. Thus, when confronted with risk information in 
the format ―X out of Y occurrences‖, respondents will focus on the smaller, more meaningful, 
and more salient X on foreground number and will tend to ignore Y, the large background 
number‖- Halpern et al., 1989, p. 254) was not confirmed. No significant difference in the 
perception was detected for 1 in 12,000 and 8, 3 in 100,000. Thus, there was no specific 
confirmation of the denominator neglect in these two experimental conditions. 
Unfortunately, results are not directly applicable to the context examined in the present thesis, 
as, indeed, participants were not required an absolute evaluation of the probability of the side-
effect occurrence, rather an assessment relative to their evaluation of other (eleven) death 
causes. This meaning, that since the evaluation of such other death causes had not been assessed 
(and indeed it is expected to show wide variance among participants), data did not allow a direct 
comparison between individuals‘ assessments of target risks of similar magnitude , as in fact 
each of them refers to a different (not weighted) comparison. 
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1.2 Other Interpretations 
 
1.2.1 Pseudo-multiplicity: Perceived Diversity Heuristics 
A different explanation of people‘s preference (in positive domain) for the option whose 
probability is stated by means of a ratio between larger rather than smaller numbers, has been 
given under a theoretical framework called Perceived Diversity Heuristics (PDH, Ayal and 
Zakay, 2009). The primary interest of such an approach was that of offering an explanation for 
the advantageous naïf behaviour showed by individuals when evaluating the risk of a pool of 
goods. Indeed, in most of the cases, they prove to ―know‖ (despite having no conscience of it) a 
specific normative way to decrease the risk associated with groups of events, thus revealing an 
intuitive understanding of ―portfolio theory‖ (Coombs, 1975; Markowitz, 1952). Portfolio 
theory is a formal account advising investors to reduce the risk connected with their action by 
means of diversifying the sources of investment trough the combination of different stocks in 
the same portfolio. In such a way, indeed, this way a poor performance in one field can be offset 
by better performance in others. 
Ayal and Zakay argued, that in their actual behaviour people attempt to implement 
portfolio theory. However, beside these so called ―normative paths‖ corresponding to situations 
in which the activation of the Perceived Diversity Heuristics would be justified because it 
corresponds to a real diversity, pseudo-paths can also be present. While the first group of paths 
(the normative ones) leads to an adaptive judgment of risk reduction, the second group (pseudo-
paths) leads to a pseudo- diversification bias (see below). Pseudo-paths are created by the 
identification of dimensions (i.e., pseudo-distinctiveness and/ or pseudo-multiplicity) which do 
not affect the measures of distributions of prospective outcomes that decision-makers should 
compare, i.e., the actual variance or the expected utility of the pool. Perceived distinctiveness 
(which can be influenced by multiple dimensions, e. g., the degree of similarity or the physical 
distance among the sources), regards the degree to which goods in the pool are perceived to be 
different one form another, while perceived multiplicity (which can be manipulated 
quantitatively), regards the number of sources of the pool.  
Under PDH, pseudo-diversification is deemed as the cause of Ratio-bias (see the 
parallelism with the concept of numerosity heuristic in Pelham, Sumarta, and Myakovsky, 
1994). In games of chance, people would choose the larger of two urns offering the same 
probability of success because the numerator in the ratio would be erroneously perceived as a 
source of greater multiplicity (i.e., a range of pseudo-diverse sources) when such probability is 
expressed in (comparatively) larger rather than smaller numbers. Due to this reason, ―the Ratio-
bias could therefore be reinterpreted as an illusion of risk reduction that leads to pseudo-
diversity bias‖ (Ayal and Zakay, 2009, p. 560).  
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Study 1C is the only study in the paper employing a problem that is somehow comparable to the 
classic game of chance of CEST. Three scenarios described a highly, a moderate, and a non-
diversified lottery offering possibility/ies of winning a single car or more than one car (Ayal and 
Zakay, 2009). Lottery A (the ―highly diversified lottery‖) was described as follows, ―10 prize 
cars (4 Volvo S-80s, 3 Toyota Corollas, 3 Honda Civics) will be raffled among 100,000 
costumers‖; Lottery B (the ―moderately diversified lottery‖) was described as follows, ―10 prize 
cars (10 Volvo S-80s) will be raffled among 100,000 costumers‖; and description of Lottery C 
(the ―nondiversified lottery‖) read, ―1 prize cars (Volvo S-80s) will be raffled among 10,000 
costumers.‖ Despite two of the three lotteries (i.e., B and C) were equivalent from a normative 
point of view because they offered the same outcome (i.e., the possibility of winning a Volvo S-
80 car) with the same probability (0.1), they differed in the superficial presentation of the 
probability in two respects, namely 1) the format of the ratio expressing it, and 2) the degree of 
elicited diversity.  
For what concerned the first point, one probability was stated using a ratio employing larger 
numbers (i.e., 10 in 100,000, or ―large lottery‖ hereafter) while the other using a ratio 
employing smaller numbers (i.e., 1 in 10,000, or ―small lottery‖ hereafter); regarding the second 
point, the large lottery offered 10 possible prizes (10 Volvo V-80) while the small one only 1 
(pseudo-multiplicity), despite in fact from the scenario description it seemed that the draw was a 
one-off event instead than a multiple event.  
Two conditions were tested, a within-subjects condition (253 participants) and a between- 
subjects condition (143 participants). In the within-subjects condition, each participant read the 
description of two out of three lotteries, and had to decide how to allocate 100 points between 
them. In the ―multiplicity version‖, participants had to split the points they owned between the 
moderately diversified pool and the nondiversified pool (i.e., Lottery B vs. Lottery C). In the 
―distinctiveness version‖, participants had to split the points between the highly diversified pool 
and the moderately diversified pool (i.e., Lottery A vs. Lottery B). Finally, in the ―multiplicity 
plus distinctiveness version‖, participants had to divide the points between the highly diversified 
pool and the nondiversified pool (i.e., Lottery A vs. Lottery C). Instead, in the between 
condition people saw only one of the three lottery descriptions (i.e., Lottery A, B, or C), and 
were asked to state the maximum amount of money that they would agree to pay as a 
registration fee for the lottery
26
.  
Results of the within-subjects condition analysis on 232 participants proved that 58% of 
those participants assigned to the questionnaire including B and C lotteries showed indifference 
between them, as it should be expected if people behave rationally. Notwithstanding, when 
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 As a control measure, participants were then asked to rank order the three cars of the highly diversified 
lottery (Volvo S-80, Toyota Corolla, Honda Civic) according to their price, from the most expensive to 
the least expensive, both in within- and between-subjects conditions. 
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analyzing the remaining participants‘ answers (i.e., those expressing a preference for one of the 
two lotteries) there was a significant difference between a majority (33.3%) preferring the 
lottery offering the greater absolute number of winning instances (i.e., the B Lottery), and a 
small percentage of them (9%) preferring the nondiversified C Lottery. The difference between 
the two preference groups was significant in the PDH predicted direction, χ2 (1) = 10.94, p < 
.01.  
Results of this version and the magnitude of the diversification preferences presented directly 
replicated the Ratio-bias reported by Epstein and colleagues (Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992), 
because people attributed higher points to the lottery offering a winning probability expressed 
with larger numbers- i.e., Lottery B, offering 10 prizes in 100,000, than to that expressed with 
lower numbers- i.e., Lottery C, offering 1 prize in 10,000. Nevertheless, an alternative 
possibility could be, that the higher-numbered option was interpreted as actually offering a 
higher number of prizes than the smaller-numbered option.  
For what concerned the between-subjects data, analysis on the 131 participants‘ measures of 
the Willingness To Take part (WTT) on the lottery showed the highest price for the highly 
diversified Lottery A, followed by Lottery B and then by Lottery C, in line with the degree of 
diversification
27
.  
Through their studies, authors demonstrated that people do exhibit a diversity preference in 
gain conditions but a diversity aversion in conditions of loss. In other words, diversification 
would operate in synchrony with the framing effect. More precisely, under conditions of gain, 
people would tend to diversify because it reduces the risk of outcomes and ensures that at least 
some resources will be fruitful (i.e., increasing the probability of at least one gain, see also Kahn 
and Lehmann, 1991). On the other hand, under conditions of loss, people would prefer to avoid 
diversification, as they believe that such a strategy would enable them to escape losing at all. On 
the contrary, we know that in fact diversification can actually protect from extreme losses.  
 
 
1.2.2 Exemplar availability: Exemplar-cuing theory 
Exemplar-cuing theory can […] account for ratio-bias, though it does not require a comparison between 
options that differ in the absolute number of ways a favourable outcome can occur. Instead, exemplar cuing requires 
only consideration of whether examples of other „winners‟ are cognitively available, regardless of the actual number 
of ways that winners might appear.  
(Koehler and Macchi, 2004, p. 541) 
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 A limitation of these measurements consisted in the large deviations from the mean (SD1 = 11.38; SD2 = 
5.64; SD3 = 8.25) obtained on the WTT that are due to task assignments- experimenters did not fix a 
minimum-maximum amount of money that could be offered by participants, thus fostering largely 
different sums. Also, since demographic variables like income are not specified in the study, it is not 
possible to get an adjustment of those WTT measures according to the value attributed to money by the 
single persons, thus making it hard for that measure to return actual participants‘ behavioral intentions. 
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Despite Exemplar-cuing theory (Koehler, 1997, 2001-a, 2001-b; Koehler and Macchi, 
2004) has been proposed in the contest of legal decision making to explain when and why legal 
jurors are persuaded by DNA match statistics, its authors claimed it could be applied to other 
domains to explain how people think about low-probability events. For instance, to give an 
account of the Ratio-bias phenomenon (Koehler and Macchi, 2004). The theory predicts that the 
description of an unlikely coincidental outcome will be valued differently depending on the 
description‘s ability to cue similar examples. ―The perceived probative value of a statistical 
DNA match (and, by extension, other forensic match evidence) depends on the ease with which 
triers of fact can imagine examples of others who would also match the DNA profile. When 
triers of fact find it hard to imagine examples of others who might match by chance, the 
evidence will be treated as compelling proof that the matching suspect is the source of the 
recovered DNA evidence. But when such matches are easier to imagine, the evidence will seem 
less compelling.‖ (Koehler, 2001-a, p. 8).  
Authors developed precise mathematical rules governing their forecast for people‘s 
evaluative behaviour. ―The weight decision makers attach to low-probability events is, in part, a 
function of whether they can easily generate or imagine exemplars for the event‖ (Koelher and 
Macchi, 2004, p. 540), namely, a function of ―exemplar availability‖. The latter would work in 
an inversely proportional way to the convincing value of the evidence, thus it would stand as an 
indicator of the subjective weight that people attach to low probability events. Exemplar 
availability would depend on both the reference-class size (the target, either single or multiple) 
and the rareness of the event under exam, which interact in a significant way
28
; two 
mechanisms, i.e., the ―multiplicative‖ and ―numerator‖ mechanism, describe this interaction. 
According to the first one, when the product of reference-class size and its incidence is greater 
than 1, exemplars would be very likely to be cued, therefore people will give more weight to the 
possibility that the unlikely coincidental outcome will occur. However, when the product of the 
two factors be lower than 1, exemplars would be less likely to be cued, and people give little 
weight to the possibility of the unlikely event.  
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 Despite being based on the same principle governing the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973) - i.e., the fact that people form their probability evaluations about an event on the ease with which 
similar instances come to their mind- Exemplar-cuing differs in the explanation on the reason why events 
would be mentally available. According to Koehler (2001-b) and Koehler and Macchi (2004), the mental 
presence of an exemplar does not have necessarily to be related to the prevalence of that event in the 
environment– as instead the literature on heuristics and biases affirms- rather it could be based on 
vividness (Nisbett and Ross, 1980), i.e., the ability of information to catch and hold people‘s attention, 
which in turn is influenced by how much unusual, important, interesting, personally relevant, publicized 
etc. that information is. According to Exemplar-cuing theory, once into mind that information would 
become crucial as it has the power of changing the personal evaluation of the event, and therefore, of 
influencing her/his choice. Authors specify that the latter affirmation would be especially true for low-
probability events which would be ignored otherwise.  
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The second mechanism, which operates only on information presented in frequencies, states that 
exemplars are cued when the numerator of the incidence rate is equivalent or bigger than 1; 
thus, decimals (e.g., 0.1 out of 10) are not expected to prompt examples. Please consider as 
illustration, the following two descriptions of the chance of winning the daily three-digit New 
York Lottery Numbers game employed in Koehler and Macchi (2004, p. 540), 
 
a) ―There is a 0.1% chance that a given ticket will win‖; 
b) ―One in every 1,000 tickets out of the 500,000 tickets that are sold each day will win.‖ 
 
In a), since the numerator of the incidence rate is smaller than 1, that expression is not expected 
to prompt examples. The contrary happens in b), because 1) the incidence of the phenomenon (1 
in 1000) is expressed by means of a 1; and 2) it is provided in combination with a large 
reference class (e.g., 500,000 tickets sold); therefore, winning-ticket exemplars are likely to be 
cued (approximately 1/1000 x 500,000= 500 tickets in this lottery will be winners).  
Despite in both experiments included in Koehler and Macchi (2004) data were consistent with 
the two mechanisms claimed to govern the cue of exemplars, it has to be considered that those 
are the only evidences available for the multiplicative mechanism. For the strong predictions 
made on the basis of the two principles (the multiplicative one in particular) to be claimed as 
valid, it would be advisable to test a broader range of values as incidence rates and reference 
classes, and also to test them in different contexts from that of DNA.  
Implication for the Ratio-bias effect stemming from Exemplar-cuing Theory will be described 
in the following section. 
 
 
1.2.3 Visualization of the numerator 
 In the domain of judgment and decision making research, the shared acceptation of the 
term ―imaginability‖ (in the wake of Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) 29 is, the ease with which 
associations or instances of the probability to be judged do come to mind. Some research (e.g., 
Carrol, cited in MacInnis and Price, 1987) suggested that imaginability would affect perceived 
probability directly, by calling upon the availability heuristic
30
 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). 
In particular, it was argued that the experience of imagining an outcome would increase its 
perceived probability by making it more salient and easier to recall. In their work, Price and 
Mattews (2009) explicitly referred to imaginability as a factor playing a role in, and by some 
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 The term has been used by, among others, Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes (2008), and does not 
correspond to imagery, in that it is a property of the stimulus and not an individual‘s characteristic. In 
some of the literature of the field, there appears to be confusion on the distinction of the two terms.  
30
 According to Availability heuristic, people would predict the frequency of an event, or a proportion 
within a population, based on how easily an example can be brought to mind. 
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authors even deemed as a cause of, ―the ratio bias and similar effects‖ (p. 445). These 
contributions will be described in the two sections here above. 
 
1.2.3.1 Imaginability/images of the numerator and affect 
 Some authors have explicitly alleged, that the ease of imaginability is influenced by the 
statistical format used to convey the probability, with frequencies producing higher probability 
evaluations than equivalent percentage presentations (see Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, 
2000, Study 3, also described in the last part of this section). Slovic and colleagues, urged that 
even Ratio-bias results obtained under CEST studies (e.g., Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992; 
Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994) could be explained by imaginability. According to them, in those 
experiments, imagined or actually seen images of winning beans would have conveyed positive 
affect, which in turn would have motivated the choice of the urn containing the larger absolute 
number of red beans. Similar studies under the CEST (i.e., Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, 
2000- Study 3) demonstrated furthermore in one of their investigations, that some measures 
could be affected by the format used to describe the harm probability (―N out of 10‖ rather than 
―10N out of 100‖) of a psychiatric patient, and such tendency was related to the degree of 
imaginability evoked in each case. Participants (members of the American Psychology-Law 
Society) were sent one of seven version of a one-page questionnaire describing the short 
assessment report of a hypothetical patient with mental disorder (Mr. Jones) about to be 
discharged. The versions varied only in the way the patient‘s probability of harming someone 
other than himself was expressed. In particular, conditions number 3- 4 and 6-7 are those of 
interest to the present case, where the magnitude of the numbers employed at the numerator and 
denominator of the ratios in each pair was either (comparatively) smaller or larger: 
 
Of every 10 [100] patients similar to Mr. Jones, 1 [10] is [are] estimated to commit an act of 
violence to others during the first several months after discharge.  
Condition 3 (in squared brackets the expressions used in condition 4) 
 
Of every 10 [100] patients similar to Mr. Jones, 2 [20] are estimated to commit an act of 
violence to others during the first several months after discharge.  
Condition 6 (in squared brackets the expressions used in condition 7) 
  
Role-playing the supervisor of the mental health facility, participants had to evaluate the degree 
of risk posed by Mr. Jones (low/medium/high), they had to express an opinion on the option of 
discharging the patient (discharge/ not discharge now/ obtain second opinion), and finally they 
had to state the degree of closeness suggested for monitoring to the patient when in the 
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community (not/ somewhat/ very closely). There did not seem
31 
to be a difference due to the 
magnitude of the numerator and denominator in the ratios employed to convey the risk neither 
in the probability judgments, nor in the opinion on the degree of closeness suggested for 
monitoring. Nevertheless, there was a difference in the behavioural intentions according to the 
perceived degree of risk showed an influence (in Ratio-bias direction) of the magnitude of the 
numbers used. Indeed, while in those receiving a smaller-numbered ratio condition (i.e., 3 and 
6) the percentages of participants refusing to discharge the patient (―do not discharge now‖) 
were 21.2% and 20.3% (for the 1/10 and for the 2/10 probability, respectively), in those 
receiving a larger-numbered ratio condition (i.e., 4 and 7) such percentages jumped to 21.0% 
and 40.6% , respectively. In sum, the superficial difference among the two types of formats had 
been able to double the number of people taking a hypothetical decision, even though from the 
pure rational point of view no reason could justify the fact that the same probability elicited 
different answers. Moreover, in the prior studies of the same article (Studies 1 and 2), authors 
showed that a frequency presentation of the same probability scenario (20 out of 100) generated 
higher risk judgments that a percentage presentation (20%), and they ascribed the effect 
obtained to the capacity of frequencies to generate a ―terrifying image‖ of the recidivist in the 
mind of the clinicians involved in their study. Similarly to other studies (e.g., Finucane, 
Alkhami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000; Finucane, Peters, and Slovic, 2003; Loewenstein, Weber, 
Hsee, and Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, 2004), since the higher 
probability evaluation had been detected in conjunction with extreme feelings appraisals, the 
affective richness of the imagery evoked by the statistical format had been attributed the power 
to mediate that relationship. Indeed, the explanation given to the more extreme behavioural 
intentions under the 20 in 100 rather than the 2 in 10 in Study 3 referred once again to the 
higher degree of imaginability evoked under the larger rather than smaller frequency 
presentation. It has to be noticed tough, that authors‘ claim of a higher degree of affective 
images elicited for larger numbers compared to smaller ones is in fact a speculation
32
. Indeed, it 
was not provided an assessment of the capacity of the two formats to prompt affective imagery.  
 In a similar vein to Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor‘ s study (2000), Peters, Vastfjall, 
Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, and Dickert (2006) hypothesized a mechanism based on the affect 
generated by the evoked images to explain results of their fourth study. That study examined the 
effect of numeracy on various decision making tasks, among which that involving the ball-and-
                                                          
31
 Because of not being the main object of interest of authors, no results of statistical tests are presented in 
the article for evaluations under the smaller and larger numbers ratio conditions. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to observe some tendencies. 
32
 ―A[n] […] issue, is the extent to which different formats do indeed affect imaginability. In most studies 
these effects are simply inferred from the responses on other dependent measures (e.g. willingness to take 
risks) (Slovic et al., 2002). Some work has been done examining the relation between imagery and 
decision-making (e.g. Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers, and Gesell, 1991) but evidence of the 
direct link between frequency formats and enhanced imaginability is currently lacking in the literature‖ 
(Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes, 2008, p. 319).  
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jar game of chance is reported here. As in Denes- Raj and Epstein (1994), the small urn of 
Peters et al.‘s scenario (described as the one ―having 10% colored jellybeans‖) offered a 1 in 10 
probability of drawing a colored jellybean, while the large (labelled as the one ―having 9% 
colored jellybeans‖) offered a 9 in 100 chance of drawing a colored jellybean. As expected, the 
majority of participants irrationally chose the large urn, despite being the sub-optimal option, 
thus showing a Ratio-bias. Authors hypothesized a leading role of people‘s affective response in 
those situations. They indicated the cause of the bias in the images mediating the affective 
response, namely ―participants‘ affective images of 9 winning balls in the large urn dominated 
the image of 1 winning ball in the small urn‖ (Peters et al., 2006, p. 410), even though it must be 
noticed that there are not evidences for this explanation in their study.  
In their view, in such a game of chance two conflicting types of affective reactions would be 
experienced, one stemming from the mental (or real, in the case where the game of chance had 
been played in reality) image of the balls and the urn, and the other due to a conscious and logic 
thinking process. A dual-system theory of information-processing view is implicit in this 
interpretation, but differently from most dual process theories where only the experiential 
system is deeply influenced by affective information, in the model proposed by Peters and 
colleagues affect has the capacity to influence both the experiential and the rational systems. 
Indeed, authors stated, ―Affect can be a direct ―hit‖ from an object‖- Zajonc‘s (1980) notion that 
affect comes before conscious deliberation- ―or it can be the result of prior deliberation.‖(Peters 
et al., 2006, p. 410). The comparison among the two urns made under a leading role of the 
experiential system would generate a more positive (or less negative) feeling of affect for the 
larger urn. On the other hand, the affect derived from thinking deliberately at the stated 
probabilities applying mathematical norms would make the small urn look advantageous as 
offering an objectively greater probability than that of the other urn. Nevertheless, this supposed 
double influence of affect was not in fact tested in the study, as only a single affective rating 
was assessed. Indeed, participants‘ degree of affective feelings was assessed by asking them to 
indicate ―how good or bad Bowl‘s A 9% chance‖ made her/him feel, on a 7-point scale ranging 
from -3 (very bad) to +3 (very good). Also, mean evaluations according to the choice made 
(large or small urn) were not reported in the study, thus it is not possible to test if there was a 
different degree of feeling for the two options in study participants.  
 
1.2.3.2 Imaginability/images of the numerator, but not necessarily affectively-
tagged 
 Two views will be presented here that offered an opposite (in terms of direction of 
causality in respect to Slovic and colleagues‘ study, described in 1.2.3.1) interpretation of the 
relationship between the format of probability and images generated. 
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The first view is that of Reyna and Brainerd (2008). According to them, images are not the 
cause of the higher probability judgments given under the frequency format if compared with 
the probability format, rather, in the example, they are a side-effect of the categorical judgment 
of violence (in the example) elicited by the frequency format but not under the probability one. 
In fact, according to the Fuzzy-Trace theory (see 1.1.2), ―20 people out of 100‖ would be 
evaluated as all categorically violent, while ―20%‖ -referred to a single person- would be 
evaluated as a relatively small tendency (or even an inexistent one) to engage in a violent 
behaviour. Reyna and Brainerd used the same logic to give account of the higher number of 
participants declaring they would not discharge Mr. Jones in the 20 out of 100 (and 10 in 100) 
condition than in the 2 in 10 (and 1 in 10) one. 
 The second view in contrast to Slovic and colleagues about the role of imaginability in 
affecting probability judgments of ratios expressed with smaller or larger numbers is that of 
Koelher and Macchi (2004). According to researchers, first and most importantly of all, to get 
an impact on people‘s evaluations there would be no need for the images generated by stimuli to 
be affectively rich (likewise, instead Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, 2000, and Tversky and 
Kahneman‘ s availabity heuristic, 1973). Instead ―the weight decision makers attach to low-
probability events is, in part, a function of whether they can easily generate or imagine 
exemplars for the event‖ (Koelher and Macchi, 2004, p. 540). Hence, in their Exemplar-Cuing 
Theory (see 1.2.2), differently from affect-laden theories (see preceding section, i.e. 1.2.3.1), for 
an effect to be produced it would suffice that the statistics evoke thoughts about examples of the 
target event. A second difference between Exemplar-Cuing Theory and other explanations, no 
privileged role of the frequency format is claimed over the percentage one by Koelher and 
Macchi, as the generation of exemplar cues depends on the reference class that is responsible for 
identifying the sample space and not on the numerical expression used to convey probability 
(see Macchi, 2000). Indeed, as Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes (2008) critically observed in a 
study examining positive and negative low-probability events, no evidences exist of a direct link 
between enhanced imaginability and the format used to describe probability, in particular 
frequency formats. Newell and others affirmed that in most studies these effects were postulated 
indirectly from results on other dependent measures, like Willingness to Take Risks (see for 
instance Slovic et al., 2000). A common critical point in all the above-presented approaches 
trying to explain the reasons why ratios in larger number formats would elicit higher probability 
evaluations than ratios in lower number formats is, then, that of how imaginability could be 
properly assessed. That issue will be analysed further in a study expressly devoted to the 
measurement of imaginability (see Study 3.2).  
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1.3 Elicitation of health state utilities, of numerical frequencies of social facts, and 
of the probability of harm posed by a mental patient if discharged are 
influenced by Ratio-bias 
 
The Ratio bias has also been shown to influence the elicitation of health-state utilities
33
 
(Pinto-Prades, Martinez-Perez, and Abellán-Perpiñán, 2006) by means of two different 
methods, i.e., the Standard Gamble (SG), and a method that authors have dubbed the ―double 
lottery‖ method (ibid.).  
SG is very common in research on individual decision making, but is employed in social 
decision making, too. Not only, in fact utilities can be used to estimate the expected utility of a 
health treatment, in order to help decision on the treatments available, but also they can serve to 
gain estimation on the cost-effectiveness ratio of medical treatments, in order to take resource 
allocation decisions.
34
 In the SG technique for chronic health states, usually participants are 
asked to choose between suffering a given condition for the rest of their life, and a medical 
treatment that can return them to full health, considering anyway that as a side-effect it could 
also fail and cause immediate death. The formulation of questions employed in Pinto-Prades 
and colleagues‘ Study 1 will illustrate:  
 
Suppose that you are experiencing health state X. If you do not receive treatment you will 
remain in X for the rest of your life. However, you can receive a medical treatment (treatment 
ALFA) that if successful, will result in return to normal health. Nevertheless, treatment ALFA 
can also fail and in this case you will die. We are going to show you different probabilities of 
success and failure and you will tell us if you think you would chose treatment ALFA or no in 
each case. 
(Pinto-Prades et al., 2006, p.124) 
 
Authors were interested in studying whether the way in which the probabilities of success and 
failure of treatment ALFA for four diverse health states (X, W, Z, and Y) expressed in 
frequencies of smaller or larger numbers, could produce different subjective utilities. In 
particular, by employing a ping-pong search procedure (i.e., first presenting a 5% risk of death, 
then a 90%, then 10%, then 80%, 20%, 70%, 30%, 60% and so on) they aimed at testing 
                                                          
33 By health utilities it is meant how a person thinks having a particular condition would compare to the 
best option (being in perfect health, at one extreme) or to the worst option (being dead, at the other). 
34
 In the first case, for chronic health states usually the SG technique asks people to choose between 
suffering a given condition for the rest of her/his life, and a medical treatment that can return him/her to 
full health, but could also fail and cause her/his immediate death. In the other case, the cost- effectiveness 
of the introduction of a medical intervention can be calculated as the difference between the utility of 
patient health state before and after treatment.  
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whether the indifference point between the gamble offering a certain probability of death and 
the complementary probability of complete recovering, and the actual health-state would change 
in a direction compatible with the Ratio-bias effect. To illustrate, it was hypothesized, that a 
higher elicited utility (because of the lower degree of risk accepted, i.e., the lower indifference 
point) be elicited when the probabilities in the gamble were presented out of 1000 people, than 
when they were presented out of 100 people. Results confirmed authors‘ supposition, as 
participants accepted a lower risk of death when probabilities of success and failure in the 
gamble were expressed as ―Y deaths out of 1000‖ rather than as ―X deaths out of 100.‖  
Study 2 of the same research represented a further confirmation that the superficial way in 
which health risks are framed has the power to lead to inconsistent preferences. A new 
elicitation technique called ―double-lottery method‖ was used, and the general population 
tested. The technique was a variation of the SG question in which risk was present in both parts, 
and participants had to answer to two questions; only one of those questions, anyway, was used 
to test the existence of the Ratio-bias effect, while the other served as a control question. For 
what concerned the main issue of interest, the scenario read, 
 
Assume that you have been injured in a road accident. If you do not receive medical treatment 
you will experience situation X. There are two alternative treatments available, C and D. When 
treatment C is applied to 100 [1000] people, 1 [10] patient experience situation X and 99 [990] 
patients experience situation W. When treatment B is applied to 100 [1000] people, N patients 
experience situation X and (100-N) [1000- N] patients return to normal health in 3-4 days.  
(Pinto-Prades et al., 2006, p.127) 
 
Participants received either the version where ratios were framed in 100 or that where they were 
framed in 1000. The number N (and its complementary) was varied using a ping-pong technique 
as in Study 1 until indifference was reached. Authors‘ prediction (based on mathemathical 
calculations), was that participants would have accepted a lower degree of risk in the 
experimental conditions where the frequencies were expressed out of a 1000 denominator rather 
than when they were expressed out of a 100 denominator. Results supported authors‘ 
hypothesis, thus further corroborated the idea that the format in which a frequency is expressed 
(X out of 100 or 10X out of 1000) matters in terms of elicited health utilities. 
The elicitation method was also at the basis of another effect that has been explained by 
means of the Ratio-bias phenomenon. Yamagishi (1994-a, 1994-b) referred about his and some 
colleagues unpublished study (Saito, Kawabata, and Yamagishi) where an interesting 
―response-range effect‖ was observed that could be attributed to the response ranges provided. 
In fact, results of the study, inspired by that conducted by Fischoff and MacGregor (reported in 
Fischoff, Slovic, and Litchenstein, 1982) showed, that when numerical estimates of certain 
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social facts (e.g., the probability of being victimized by violent crimes) were required in 
frequency terms, radically different estimates were returned by participants who had to provide 
an estimation for a relatively small range (i.e., ‗out of 100‘) and by those who instead had to 
provide an estimation for a relatively large range (i.e., ‗out of 10,000‘) of population. In 
particular, the estimations elicited out of a population of 100 persons were generally lower than 
those elicited out of a population of 10,000 persons, an effect in line with the Ratio-bias. 
Authors‘ explanation for the phenomenon concerned with the idea that perception of riskiness 
depends highly on method of elicitation (Fischoff, Litchenstein, Slovic, Derby, and Keeney, 
1981; Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1982; Slovic, Kraus, and Covello, 1990). In particular, 
it referred to a common and underestimated bias in frequency judgments connected to the 
survey methodology, i.e., the fact that study participants infer normal tendencies in the reference 
population from the presentation of verbal response ranges (Schwarz and Hippler, 1987; 
Schwarz, Strack, Muller, and Chassein, 1988). Saito, Kawabata, and Yamagishi (quoted in 
Yamagishi, 1994-a, p. 652) argued that, ―the presentation of the narrow (100) response range 
implicitly suggests that the least possible occurrence is one in 100 […]. Yet the use of the wide 
(10,000) range suggests that the least possible occurrence is one in 10,000, retaining much less 
lower frequency rates in concern‖. In Yamagishi (1994-a) the author claimed that such a 
response-range effect he could replicate was nothing else but a particular type of anchoring 
procedure. In particular, the anchoring procedure author referred to was an implicit one, as 
differently from the anchoring and adjustment process described by Kahneman and Tversky‘s 
(1974), no numerical expression had been provided as an anchor on the response scale. Instead, 
embedded clues from the range provided (1/100 or 1/10,000 in the proposed scenarios) were 
picked up spontaneously by individuals, who used them to ease the evaluative procedure. In 
Yamagishi (1994-a), participants were asked to provide an estimate of frequencies of death for 
11 well-known causes in a sample of 10,000 people (i.e., ―wide range‖ condition), in a sample 
of 100 people (i.e., ―narrow range‖ condition), and to rank-order those lethal causes from most 
to least frequent, in three different sessions. In order to compare the reported evaluations in the 
two conditions differing for size range, the measure obtained in the wide condition were divided 
by 100. Two different analyses- aggregated level and individual subjects‘ level- of the same 
data obtained from 49 participants were performed. Significantly greater mean estimates of 
mortality rate were found in the narrow range condition (i.e., 29.06) than in the wide range one 
(i.e., 12.95), thus demonstrating a clear influence of the superficial way of expressing the 
response-range. Subjects‘ performance analysis showed a high consistence among subjective 
risk scales, in other words ―the relationship that one cause was judged as more or less frequent 
than another was highly well preserved across methods of elicitation‖ (Yamagishi, 1994-b, p. 
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663). Nevertheless, these results must be taken with caution, considering that they were 
obtained from a within-subjects design for what concerned the ratio format presentation
35
. 
Comparable results, though, were obtained by Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor (2000, Study 1 
and Study 2 described here below).  
Finally, elicitation of probability has been shown as influenced by Ratio-bias even in 
Slovic et al. studies (2000). Forensic psychologists and psychiatrists shown six case summaries 
of mental hospital patients were asked to evaluate the probability that the protagonist of the case 
would harm someone else within six months after discharge from the hospital. Also, they were 
required a judgment on the risk level posed by the person, an opinion on the need of monitoring 
the individual, and an evaluation of the likely necessity of rehospitalisation or involuntary 
outpatient commitment in the event of the patient‘s failure to comply with the prescribed 
medication. The variable manipulated within-subjects was the format of the response scale used 
to assess the probability of the question on the judgment of the risk level, namely that of interest 
for the present aims. Indeed, participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions, LP 
(Large Probability), SP (Small Probability), LF (Large Frequency), SF (Small Frequency), or 
SF1000 (Small Frequency out of 1000). Results showed lower mean probability judgments for 
the scale with comparatively smaller than that with comparatively larger numbers, both for 
scales where points were labelled in percentages and in relative frequencies, showing a clear 
response-range effect. The same effect was replicated in Study 2 with the same scenarios, but an 
additional tutorial at the beginning of the session on how to make probability or relative 
frequency judgments. Overall responses aggregated across all six cases for each of the five 
experimental conditions showed that within relative frequency formats, a scale expressed in 
terms of 1000 rather than 100 individuals elicited larger frequency judgments than the same 
scale expressed in terms of 100 individuals. For instance, while 15.9% of the case summaries 
were considered at a 1/100 probability of harming someone else during the six months after 
discharge (Condition SF), more than double the number of such cases (i.e., 32.5%) were judged 
at a 10/1000 probability of harming someone (Condition SF1000), despite the two probabilities 
were in fact equivalent. The risk judgment on the probability that the patient would harm 
someone else followed the same trend; in other words, more people assessed the same risk as 
low when that had been evaluated on the SF scale (out of 100 people) than when it had been 
evaluated on the SF1000 scale, e.g. 81.2% vs. 76.6% for the 1% judged probability of harm, 
respectively. 
  
                                                          
35
 See observations in Khaneman (2003), reported at the beginning of Chapter 3. 
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SECTION 2.  
When 1 in 10 is higher than 10 in 100: Results in favour of neglect of 
the numerator 
 
The group-diffusion effect and the reference group effect  
 Opposite results to the Ratio-bias (or denominator neglect), thus indicating that people 
attend to and weigh the denominator more than the numerator, have been obtained by 
Yamaguchi (1998), when ratios used different superficial formats of expression. In two studies, 
author demonstrated that individuals feel illusory safer (more in control) in the presence of 
others than when they are alone, an effect that he dubbed the ―group-diffusion effect‖. As the 
number of these ―others‖ grew, the feeling of safety increased and people tended to assess risk 
at lower levels. 
In fact, in Study 1 (Yamaguchi, 1998) Japanese female students evaluated risk as lower when 
the number of their peers exposed to the same risk increased. Participants presented with six 
hypothetical risk scenarios in the physical and financial domain, and asked to role-play to have 
part in them, were asked to estimate the amount of risk (in %) involved in each of the six 
situations. The independent variable manipulated between-subjects was the number of people 
potentially at risk, i.e., the participant alone, a small group (i.e., 10 people), or a large group 
(i.e., 100-1 million people). As a result, not only the group size showed a main significant effect 
on the perceived probability level, but also the two variables inverse relationship was obtained, 
since the declared level of probability decreased as the magnitude of the number of companions 
increased (as function of the number of risk companions). For example, one scenario 
(―Carcinogen 2‖ scenario) read: 
 
The underground water supply in your area was recently found to be contaminated with 
carcinogens. It is estimated that it will take about five years before the effects of these 
carcinogens appear. It is also uncertain how many people will eventually get cancer from the 
contaminated water. There are 10 [100, 1 million] people including yourself [you are the only 
one] in three families who are drinking the contaminated water every day from wells in your 
area. 
How likely do you think it is that you will develop a cancer? 
(Yamaguchi, 1998, p. 128) 
 
In this case, participants estimated, that their personal probability of getting a cancer due to 
water contamination through a carcinogen would be lower as more people drank the water on a 
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daily basis. Obviously, their judgmental behaviour was irrational, as in fact the presence of 
other people in the same situation would have not reduced the protagonist‘s objective risk level.  
In Study 2, results of Study 1 were further confirmed in a more realistic situation (i.e., 
laboratory setting), thus broadening their external validity. Female students participated 
individually by reading the description of an experiment involving electric shocks, in which the 
total number of prospective participants that would have communicated to them was varied in a 
way similar to that adopted in the preceding experiment. It could be one person only (i.e., the 
participant alone), a small group (i.e., 10 people), or a large group (i.e., 500 people). After 
reading the scenario, students were asked to estimate, in %, 1) the probability of suffering from 
the after-effects if they had taken part in the trial, 2) the severity of those effects, as well as 3) 
their willingness to participate into the experiment, all on 7-point Likert scales. Reasonably, and 
comprehensibly, eagerness to participate was constant across conditions, and generally low. 
Instead, the probability of suffering from after-effects decreased as the number of people 
involved in the experiment increased, and its trend was paralleled by that of the degree of 
intensity of those effects. 
 According to author, findings of both studies would show that individuals demonstrate 
an irrational tendency to feel safer, i.e., to judge a risk as lower, when in group than alone, a 
tendency of illusionary ―safety in numbers‖ (Price and Mattews, 2009). Such feeling would be 
the result of a notion that is the product of the natural human propensity to group with other 
humans in order to face otherwise impossible-to-hand threats to their survival, or in order to 
better face those, as in case of, for instance, natural disasters. If the history of humankind is full 
of episodes where indeed the fact of being in a group has shown essential (or at least useful) for 
individual survival, the mere application of such notion to all situations appear notwithstanding 
irrational, as the presence of other individuals not always works as a benefit for ameliorating an 
individual condition. For example, in those circumstances where collaboration has no room to 
offer an advantage, people are not necessarily safer in a group than alone (see, for instance, the 
probability to get home safely on a plane in a bad storm is not function of the number of people 
flying on board, rather is dependent on the pilot‘s skills). 
Such ―group-diffusion effect‖, demonstrated on a Japanese sample, received further 
confirmation in Hong Kong by Ho and Leung (1998), and in the USA, albeit partially, by Chua, 
Yamaguchi, and Yates (unpublished, cited in Yamaguchi, Okumura, Chua, Morio, and Yates, 
2008). The study in Hong-Kong aimed at testing several potential explanations for the effect, 
among others the ―interdependence heuristic bias‖ and the ―comfort hypothesis‖, both offered 
by Yamaguchi (1998). According to the ―interdependence heuristic bias‖, the tendency of 
feeling safer in a group than alone would be the result, in collectivist cultures like the Japanese 
one, of people‘s attitude to see the group rather than the single person as the basic unit of 
survival. As a consequence of the effect of solidarity, and of a high concern for others in their 
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society, collectivist people would perceive a lower degree of threat in presence of risk 
companions than alone. Nevertheless, the interdependence heuristic bias hypothesis has been 
disconfirmed by Ho and Leung (1998) who found no evidence that the effect was stronger for 
individuals evaluated as collectivists rather than individualists on an appropriate scale (the 
INDCOL, in Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, and Lucca, 1988, translated in Chinese) 
intended to measure the collectivism orientation. Similarly, in the same study the ―comfort 
hypothesis‖ arguing for a sense of security in presence of other people in a fearful situation did 
not receive support. Indeed, the same intensity for the bias was found when participants were 
provided with an alternative source of comfort (i.e., insurance) and when they were not.  
A similarity between the group-diffusion effect and the so-called ―reference group 
effect explanation‖ (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997) can be noticed. Indeed, according to this 
latter account, in brief, individuals would feel greater distress for victims as ―the reference 
group they are part of grows smaller‖ (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, quoted in Small and 
Lowenstein, 2003, p. 6), namely they would feel more distress for a single victim than for a 
statistical life. ―Identifiable victims represent the most highly concentrated distribution of risk 
(an n of n) because identifiable victims become, in effect, their own reference group. In contrast, 
a statistical life has a much larger denominator, because the risk is typically spread across a 
large population.‖ (ibid), despite the value of life should be the same independently of the total 
number of individuals at risk. This ―greater sensitivity to proportions than to absolute numbers 
of lives‖ (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic, 2007, p. 144) obtained empirical confirmation in 
some subsequent studies (e.g., Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich, 1997; Baron, 
1997). 
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From group diffusion to Ratio-bias 
 A link between Ratio-bias and group-diffusion effect has been traced by Price and 
Mattews (2009). In a series of four studies, authors first replicated Yamaguchi‘s finding (Exp. 
1) and extended it to a positive outcome, thus ruling out the interdependence heuristic as 
explanation (Exp. 2), then made the group-diffusion effect disappear (Exp. 3), and finally 
argued Ratio-bias as the reverse of the group-diffusion effect.  
In Study 1, a ―bacteria scenario‖ (here following), or a ―carcinogen scenario‖ were employed: 
 
Imagine that you are one of N people eating at a restaurant. Afterward, you find out that you 
were exposed to a certain kind of bacteria in the food. Furthermore, medical experts say that 
people exposed to these bacteria have a P probability of becoming seriously ill as a result. 
(Price and Mattews, 2009, p.439), [N (1, 10, 100, 1000); P (1%, 20%)]  
 
Despite a variant of Yamaguchi‘s paradigm was used (within-subjects presentation of the 
scenarios, of the probability, and of the number of threat companions; non-numeric judgment on 
a 12-point scale rather than on a percentage scale), the typical group-diffusion effect was found. 
In fact, participants evaluated their chances of experiencing the negative event as lower when 
the number of people exposed to the risk increased. 
 In a further experiment presented in the study, both scenarios were slightly modified to 
include an explicit mention to the numerator of the ratio, that in Study 1 and 2 had instead to be 
deducted through a mathematical operation on the probability (%) to experience the negative 
outcome and the number of people exposed to the threat. It has to be noticed, that such 
mathematical operation was rather difficult because not everybody knows in similar cases, that 
a) the information (% and N) have to be integrated to return the personal probability of 
experiencing the negative outcome; and b) the mathematical rules necessary to integrate 
information. The general form of the new version of the scenario read, 
 
Picture yourself as one of N people in a room. n of the N people in the room will be randomly 
selected to [win/lose] $ 50. 
(Price and Mattews, 2009, p. 439), [N (10, 100, 1000), P (10%, 30%), n accordingly] 
 
A null effect of the size of the group of probability companions was detected, namely an 
absence of the group-diffusion effect. Authors interpreted similar findings as due to the fact that 
participants could now focus on both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio they were 
required to judge.  
 In the final Experiment presented in their study, Price and Mattews demonstrated, as they 
had hypothesised, that a group-diffusion effect was present in the condition where only the 
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denominator was made salient (―denominator-only condition‖), while no effect was present 
when both numerator and denominator were made explicit (i.e., ―numerator-plus-denominator 
condition‖). A Ratio-bias effect was present instead when the numerator of the ratio was made 
salient (i.e., ―numerator-only condition‖). Nevertheless, it has to be noticed, for reasons which 
will be clarified at the beginning of next chapter), that in the latter condition the items indicated 
the number of people expected to be affected by the condition, but the exact number of the total 
people at risk was not specified, i.e., it was not clearly stated- since the scenario read: ―several‖ 
people were exposed to the risk). 
Other researchers apart from Price and Mattews had argued for, among different mechanisms, 
the role of saliency in creating the Ratio-bias (see Pinto-Prades, Martinez-Perez, and Abellán-
Perpiñán, 2006), without nevertheless testing experimentally such supposition. In authors‘ 
words, ―[...] the group-diffusion effect is related to the ratio-bias. Both effects occur when 
people make risks or likelihood judgments based on information presented as a ratio. The 
difference is that the group-diffusion effect occurs when the denominator of the relevant ratio is 
more salient than the numerator, while the ratio-bias occurs when the numerator is more salient 
than the denominator‖(p. 436). Relative saliency of either of the two features in a ratio has been 
indicated as the cause generating either one or the other effect. In line with Epstein and 
colleagues‘ idea that ―information can be presented so that participants attend to and weight 
either the denominator or the numerator more heavily in their likelihood judgments‖ (Price and 
Mattews, 2009, p. 445), Price and Mattews argued that there is not an intrinsic feature in the 
ratio that can be deemed responsible of one either of the two biases, rather one of the biases is 
generated in the conjunction of a specific ratio presentation and the problem examined.  
The reason why people would focus on one feature rather than the other could be, as suggested 
by Pinto-Prades and colleagues (2006), the motivational concern. In their study, the numerator 
was the object of motivational concern as it was in that feature of the ratio that the numerical 
outcome of the medical treatment (success or failure) was communicated. The same idea had 
been claimed by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994), to explain results obtained in the typical game 
of chance: individuals would have focused on the numerator since the red beans were of 
motivational concern as participants wanted to select them (gain outcome) or avoid them (loss 
outcome),  
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Empirical studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A manuscript partly based on this chapter is under review (2
nd
 revision) in Medical Decision 
Making as: Pighin, S., Savadori, L., Barilli, E., Cremonesi, L., Ferrari, M., and Bonnefon, J.-F. 
―The ‗1 in X effect‘ on the subjective assessment of medical probabilities‖.
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Rationale for research studies 
 
The main rationale for the research was that of examining how numerical format affects 
perceived probability in single risk communications. The rationale stemmed from recent 
theories in the psychology of risk perception, that separate the role of experiential vs. analytical 
reasoning in the way individuals form perceptions of risk (see beginning of Chapter 2). Much 
evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that presentation formats have been interpreted as a 
way to convey an experiential vs. analytical processing of information (see, for instance, 
Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole, 1995; Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, 2000). However, some 
of the researches described in Section 1 of Chapter 2 could be criticised for ecological validity 
if they ought to be transferred, as they are, into the medical health domain. Most of the studies, 
indeed, presented people with the same probability expressed in two different formats, and 
asked them for a direct comparison between the two formulations. This method might 
compromise the ecological validity of the results, if one considers the domain of medical risk 
communication. Presumably, doctors rarely explain to patients that one treatment has, for 
instance, a 1 in 10 chance to succeed, whereas the other has a 10 in 100 chance to succeed. 
Using different ratio formats for two probabilities that are trivially the same, besides being in 
principle not advisable because the employment of different denominators in the ratios does 
not favour a sound comprehension and comparison of probability magnitudes (Burkell, 2004; 
Paling, 2003), would surely be an odd communication move. A more realistic situation, 
instead, is one where the practitioner chooses a specific format to express the equal chance of 
success of two different treatments, and coherently sticks to it for the description of the 
probability of both cures. Moreover, there are even occasions when patients are presented with 
information relating to a single treatment or with the probability of an adverse outcome, rather 
than being required the comparison between two or more options. In fact, frequently they are 
required to evaluate clinical risks having little contextual knowledge to support consistent risk 
perceptions. Very often, risks cannot be compared against each other, and they have to be 
evaluated on an absolute scale (for an exhaustive review concerning the differences between 
joint and separate evaluations and on how these two evaluation modes differently affect 
preferences, see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). 
In both the case of two different treatments, and in that of a single one/ of the probability of an 
adverse outcome, knowing whether there are any differences in the subjective probability 
assessment of a health-related outcome as a function of the magnitude of the numbers 
employed in the ratio expressing its probability can be useful for easing the choice between 
them.  
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Methodological considerations 
 The present research focuses on a relatively less evaluable context where only separate 
evaluations are possible. From the methodological point of view, two main considerations have 
been made on the basis of both the aim just delineated and the literature described in Chapter 2. 
First, in accordance with what expressed above on the ecological validity of studies in medical 
risk communication, it was reasoned that experiments aimed at assessing effects on perception 
of ratio formats should use between, rather than within-subjects, evaluations of the ratio 
formats. That happened in the studies on group-diffusion effect described in Section 2 of the 
previous chapter; nevertheless, differently from those, both numerator and denominator of a 
ratio should now be made explicit. Additionally, a between- rather than within-subjects design 
for the ratio formats under study was judged as more appropriate, in order to avoid that 
participants could disclose the equality of the two formulations
36
. Thus, unlike in Price and 
Mattews (2009, Study 1-4, still in Section 2) in our studies different participants would have 
assessed different ratio formats.  
The research work included twelve main studies, description of which has been organized in 
four distinct sections.  
 
 
Preliminary brief characterisation of the basic constructs investigated 
Focus of investigation regards the effects of ratio format presentation (smaller/larger numbers in 
the ratios) on perceived probability. Nevertheless, some other related measures normally 
assessed in the risk communication literature will be examined as well, in particular 
worrisomeness for the outcome probability, the perceived severity of the outcome, behavioural 
intentions, and numeracy level. In order to make reading as smooth as possible, it was judged 
convenient to briefly delineate here, the general utility of those measures, and to specify the 
rationale for their use in the present research. Here following, the concepts tapped by those 
constructs will be briefly described, together with the modality normally adopted to elicit them 
in the decision making literature, so to make any change adopted in the present studies evident 
to the reader. 
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 As affirmed by Kahneman (2003, p. 712), ―Intuitive judgments and preferences are therefore best 
studied in between-participants designs and in short experiments that provide little information about the 
experimenter‘s aims. Within-participant designs with multiple trials should be avoided because they 
encourage the participants to search for consistent strategies to deal with the task. Within-participant 
factorial designs are particularly undesirable because they provide an unmistakable cue that any factor 
that is varied systematically must be relevant to the target attribute (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).‖ 
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1. Perceived probability of an outcome 
The weight of a risk can be described as the severity of the possible harm that might 
occur from a given activity or event multiplied by the probability of the harm occurring (see, for 
instance, Savadori and Rubaltelli, 2008). This can be expressed by the following equation: 
 
(weight of risk) = (severity of harm) x (probability of occurrence) 
 
Thus, people‘s judgment on the level of perceived risk (i.e., the weight of the risk, e.g., ―In your 
opinion, how risky is X?‖) will not only enclose the subjective level of perceived probability of 
the event occurring (―In your opinion, how likely is that X happens?‖), but also the personal 
assessment of the gravity of that outcome (―How severe would X be?‖)- for a more detailed 
description of the severity construct, please see point 3. If the objective is to measure perceived 
probability in terms of risk magnitude estimation, thus, when the outcome is rather severe (e.g., 
Down syndrome), it is preferable to focus the question on probability rather than risk in order to 
properly tap one rather than the other concept (i.e., ―In your opinion, the probability of X 
happening is___?‖, rather than ―In your opinion, the riskiness of X happening is ___‖). This 
expedient will be adopted in the studies of the present dissertation.  
 
2. Perceived worry for an outcome 
 Studies of risk perception normally differentiate between cognitive and emotional 
reactions to threats. Normally, the experience of worry does not correspond to that of 
intellectual judgment. 
―With the word ‗worry‘ is denoted preoccupation with thoughts about uncertain and unpleasant 
events‖ (Sjoberg, 1998, p. 85). Worry is normally assessed by means of an item like, ―To what 
extend are you concerned about X?‖ Worry ratings give a different picture compared with risk 
judgments. In line with what affirmed by Sjoberg, namely that ―It can often be a good idea to 
use both types of dimensions [probability and worrisomeness perceptions] in a study on risk 
perception‖ (Sjoberg, 1998, p. 92), both dimensions will be assessed in the first study of this 
thesis. 
 
3. Perceived severity of an outcome 
The severity of a risk can be defined as the perception of the badness of the outcome in 
the case a hazard happens for sure. Generally speaking, higher risk activities have higher 
probabilities of more severe harm, while lower risk activities have lower probabilities of less 
severe harm. For example, Russian roulette would be considered a very high risk activity 
(perhaps a 1 in 5 chance of death) while reading a book would be considered a very low risk 
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activity (perhaps a 1 in a million chance of a paper cut). Nevertheless, like benefits, harms are 
also largely subjective, and their severity can be assessed differently by different people. In 
other words, harm that one person considers extremely severe another person might not care 
about very much at all. In case the two persons are asked an evaluation of the same probability 
of that harm happening, two profoundly different judgments could be given by them. It is 
expected that the first person gives a higher risk judgment than the second, because the higher 
perceived riskiness of that harm reflects a higher severity assessment. Thus, when eliciting a 
probability judgement on a negative event or outcome, it is important to disentangle the 
person‘s probability evaluation (i.e., perceived “probability of occurrence‖, in the weighting 
function above) from her assessment of the gravity of the outcome at stake (i.e., perceived 
―severity of harm‖, in the weighting function above). Perceived severity of the outcome at stake 
will be assessed in the first study of this thesis to separately account for that variable. 
Nevertheless, for the specific outcome investigated in this research (i.e., Down syndrome) one 
more aspect related to severity has to be considered. 
 
The extreme case of probability neglect 
One of the consequence of the ―risk as feelings‖ hypothesis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, 
and Welch, 2001) according to which people are more insensitive to probability variations for 
emotional and vivid outcomes than for pallid outcomes, is that the impact of probability 
depends strongly on the nature of the outcome. In other words, the probability weighting 
function simplified above would be flatter (i.e., overweighting would occur, especially for small 
probabilities) for vivid outcomes evoking emotions than for pallid outcomes. Taken to the 
extreme, such consequence could result in extreme insensitivity to probability, ―when the 
adverse event carries sharp and strong affective meaning, as in the case with a lottery jackpot or 
a cancer. In such situations, variation in probability often carries too little weight‖ (Slovic, 
2004, pp. 13-14). Similarly, but in a positive domain, as Lowenstein et al. (2001) observed, 
one‘s images and feelings toward winning the lottery are likely to be similar whether the 
probability is one in 10 million or 1 in 10,000. Authors further noted that responses to uncertain 
situations appear to have an all or none characteristic that is sensitive to the possibility rather 
than the probability of strong positive or negative consequences, causing very small 
probabilities to carry great weight. 
Support for these arguments can be found even in research of Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) 
that showed that, if the potential outcome of a gamble is emotionally powerful, its attractiveness 
or unattractiveness is relatively insensitive to changes in probability as great as from .99 to .01. 
Authors found, not only that people were insensitive to probability variations, but also that such 
insensitivity depended on the emotional impact of the associated outcomes. That basic point has 
received its clearest empirical confirmation in a striking study of people‘s willingness to pay to 
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avoid electric shocks. The central purpose of the study was to test the relevance of probability in 
―affect rich‖ decisions. The experiment that is relevant to the present case (i.e., Study 3) 
attempted to see whether varying the probability of harm would matter more, or less, in settings 
triggering strong emotions than in settings that seem relatively emotion-free. In the ―strong 
emotion‖ setting, participants were asked to imagine that they would participate in an 
experiment involving some chance of a ―short, painful, but not dangerous electric shock‖ 
(Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001, p. 188). In the relatively emotion-free setting, participants were 
told that the experiment entailed some chance of a $20 penalty. Participants were asked to say 
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid participating in the relevant experiment. In a 
similar way, a measure of the Willingness to Pay to avoid a risk was raised to calculate the 
Willingness to Reduce various fatality risks (Jones-Lee, Hammerton, and Philips, 1985) or that 
of preventing non-fatal road injuries (Jones-Lee, Loomes, and Philips, 1995), or of illness from 
eating oysters, for instance (Lin and Milon, 1995). In Rottenstreich and Hsee‘s study, some 
participants were told that there was a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome (either the $20 
loss or the electric shock); others were told that the chance was 99%, and still others were told 
that the chance was 100%. The central result was that variations in probability affected those 
facing the relatively emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than they affected people 
facing the more emotionally evocative outcome of an electric shock. For the cash penalty, the 
difference between the median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a 99% 
chance was predictably large and indeed consistent with the standard model: $1 to avoid a 1% 
chance, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance. For the electric shock, by contrast, the difference in 
probability made little difference to median willingness to pay: $7 to avoid a 1% chance, and 
$10 to avoid a 99% chance. Thus, apparently people pay a significant amount to avoid a small 
probability of an affect-laden hazard, and the amount that they pay does not vary greatly with 
changes in probability. In a similar fashion, in the health-related field. Levy and Baron (2005) 
examined people‘s assessment of badness of 56 different medical risks varying in the 
probability from a 1 to 100%. Participants‘ judgments showed a complete independence from 
the amount of probability stated, while they depended entirely on the outcome.  
Sunstein (2003) argued that that insensitivity, which he dubbed ―probability neglect,‖ explains 
overreaction to certain rare but emotionally powerful events such as terrorist acts. In practice, as 
a result of probability neglect people are often much more concerned about risks from terrorism 
than about statistically greater risks that they confront in ordinary life. That would happen 
because people tend to focus on the badness of the outcome, rather than on the probability that 
the outcome will occur, when strong emotions are involved in a judgment. In these conditions, 
people ―[...] are not closely attuned to the probability that harm will occur.‖(Sunstein, 2003, p. 
62). Among the studies described by Sunstein, a relevant one is that of Weinstein, Sandman, 
and Hallman (1998), where two conditions were compared, a high and a low outrage condition. 
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Results showed that a large difference in statistical seriousness had no effect in the ―high 
outrage‖ condition, with people responding the same way to a risk of 1 in 100,000 as to a risk of 
1 in 1,000,000. Even when the statistical risk was identical in the high outrage (nuclear waste) 
and low outrage (radon) cases, participants in the nuclear waste case reported a much greater 
perceived threat and a much higher intention to act to reduce that threat. What is more important 
for the present case, Sunstein (2003) argued ―[…] that when emotions are intense, calculation is 
less likely to occur, or at least that form of calculation that involves assessment of risks in terms 
of not only the magnitude but also the probability of the outcome‖ (p. 66- 67). We will return to 
this point in Study 1.1. 
 
4. Numeracy, or on “collective statistical illiteracy” 
For an educated citizenship in a modern democracy, statistical thinking would be as indispensable as 
reading and writing (attributed to H.G. Wells, quoted in Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, 
and Woloshin, 2007).  
 
How large is a 1 in 250 risk? People might view an expression like the one just 
presented without being able to translate it into a meaningful representation. The reasons for this 
phenomenon are mainly two. 
First of all, individuals experience difficulties in sensing numbers, and these difficulties 
become even greater when people have to grasp those that are not integer. Much evidence exists 
in fact in the developmental literature, proving that fractions and other related ratio concepts 
(rational numbers, decimals, proportions, and part–whole concepts) are especially difficult to 
learn (e.g., Hecht, Close, and Santisi, 2003; Reyna, 1991). When these numerical expressions 
are used to convey the probability of an uncertain outcome occurring rather than a fix partition 
of a quantity, people‘s difficulties are even furthermore increased due to the non intuitive ideas 
of probability and randomness. Indeed, several findings have showed that probabilities attached 
to outcomes are poorly comprehended by children and adolescents (e.g., Hoemann and Ross, 
1982; Piaget and Inhelder, 1975; Reyna and Brainerd, 1991, 1994; Siegler, 1981) as well as by 
adults (i.e., see the entire heuristic and biases approach). Structural as well as evolutional 
accounts have been proposed to explain laypeople‘s low understanding of fractions, partitions, 
and probabilistic concepts. In sum, individuals would not be able to translate a probability 
expression like the one stated above into some meaningful concept because of their poor 
comprehension of numbers and the concept of uncertainty. Some authors have argued, that as a 
consequence of such poor comprehension laypeople face difficult and stressful decisions, even 
in health-care (see, for instance, Estrada, Martin-Hrynlewicz, Peek, Collins, and Byrd, 2004; 
Rothman, Housam, Weiss, Davis, Gregory, Gebretsadik, et al., 2006). 
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Secondly, people‘s hard times in sensing numbers can be partly ascribed to the 
educational system of our societies. A widespread innumeracy– ―an inability to deal 
comfortably with the fundamental notions of numbers and chance‖ (Paulos, quoted in Hertwig, 
Zangerl, ,Biedert, and Margraf, 2008, p.3) - had been diagnosed long ago. Despite even a raise 
of requirements for numeracy, performance of 12
th
 graders has not changed in decades (see 
NAEP, for instance, Lee, Grigg, and Dion, 2007). Indeed, quite recent data from the American 
National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS) showed, that about half of the American population 
lacks the minimal mathematical abilities necessary to use numbers inserted in printed materials 
or to perform a numerical task requiring at least two sequential steps (Kirsch, Jungeblut, 
Jenkins, and Kolstad, reported in Reyna, Nelson, Han, and Dieckmann, 2009). Data have been 
further confirmed in a subsequent assessment of the nation‘s literacy (NAAL, 2003), estimating 
around 36% of the adult population (i.e., something like 93 million people) at a below-basic or 
basic level of performance, with quantitative items eliciting the worst results (Kutner, 
Greenberg, Jin, and Paulsen, also researches reported in Reyna, Nelson, Han, and Dieckmann, 
2009). The picture gets even more worrisome considering that some vulnerable groups (non-
native English speakers, poor people, older or less educated individuals) that have been 
identified as those more in need of a public health-service, have also been estimated as those in 
fact performing as the worst in those quantitative operations. The situation appears slightly 
better in Europe than in the U.S., as the gap between lower and higher educated people are 
smaller than in North America (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero, in press). Nevertheless, the level 
is still too low to ensure a sound comprehension of risk messages, as for instance a recent 
research on a representative German sample showed that only the 68.5% of items assessing the 
abilities required to understand numeric data in messages could be correctly answered (Galesic 
and Garcia-Retamero, 2010).  
Both rationales reported here for people‘s low ability in translating probability 
expressions into meaningful representations have evidenced the central role that individuals‘ 
level of numeracy-  namely people‘s ―facility with basic probability and numerical concepts‖ 
(Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, and Welch, 1997, p. 966)- has in explaining possible problems 
associated with risk perception. While even researchers have long recognized the importance of 
literacy for making informed health decisions, the same cannot be stated for numeracy (Reyna, 
Nelson, Han, and Dieckmann, 2009) despite its evident importance. Indeed, the 
acknowledgement of this construct‘s relevance is only a relatively recent thing, especially in the 
decision making literature.  
Subsumed by some authors within the broader concept of literacy, numeracy can be equated to 
quantitative literacy (Lipkus and Peters, 2009) as it encompasses the possession of those basic 
mathematical skills necessary to comprehend and use numerical information expressed in texts 
or displayed in charts, graphs, or tables. As such it has been defined as ―the ability to locate 
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numbers within graphs, charts, prose texts; and to perform appropriate arithmetical operations 
on text-based quantitative data‖ (Bernhardt, Brownfiled, and Parker, p. 6, quoted in Reyna et al., 
2009). However, as Reyna and colleagues have highlighted, numeracy has to be distinguished 
from the broader concept of health numeracy (for a comprehensive and detailed review of 
differences between the two constructs, see that source), in that the latter ―is not simply the 
ability to understand numbers but rather to apply numbers and quantitative reasoning skills in 
order to access health care, engage in medical treatment, and make informed health decisions‖ 
(Reyna et al., 2009, p. 947)
37
.  
In the studies reported in the present dissertation, the decision to adopt the numeracy instead 
than the health numeracy construct relied on the consideration, that despite given the domain of 
study (i.e., a health condition) health numeracy could have probably been more appropriate than 
numeracy, the latter had more often been object of analysis in researches in decision making 
than the former. As a corollary of such an extensive use, there was a relatively large number of 
evidence available for numeracy, while the opposite was true for what concerned health 
numeracy. That evidence provided, beside relevant instances of implementation of the construct 
assessment, a good basis for theoretical considerations. Furthermore, numeracy level had also 
been related with several individual and contextual features definitely relevant for the issue at 
study.  
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that those who are highly numerate have more ability to 
retrieve and use appropriate numerical principles, tend to be better at reading graphical aids 
(e.g., Zigmund-Fisher, Smith, Ubel, and Fagerlin, 2007), tend to rely more on numeric rather 
than verbal risk information from physicians (e.g., Black, Nease, and Toteson, 1995; 
Gurmankin, Baron, and Armstrong, 2004), and what is more relevant for present aims, tend to 
be less influenced by presentation format effects, like framing (Reyna, Nelson, Han, and 
Dieckmann, 2009). By contrast, those who are less numerate would perceive higher degrees of 
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 Among other skills, health numeracy includes indeed even the ability to assess the magnitude of risks, 
compare likelihood values, and ―understand decimals, fractions, percentages, probabilities, and 
frequencies, as these are the formats in which risk and benefit information is most often presented […]‖ 
(Reyna et al., 2009, p.946). As authors emphasized, though, these abilities are not possessed by everyone, 
but only by those who can be classified as at the highest level of numeracy, i.e. that encompassing ―[…] 
basic logic and quantitative reasoning skills, knowing when and how to perform multistep operations, and 
an understanding of ratio concepts, notably fractions, proportions, percentages, and probabilities […]‖ (p. 
945), Such level, though, is rarely achieved even by highly educated people (e.g., those with a University 
degree), or experts (e.g., health professionals). In a study of Estrada, Barnes, Collins, and Byrd (2004), for 
instance, a definitely low degree of ability with numbers was showed even in health personnel (e.g., 
medical students, nurses, doctors). Findings of that survey represented the practical demonstration that the 
education level is a misleading proxy for individuals‘ numeracy ability, as ―educational attainment does 
not ensure grade-level skills, and this is particularly true for mathematical skills […]‖ (Reyna et al., 2009, 
p. 948). In a similar way, Dehaene (1997) had already indicated that education attainment is not the 
proper factor to define numeracy: despite the fact children spend a significant amount of time learning the 
methods of mathematics at school, they might nevertheless not really comprehend how to apply those 
rules even in adulthood. Hence, numeracy has been claimed as an individual trait, as its degree has been 
shown to vary substantially across individuals (e.g., Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer, 2001; Peters, Västfjäll, 
Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, and Dickert, 2006).
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risk (i.e., overestimation of a probability), and would also lack a clear affective understanding of 
numbers (Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, and Dickert, 2006; but see Reyna and 
Brainerd, 2008). This lack of numerical skills would represent for them a crucial deficit, 
resulting in reduced medication compliance, difficult access to treatments, impaired risk 
communication, and poor medical outcomes (Reyna and Brainerd, 2007). Low numeracy ability 
has also been associated with greater susceptibility to extraneous factors, like effects of mood, 
or the way information is presented, as well as biases in judgment and decision making (Reyna 
et al., 2009, see also paragraph 1.1.3 in Chapter 2 for a more detailed description). Among 
systematic tendencies, even denominator neglect has been documented (see Peters et al., 2006), 
showing that numeracy affected participants‘ performance in a non-optimal Ratio-bias-type 
study involving the classic urn and balls game of chance.  
For all the reasons just mentioned , it was expected that our study participants‘ numeracy level 
could influence the degree to which they would have been biased by the variation of superficial 
details like the magnitude of the numbers employed in ratios used to express probability. 
For what concerns the choice of the inventories to assess the numeracy construct, both 
an objective and a subjective scale were used in the studies. Distinction between the two types 
of scales has been made in the literature based on the perspective of assessment for the 
construct. While in the case of objective scales people‘s level of numeracy is assessed from ―the 
outside‖ by means of tests calculating their performance, in the second case (i.e., subjective 
inventory) self-assessment of the level of confidence in numerical ability (i.e., subjective 
evaluation) takes place
38
.  
As objective scale, the one ideated by Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001) has been chosen; 
seemingly, the inventory is seemingly one of the most used in decision-making research, likely 
because its devisers expressly linked performance on such a scale to the way people perceive 
risk. Lipkus et al.‘s scale (2001) has been developed on the basis of the scale of Schwartz, 
Woloshin, Black, and Welch (1997), a three-item inventory that tested 1) the understanding of 
the chance concept (―Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is your best guess about 
how many times the coin would come up heads? X times out of 1,000‖), as well as 2) people‘s 
ability to convert a percentage like 1% into a proportion, namely into 10 in 1000 (―In the BIG 
BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best guess about 
how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket to BIG 
BUCKS? __ person(s) out of 1,000‖), and finally, 3) the ability to convert a proportion like 1 in 
1000 into a percentage, namely into 0.1% (―In ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSAKES, the 
chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING 
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 Yet, one more distinction in objective scales has been made depending on whether they focus on 
numbers rather than on a situation or a specific disease, with the first type of scale dubbed ―disease-
general‖, while the second ―disease-specific‖ (Reyna et al., 2009). 
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SWEEPSAKES win a car? ___%.‖). Beside a minor change to Schwartz and colleagues‘ three 
items (dice instead than lottery scenarios), Lipkus and others‘ scale further included eight 
questions referring to the health sector domain (but to non specified diseases/infections). Such 
expanded scale measures how well individuals can perform easy mathematical operations on 
risk magnitudes using proportions and percentages, how well they can convert percentages to 
proportions and vice-versa, or convert probabilities to proportions (for the complete list of items 
see Study 1.1. of Section 1, in which the scale has been used). 
As a subjective measure, instead, the Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS) of Fagerlin, Zikmund-
Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, and Smith (2007)- validated by Zikmund-Fisher, Smith, Ubel, 
and Fagerlin (2007)- has been used, see Study 2.2 (Section 2). Indeed, recently, some subjective 
measures have been proposed as valid substitutes of objective numeracy inventories, in that they 
do not contain mathematical questions and have no right/wrong answers. They showed to be 
good proxies for the objective concept of numeracy (see introduction to Study 2.2.) 
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SECTION 1, or 
A new bizarre systematic effect 
 
In the present section, two studies are exposed. In Study 1 it will be showed that the probability 
of a clinical condition was subjectively perceived as higher and more worrisome when 
expressed as ―1 in 200‖ than when expressed as ―5 in 1000‖ by women who were pregnant or 
had just given birth to a child. In Study 2, the effect was generalized to both genders in an adult 
population.  
 
Study 1.1 
 
Goals 
Study 1 was intended to investigate if a ―1 in 200‖ instead of ―5 in 1000‖ format used to convey 
the same .005 medical risk affected patients‘ subjective assessment of that risk. According to 
the literature previously reviewed, two antithetic hypotheses were putted forward: 
 
Hypothesis 1: According to the theories reviewed in Section 1 of Chapter 2 
(suggesting that, when evaluating probability conveyed through a ratio, people 
show a tendency to neglect denominators and to judge on the basis of the 
magnitude of numerators), a higher magnitude perception should be observed for 
a probability expressed as “5 in 1000” than as “1 in 200” even in single 
presentation conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: According to the group-diffusion effect described in Section 2 of 
Chapter 2 (suggesting that people neglect numerators, rather than denominators, 
when they evaluate a probability conveyed through a ratio), a higher magnitude 
perception should be expected for a probability expressed as “1 in 200” than as “5 
in 1000” when both terms (i.e., numerator and denominator) are explicit. 
 
It was hard to lean toward one of those hypotheses rather than the other, given that, as affirmed 
in the description of the rationale for the studies, neither experimental designs and material 
employed in one group of theories nor in the other‘s exactly reproduced the situation at study in 
the present dissertation. Nevertheless, following data of the literature on numerical cognition 
(see studies on the difference between encoding of small and large numbers- but integer ones 
only, for instance that on Weber‘s law (i.e., Fechner, 1860), intuitively it was judged more 
likely that individuals would assign higher evaluations of probability to ratios employing larger 
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(i.e., 5 in 1000) rather than smaller (i.e., 1 in 200) numbers, even in single presentation 
conditions. It was reasoned, that very likely individuals would have given an assessment of the 
magnitude of the ratio by looking at the magnitude conveyed of both terms (i.e., the numerator 
and the denominator): the higher the numbers were, the higher the perceived probability for the 
event. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was thought of as the most likely one. 
The same hypotheses (1 and 2), and the same logic adopted for perceived probability 
were deemed as valid for the degree of worry expressed for the outcome. Instead, it was 
thought, that severity should have not been affected by a format effect, since the severity of an 
outcome is a judgment of an event as already occurred (hence, no probability is involved, but 
certainty).  
Finally, it was reasoned of the possible role in perceived probability of people‘s facility 
with numbers and probability concepts. In accordance with the literature demonstrating that 
those who are highly numerate tend to be less biased by presentation format effects (e.g., 
framing, see Peters and Levin, 2008), it was expected that those showing less competence in 
performing numerical operations and dealing with the concept of uncertainty could also be those 
showing a higher degree of influence of the ratio format in which the probability was expressed 
(smaller/larger numbers in the numerator and denominator of the ratio)- see Hypothesis 3, 
below. Indeed, those that would be classified as low numerates were expected not to possess the 
necessary abilities to draw a meaning from the probability information communicated through 
the ratio format, because of their difficulties with numbers, proportions, and more generally 
with the concept of probability. As a consequence of that, it was likely that they would have 
tended in a larger measure than the other participants to rely on a heuristic-type of processing of 
the information, one for instance where superficial details like the absolute magnitude of the 
numbers employed would be determinant for the probability assessment. On the contrary, 
thanks to their higher ability with numbers and the idea of probability, high numerates were 
expected to be less (or not at all) prone to the bias under study, likely because of the supposed 
higher capacity to draw a meaning from the probability information communicated. Thus, the 
hypothesis on numeracy was: 
 
Hypothesis 3: More numerate individuals should be less susceptible to numerical 
format effects in perceived probability (i.e., 1 in 200 perceived as conveying a 
smaller/larger probability than 5 in 1000).  
 
Method 
Participants. A total of a 63 women, patients of a hospital in North Italy, took part in the study 
voluntarily. The large majority of them (74.6%, n = 47) were recruited at an out-patients‘ 
(gynaecologist), some of them (23.8%, n = 15) at the Sterility Centre of the hospital, while one 
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person was recruited in a maternity ward of the hospital. In the present study and in the others 
described in this dissertation (where not specified differently) individuals did not receive reward 
for participation. 
Mean age was 33.63 years (SD = 4.71), varying between a minimum of 22 and a maximum of 
45 (one participant did not disclose her age). Most of participants had completed high school (n 
= 33, 53%) or had already a University degree (n = 21, 34%), and only few of them (n = 8%) 
had completed the lowest education level in Italy. Almost all women (n = 61, 95.2%) had an 
occupation at the moment of survey completion, and only one was unemployed (one person did 
not answer to this question).  
The large majority of women (87.1%, n = 54) were pregnant at the moment of survey 
completion, 8 (12.9%) had just given birth (one person did not disclose this information). The 
thirty-nine percent of them (n = 24) had already one or more children, while the remaining 
60.7% (n = 37) did not have children (2 people did not answer to this question).  
 
Design and material. Participants read a scenario (for the exact wording, please see the 
Appendix
39
) where they were exhorted to imagine that one of their friends had just bought a trip 
to an exotic country. They were informed on the statistical risk of contracting malaria in that 
country: the probability was expressed through a numerical ratio. The single independent 
variable manipulated between-subjects in the study was the format in which the value of the 
probability could be expressed. Indeed, its numerator and denominator were numbers that could 
be comparatively smaller or larger. In the first case (i.e., smaller numbers), the ratio used was 1 
in 200
40
, while in the second case (i.e., larger numbers), 5 in 1000 was used.  
Four dependent variables were assessed: the subjective magnitude of the probability of 
infection, the degree to which this information would be found worrisome by participants, the 
perceived severity of the health-related outcome at stake (i.e., malaria), and the degree of 
participants‘ numeracy. 
Perceived probability was measured by asking a personal assessment of the friend‘s probability 
of contracting malaria going to Kenya on a seven-point Likert scale anchored to ―negligible‖ 
and ―almost certain‖- all points in this and the other scales employed in the present study were 
verbally labelled. Similarly, worry for infection (in the hypothetical situation that the participant 
would go to Kenya) was measured on a 7-point Likert scale anchored to ―not at all worried‖ and 
―very much worried‖. Finally, perceived severity of malaria was measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale anchored to ―very severe‖ and ―not at all severe‖- this question had to be reverse scored 
for analysis.  
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The experimental material of all the studies described in this dissertation (where not specified 
differently) is reported in the Appendix. 
40
1 in 200 is the approximated and rounded frequency of fetuses with Down syndrome to normal fetuses 
at 16 weeks of pregnancy for a 36-year- old woman (Hook, Cross, and Schreinemachers, 1983). 
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On a separate page, participants read the 11-item inventory measuring numeracy, substantially 
corresponding to that of Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001) apart from minor changes not 
altering its sense
41
.  
 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (numbers in 
the ratio format: smaller/larger) constructed to follow the experimental design. A paper version 
of the questionnaire was handed out personally to each individual by the experimenter after the 
participant had read and signed an informed consent form. The completed copies were collected 
by the experimenter who also debriefed participants on the study aims. Individuals could 
complete the questionnaire at their pace, without any time constraints.  
Ethical approval. The study required an ethical approval because it was addressed to a special 
population (i.e., patients, many of them pregnant women). Under the requirement of the Clinical 
Ethical Committee, the questionnaire did not include any sensitive question that participants 
might feel unconformable answering. Indeed, the scenario employed in the questionnaire should 
have included the doctor-patient communication of the probability of having a child with Down 
syndrome, rather than the probability of contracting malaria in an exotic country. However, 
Down syndrome had to be substituted with an outcome not directly related to the current health 
condition of participants, in such a way to possibly avoid anxiety in the already sensitive 
individuals. For the same reason, the risk mentioned in the scenario had to attributed to a 
participant‘s friend instead than to the participant herself.  
Anonymity and confidentiality in the treatment of the data gathered were ensured to 
participants. 
 
Statistics. Most of the analyses of the present study and of those described in this dissertation 
were run by means of widely known analytical tools available in SPSS. 
 
Results 
Perceived probability, worry, and severity. Figure 1 displays the mean values of the three 
dependent measures as a function of the ratio format used to communicate the probability in the 
two experimental conditions of the present study. The visual inspection of Figure 1 immediately 
suggests that changing the ratio format changed patients‘ subjective assessments of probability, 
as well as the degree they found it worrisome, while not affecting the subjective severity of the 
negative event (i.e., malaria). 
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A as question number 5 of the original expanded numeracy scale included two subquestions (i.e. A: how 
many people […] out of 100?, and B: how many people […] out of 1000?), we preferred to split it into 2 
separate questions to increase its clarity.  
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Fig. 1. Subjective ratings of probability, severity, and worry for the outcome, as 
a function of ratio format in the two experimental conditions  
 
This visual impression was conﬁrmed by a multivariate analysis of variance42. Ratio format had 
a global impact on the set of dependent measures, F(3,59) = 2.84, p = .045, ηp² = .13. This 
global impact, though, was the result of a localized impact on the probability and worry 
measures, rather than on the severity measure. The subjective magnitude of the probability was 
3.84 (SD = 1.08) when it was phrased as ―1 in 200‖, and 3.10 (SD = 1.27) when it was phrased 
as ―5 in 1000‖, a signiﬁcant difference, F(1,61) = 6.31, p = .02, ηp²= .09. A higher perceived 
probability was detected in the format using smaller instead than larger numbers at the 
numerator and at the denominator, contrary to what expected. Similarly, the degree each 
participants would worry about the risk was 5.16 (SD = 1.22) when the probability was phrased 
as ―1 in 200‖, and 4.23 (SD = 1.50) when it was phrased as ―5 in 1000‖, a signiﬁcant difference, 
F(1,61) = 7.32, p = .01, ηp²= .11. However, the subjective severity of malaria was the same in 
the two conditions (M = 2.31, SD= .82 vs. M = 2.45, SD = .72), F(1 61) = 0.51, p =.48, ηp²
  =
 .01. 
Thus, results of this first part of the analyses supported Hypothesis 2, but rejected Hypothesis 1, 
contrary to our expectations. 
To further establish that the increased worry expressed by the participants in the ―1 in 
200‖condition was mediated by an increase in subjective probability, a path analysis by means 
of a series of three regressions was conducted. The ratio format (dummy coded, 0 standing for 
―5 in 1000‖) was a signiﬁcant predictor of how much the risk was worrisome, as shown by the 
standardized regression coefficient β = .33, t = 2.7, p = .01, and a signiﬁcant predictor of 
                                                          
42
 Except when differently stated, all tests used a critical alpha value of .05, and the p-value presented is 
for a two-tailed test. 
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subjective probability, β = .31, t = 2.5, p= .01. Subjective probability also was a significant 
predictor of how worrisome the risk was, β = .61, t = 6.1, p < .001. When ratio format and 
subjective probability were simultaneously entered as predictors of how worrisome the risk was, 
subjective probability remained a significant predictor, β = .57, t = 1.5, p = .15. A Sobel test 
(value of which was 2.3, p = .02) confirmed that the contribution of the ratio format dropped 
significantly when subjective probability was entered into the regression. 
 
The moderating role of numeracy. The overall percentage of correct responses to each of the 
11 items of the Numeracy scale is presented in Table 1. Performance on single items was 
comparable to that found for a sample of adult people in Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001, Exp. 
3) and highlighted the difficulty with some simple questions testing rather basic abilities 
required in important decisions (see, for instance, items 2 and 4).  
The mean numeracy score was 7.11 out of 11 possible (range 0-11). Because the distribution 
was highly skewed
43
 (see Fig. 2), a median split (Mdn = 8) was performed that allowed to form 
two groups, one including those participants (n = 32, ―high numerates‖ from now on) who had 
more facility with numbers and calculations (8 or more correct items on the scale) and the other 
(n = 31, ―low numerates‖ from now on) those who were less able in that respect (1- 7 correct 
items). When the two groups were analysed separately for the main dependent variable (i.e., 
probability perception) according to the ratio format
44
, Mann-Whitney tests
45
 returned a non 
significant difference in the two experimental conditions for low numerates (Z= -.95, p = .34), 
but a significant difference for high numerates (Z= -2.54, p = .01). This finding, in contrast with 
Hypothesis 3, meant that, only among the high numerate participants the 1 in 200 format was 
perceived as indicating a significantly higher probability than the 5 in 1000 format, while 
instead low numerates did not perceive any difference between the two formats.  
  
                                                          
43
 The distribution of the Numeracy scale was not normal (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = .154(63), p = 
.001). 
44
 This procedure is similar to that adopted in Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, and Dickert 
(2006). 
45
 Non parametric tests were employed since the numerosities in each of the groups were too low (n < 30) 
to apply parametric tests. 
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Table 1 
Overall participants’ performance to each of the items composing the Numeracy inventory 
employed, in order of decreasing accuracy 
 
Item  
Percentage 
correct 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected 
to get the disease out of 100? |______|  
81 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected 
to get the disease out of 1000? |______| 
79 
6. If person A‘s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B‘s risk is 
double that of A‘s, what is B‘s risk? |_____|% 
78 
7. If person A‘s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B‘s 
risk is double of that of A‘s, what is B‘s risk?                                                                                           
|_________| out of |________| 
73 
5. Which of the following numbers represents the highest probability? |__| 1%, |__| 
10%, |__| 5% 
73 
10. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as 
having a ___% chance of getting the disease. 
71 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the highest probability? |__| 1 in 
100, |__| 1 in 1000, |__| 1 in 10 
61 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. 
What is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 
1,000 people each buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS? |________| 
57 
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how 
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? |_______|  
54 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 
in 1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES 
win a car? |______|% 
44 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about 
how many of them are expected to get infected? |______|                                                                                                  
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of participants’ performance according to the 
overall score in the Numeracy scale 
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Discussion 
Using either 1 in 200 or 5 in 1000 when communicating a .005 health-related risk induced a bias 
in the degree of perceived probability. However, this distortion was not in the direction 
suggested by studies consistent with the idea of denominator neglect implied in explanations 
described in Section 1 of the theoretical chapter, which we had intuitively supported. Indeed, 
patients who would neglect denominators when assessing probability ratios would perceive ―5 
in 1000‖ as conveying a higher probability than ―1 in 200‖, and not the contrary, as present 
results instead showed. Thus, findings were congruent with Hypothesis 2 suggesting that people 
neglect numerators, rather than denominators, when evaluating a probability conveyed through 
a ratio in single presentation conditions, and that they focus on the magnitude of the 
denominator. Indeed, a higher magnitude perception for probability was found when expressed 
as ―1 in 200‖ than as ―5 in 1000‖. However, applicability of the group-diffusion explanation 
implied in the findings to the present case was perceived as rather awkward. Could it be, that 
people‘s higher perceived probability of having a Down syndrome-affected child detected in the 
1 in 200 rather than in the 5 in 1000 condition be due to a lower feeling of safety when being 
alone (compared to when other 4 possibilities were there, as in the 5 in 1000 case)? The 
question was challenging, but such explanation had, anyway, to be taken with caution, given 
that present experimental design and material were different from those used in group-diffusion 
experiments. 
Undoubtedly, instead, people‘s evaluative behaviour proved irrational, as the two different 
expressions of probability correspond in fact to the same .005 value. Looking at it from the 
point of view of classic economic theory, it was a case of contravention of the invariance 
principle, as completely ―rational‖ people should not modify their assessments on the basis of 
the presentation format of problems. If people could really grasp the numerical meaning of 
proportions and rates, and had a clear understanding of those numbers, the probability they 
perceive should have not varied depending on the format used for expression. However, it is 
known instead, that 1) the human representational system for quantities is not a perfect one, in 
that mental representation of numbers follows some rules that result in well known simplifying 
effects (see, for instance, Weber‘s and Fechner‘s law, 1860); and that 2) fractions and ratios are 
especially hard concepts for the human mind (see, for instance Hecht, Close, and Santisi, 2003). 
Thus, considering that no objectively ―right‖ representation of numbers exists, it seemed more 
appropriate not to talk about ―irrational‖ participants, but to affirm that they used some kind of 
heuristic based on the superficial features of the stimuli (i.e., magnitude of the numbers in the 
ratios) to build a personal assessment of those quantities.  
Worry for the condition showed a tendency similar to that described for perceived 
probability, but when investigating the causal direction between these two variables, it was 
found that people judged the risk more worrying because it was evaluated as more probable, and 
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not vice versa. In accordance with that, it was decided that in Study 2, and in the next 
experiments, focus of research would have mainly been on the subjective assessment of 
probability.  
The third construct measured, namely perceived severity of the outcome, did not show a 
significant variation across the two experimental conditions, as hypothesized.  
Furthermore, data highlighted a general lack of understanding of both the concept of 
fractions/ ratios, and of that of risk. Although the predictions were that low rather than high 
numerates would be those more exposed to the bias, because of their higher degree of difficulty 
with numbers, findings showed the opposite. Indeed, the high numerates were those perceiving 
a difference between the two formats in the degree of probability conveyed, with the 1 in 200 
ratio expressing a higher probability than the 5 in 1000 one. It might be, that highly numerate 
individuals showed the bias because they were those who really processed numerical 
information of the ratio expressions. Low numerate individuals, instead, could have not 
processed numerical information, and therefore did not show the bias. Whatever the right 
interpretation, nevertheless, these findings called for a replica given the low number of 
individuals tested on whose basis the analyses were performed.  
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Study 1.2 
 
Goals 
In Study 1 a bizarre bias in probability evaluation was detected showing female patients‘ 
irrational tendency to judge the same health-related probability value as higher if stated 
through a ratio employing comparatively smaller (i.e., 1, 200) rather than larger (i.e., 5, 1000) 
numbers at the numerator and denominator. The result was clearly inconsistent with the idea of 
denominator neglect suggested by Chapter 2 Section1-like studies, and expressed in 
Hypothesis 1. Instead, it was coherent with Hypothesis 2 in line with the theories reviewed in 
Section 2 of Chapter 2, suggesting that, when evaluating probability conveyed through a ratio, 
people show a tendency to neglect denominators and judge on the basis of the magnitude of 
numerators. 
Study 1.2 aimed at achieving two goals, namely 
 
1) to replicate the main result obtained in Study 1, extending it to the Down syndrome 
domain, and to the general adult population; 
2) to verify if the bias could be moderated by the perceived severity and the familiarity 
with the clinical condition.  
 
Regarding the first goal, i.e. replica, beside the obvious consideration that a tendency 
found only in one study should not be taken seriously unless replicated, other reasons urged us 
to replicate the findings. First of all, it has to be considered that the population tested in Study 
1 included a rather sensitive group of individuals (i.e., pregnant women, and new mothers), 
thus extending the finding to non-sensitive individuals (i.e., general population) was seen as 
advisable. Secondly, the effect had been tested on women only, thus both females and males 
were meant to be involved if the aim was that of generalizing results to all the adult population 
(i.e., prospective parents of both genders). Third, in Study 1 the outcome was fictitiously 
attributed to a friend, that is a person who is close to the protagonist but nonetheless is not the 
protagonist (for the differences between self and other perspective, see e.g., Kirkpatrick and 
Epstein, 1992). Beside the fact that self- rather than others-perspective constituted our real 
object of interest, a replica of the effect in self-attribution conditions seemed also more 
ecological, as in real life many more situations see people faced with choices related to their 
own health rather than to one friend‘s or relative‘s.  
The second goal, considered the fact that perceived severity and familiarity with the 
disease could have been two potential moderators of the effect found in perceived probability, 
because some studies have argued for an influence of the availability of examples of cases 
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involving the occurrence of the health outcome on its perceived probability: The greater the 
availability, the greater the probability of the outcome would seem. For instance, Gates (2004) 
mentioned the moderating role of already having, or knowing someone who has, a child with a 
particular birth defect. According to the author, for such a person it would be easier that 
examples of disabled children be brought to mind by a communication of risk related to birth 
defects than for another who does not have similar familiarity with the issue. As a 
consequence, such person would perceive the same probability of the risky outcome as higher 
than a person who does not have a similar degree of familiarity with the issue. In a analogous 
direction can be classified Wertz, Sorenson, and Heeren (1986)‘s claim that the risk of having 
a disabled child tends to be interpreted as higher if a woman has personal experience with an 
affected child than if she does not. Scholars, indeed, found that having a disabled child at home 
was associated with a more pessimistic interpretation of risk than that of people without an 
affected child at home, an interpretation which in turn tended to produce a higher risk 
perception. 
Thus, summing up these considerations with the original need of broadening Study 1 findings to 
the general population, three were the specific hypotheses for the present study, namely: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Probability will be judged as higher when expressed as “1 in 200” 
rather than as “5 in 1000”.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Those individuals who perceive greater severity of the disease will 
show the bias (i.e., 1 in 200 > 5 in 1000) to a greater extent.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Those individuals who are more familiar with the health-related 
outcome (i.e., that already have, or know someone who has, a Ds affected child) 
will show the bias (i.e., 1 in 200 > 5 in 1000) to a greater extent.  
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and thirty-four individuals (90 women, 43 men, and 1 individual not 
reporting the gender) from the general population took part in the study voluntarily. They were 
approached at several public locations (e.g., libraries, IT rooms, common areas), mainly in a 
University in North Italy. The experimenter asked them individually to participate in the 
research. Mean age of participants was 24.90 years (SD = 8.14, ranging from 18 to 66). Many of 
them (47%) were University students. Accordingly, education level was fairly high, as 80.5% of 
the sample had completed college (n = 95), 16.1% (n = 19) had a University degree, and 1 
person had a higher level education, while 3 participants (2.5%) had the lowest level of 
education in Italy (6 participants did not answer to this question). The large majority of the 
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sample- 92% (n = 102)- had no children (13 individuals did not answer to this question). The 
majority of participants (n = 107) did not report whether they had been or not communicated the 
probability of having a child with Down syndrome by a health professional; only 2 of those who 
answered (i.e., 11.8%) did it in an affirmative way. 
 
Design and material. Participants read a fictitious scenario describing a couple of parents-to-be 
being communicated by the gynaecologist the maternal-age probability that their child would be 
affected by Down syndrome. Such probability, expressed through a numerical ratio, could be 
expressed in two variants- the single factor manipulated between-subjects in the study: the 
magnitude of numerator and denominator was modified, and could be either comparatively 
smaller (i.e., ―1 in 200‖), or comparatively larger (i.e., ―5 in 1000‖).  
After having read the scenario (whose instructions asked to role-play one of the protagonists, 
namely, Anna, the mother-to-be, if females, or Luca, the father-to-be if males), participants 
were asked to rate within this context their subjective perception of the magnitude of the 
probability of having a Down syndrome affected child on a 7-point Likert-scale anchored to 
―extremely low‖ and ―extremely high‖ with all points verbally labelled. Next, two further 
questions followed. The first question assessed the perceived severity of the disease on a 5-point 
Likert scale from ―not at all severe‖ to ―extremely severe‖46, while the second one assessed the 
degree of knowledge of the disease in terms of personal experiences with people affected by the 
condition (i.e., ―familiarity‖)- for the experimental material employed, please see the 
Appendix
47
.  
 
Procedure. The study was described as part of a broader study on risk communication. A paper 
version of the questionnaire was handed out personally to each individual by the experimenter, 
who later collected the completed copies and debriefed participants on the study aims; 
individuals could complete the questionnaire at their pace, without any time constraints
48
. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions constructed to follow the 
experimental design. A minimum of 30 participants per condition was necessary to make 
statistical comparison valid. Individuals were allowed an unrestricted amount of time to 
complete the questionnaire.  
 
                                                          
46
 This time, severity did not measure the probability of the outcome, but the outcome alone- i.e., 
―According to you, how serious is Down syndrome?‖ instead of ―According to you, how serious would 
be the X probability of having a Down syndrome affected child?‖ 
47
 All the questions in the questionnaire appeared on a separate page so to maximize participants‘ 
attention to the information presented in that only page- the question on perceived probability appeared in 
the same page as the related scenario. 
48
 The same procedure was employed for all the other studies reported in the present dissertation. When 
not differently stated, thus, it will not be repeated in the next studies. 
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Results 
Data of ten participants had to be removed from the sample because they declared not knowing 
how to rate the severity of the Down syndrome disease. Likely, their probability assessment of 
the ratio was not the result of a sound evaluation. Thus, the final number of participants in the 
sample was 124. 
 
The effect due to the magnitude of the numbers employed in the ratio. Ratio format had an 
impact on the main dependent measure, namely perceived probability, as showed by the 
significant result of a t-test comparison of the means in the two experimental conditions, t(122)= 
2.60, p = .01. Indeed, the subjective magnitude of the probability was 3.75 (SD = 1.43) when 
that was phrased as ―1 in 200‖, and 3.12 (SD = 1.27) when it was phrased as ―5 in 1000‖. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 was supported by data.  
 
The influence of perceived severity of the disease and familiarity with the disease. Aim of 
these analyses was that of understanding whether the format bias (1 in 200 > 5 in 1000) was 
greater/lower/the same for a) those individuals that perceived the possible outcome as highly 
severe and for those who perceived it as lowly severe (i.e., severity variable); b) those 
individuals who were familiar to a lower vs. greater extent with the disease under study (i.e., 
familiarity variable).  
 
a) Neither the median split (Mdn = 3), nor that on the basis of the 33rd and 66th percentiles 
(i.e., 3 and 4) on the severity measure returned groups that could be compared in terms of 
numerosity- see Table 1. Indeed, the majority of the sample was distributed between the 
two answers, namely that affirming that Down syndrome is a ―quite severe‖ disease (46% 
of the sample, n = 57), and that affirming it is a ―very severe‖ disease (29%, n = 36). 
Hence, it was not possible to test Hypothesis 2. 
Table 1 
Distribution of participants according to the perceived severity of the disease 
(Down syndrome) 
 
            Answer    Frequency   %   Valid % 
Not all severe 3 2.4 2.4 
Slightly severe 19 15.3 15.3 
Quite severe 57 46.0 46.0 
Very severe 36 29.0 29.0 
Extremely 
severe 
9 7.3 7.3 
Total 124 100.0 100.0 
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b) In a similar way, unfortunately participants‘ distribution on the degree of familiarity with 
the disease was highly skewed, because the majority of answers were either on the 2
nd
 (―I 
have seen Down syndrome affected-people but never interacted with them‖) or 3rd answer 
(―I have been interacting with them, but sporadically‖) - see Table 2. Thus, it was not 
possible to split participants on the basis of the mean familiarity measure, nor on that of the 
median familiarity measure as correct analyses would require; both procedures resulted in 
largely unbalanced groups.  
It was decided, nevertheless, to try some explorative analyses, and hence such a different 
dichotomisation of participants was created. When those participants occupying the most 
extreme positions on the variable were excluded from analysis (i.e., those who had never 
heard about the disease, n = 12; and those who had been interacting with, or normally used 
to interact with, Down syndrome-affected people, n = 17), the remaining participants were 
split in two groups, namely those ―lowly familiar‖ [with the disease], n = 44 (i.e., those 
who declared to have heard about Down syndrome disease, but never seen a person 
affected by the disease, and those who stated they have seen Down syndrome-affected 
people, but had never been interacting with one of them), and those ―highly familiar‖ [with 
the disease], n =59 (i.e., those who have interacted, even if sporadically, with people 
having Down syndrome). While there was no effect due to the format of the ratios in the 
former type of participants (Z = - .68, p = . 50), the latter instead showed the bias in 
perceived probability (Z = - 2.00, p = .046). Thus, despite these results would call for a 
replica, it can be affirmed that Hypothesis 3 was corroborated by data. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Distribution of participants according to the declared degree of familiarity with 
the disease (Down syndrome) 
Answer Frequency   %    Valid % 
Never heard about it 0 0 0 
Heard about but never seen  12 9.9 9.8 
Seen but never interacted with 32 26.4 28.5 
Interacted with, but sporadically 59 48.8 48.0 
Frequently interacted with 17 14.0 13.8 
Total 123 99.2 100.0 
Missing answers 1 0.8  
Total 124 100.0  
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Discussion 
Study 1.2 generalized the effect described for female patients in Study 1 to the general adult 
population and for the risk that was the actual object of study of the present work (i.e., that of 
having a Down syndrome- affected child). In particular, it was found that when evaluating a 
probability, laypeople‘s perception was influenced by the magnitude of the numbers employed 
in the ratios: Using ―1 in 200‖ resulted in a larger probability perception than using ―5 in 1000‖, 
despite corresponding to the same .005 probability. Such bizarre bias was found not only in the 
case the outcome at study was described as potentially affecting a person which was close to the 
participant (i.e., a friend, see Study 1), but also when the participant her/himself was the person 
potentially affected by the outcome (i.e., in self-perspective, see Study 2).  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to test whether the perceived severity of the disease had 
influenced the bias under examination, due to the fact that an exact median split was not feasible 
(see the highly skewed distribution of participants along this variable). The same has to be 
affirmed for what concerned the level of familiarity with the disease, but when those individuals 
at the extremes of the scale (i.e. those that can be considered in the dark about the medical 
condition under study, and those, that on the contrary, are completely familiar with it) were 
excluded from analysis, familiarity level showed an interesting mediating effect on the 
appearance of the bias under study. Indeed, only participants that had high familiarity with the 
disease showed a higher probability perception for the 1 in 200 rather than the 5 in 1000 format.  
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SECTION 2, or 
Boundaries of the bias 
 
In Section 1, a new bizarre bias has been established: When the same probability of a medical 
outcome was expressed through a ratio format, its perception was systematically higher when 
the numbers in the ratio were smaller (i.e., 1 in 200) rather than larger (i.e., 5 in 1000). In the 
present section, six experiments are presented. 
In Study 2.1, the bias in probability perception found in Section 1 will not only receive 
additional corroboration, but further extension to those less frequent but still possible cases 
where a ratio employs a larger denominator (i.e., 10,000). Indeed, it will be showed, that in 
terms of probability perceptions 1 in 200 > 5 in 1000, and also that 1 in 200 > 50 in 10,000. 
Exploratory analyses conducted on individual‘s decision style (despite numerous problems 
blurring indexes on which basis the categorisation will be made) will reveal an apparent 
association of the bias with individuals‘ experientiality score. Nevertheless, the expected higher 
appearance of the bias in those individuals high in experientiality compared with those low in 
experientiality will not manifest; on the contrary, low experientials will be those showing a 
stronger bias, probably because they elaborated numbers at least to a certain degree. Finally, in 
this study previous results showing that a high level of numeracy is associated with the bias (see 
Study 1.1) will be confirmed with a subjective measure of the construct.  
In the next study (i.e., 2.2), it will be showed that the bias extends well beyond the 
specific numerical ratios considered till then, as it will prove valid for comparisons between 
proportions (i.e., ratios in a ―1 in X‖ format) and rates with 1000 as denominator. The 
systematic tendency to perceive the same probability as higher when expressed in a ―1 in X‖ 
than in a generic ―N in NX‖ format will be dubbed the ―1 in X effect” as effect of the 
generalisation of results to ratios with that superficial structure.  
Study 2.3 will confirm the validity of the bias when rates using 100 (120, to be precise) 
as denominator will be employed; furthermore, exploratory analyses on the degree of 
understanding of the two types of format, will confirm results obtained in Study 2.2 on the same 
variable but through a different inventory. Indeed, in a similar fashion, no difference will be 
found between ―1 in X‖ and ―Y in 100‖ (or ―Y in 1000‖) formats in the difficulty they pose for 
comprehension- an unexpected result if one considers claims of a higher difficulty of 
proportions rather than of rates stemming from the literature. 
Till then, results will seem to converge on some specific features of the ―1 in X‖ format. 
A further study, i.e., 2.4, will be conducted to exclude, that the higher probability perception for 
―1 in X‖ than for ―N in NX‖ formats found reflects in fact a general focus on the denominator of 
the ratio, rather than a specific effect of the ―1 in X‖ format. It will be showed that such 
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possibility is very unlikely, as the probability perceptions of two equivalent ratios, none 
appearing in formats featuring directly a ―1 in X‖, will not differ significantly. However, a 
direct comparison between pairs of equivalent ―1 in X‖ and ―N in NX‖ formats, and pairs of 
equivalent N in NX formats will be deemed as necessary to demonstrate, that only when the ―1 
in X‖ format is present in the comparison, the effect in perceived probability manifest itself. 
Such demonstration will be showed in Study 2.6, where the idiosyncrasy of the ―1 in X‖ format 
found for abstract ratio values (namely, not referred to an outcome, see Study 2.5) will receive 
further confirmation in a contextualized situation. Indeed, while people will generally tend to 
transform ratios expressed in ―N in NX‖ formats, and they will not do that with a ratio in ―1 in 
X‖ format.  
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Study 2.1 
 
A special thanks to Sandra Eccel for collection of data presented in this study 
 
Goals 
Studies 1 and 2 of the previous section assessed a bias in laypeople‘s probability perception due 
to two specific ratio formats (i.e., 1 in 200 and 5 in 1000). In particular, the bias consisted in an 
irrational tendency to judge the same health-related probability value as higher if stated through 
a ratio employing comparatively smaller (i.e., 1, 200) rather than larger (i.e., 5, 1000) numbers 
at the numerator and denominator.  
The first issue addressed in the present study was the following: What about this 
tendency when numbers even higher than those already analyzed are used in the ratios? Despite 
probably less frequent in face-to-face communication, the employment of large numbers in a 
ratio expressing a probability takes place even for medical risks. It is especially the case of 
mass-media-driven communications on base-rates of events happening in a population. But it 
can also be the case of a physician-patient communication, when for instance the doctor is 
suggesting vaccination against a disease to her/his patient about to go on vacation in an exotic 
country. Or, that of different treatments for a disease in terms of survival rates (i.e., number of 
people that get completely cured, for instance, per 100,000 people). Garcia-Retamero and 
Galesic (in press-b, p. 1), for example, referred to the recent case of communications on swine 
ﬂu pandemic deaths (―about 5700 deaths out of 440,000 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases in the 
world‖), and that of information on lung and stomach cancer in the United Kingdom (―40.1 and 
5.7 deaths per 100,000 people per year‖) as example of the use of ratios employing larger 
denominators.  
If in similar cases, the use of large denominators can be necessary, nevertheless, grasping the 
meaning of such numbers may be particularly difficult both for laypeople and specialists, for 
mainly two reasons.  
First of all, because of the fuzzy representation of such quantities in the mind: some authors 
have claimed that numbers follow the same ―psychophysical function‖ described by work of 
Weber and Fechner and known as the ―Weber‘s law‖ (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860). Weber‘s 
law is believed to characterize ―our diminished sensitivity to a wide range of perceptual and 
cognitive entities—brightness, loudness, heaviness, and money—as their underlying magnitudes 
increase‖ (Slovic, 2007, p. 6). According to some scholars (see Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and 
MacGregor, 2004), encoding of quantities in the experiential system (besides in the analytic 
one), would follow those rules. In other words, some scholars think, that the affective system is 
designed to make individuals sensitive to small changes in the environment (e.g., the difference 
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between 0 and 1 deaths) with the drawback of rendering them insensitive to larger changes 
further away from zero (e.g., the difference between 800 and 900 deaths), a tendency that has 
been dubbed ―psychophysical numbing‖ (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich, 
1997). If that principle is valid even in the field of medical diseases, and for the probability of 
having a Down syndrome-affected child, then some specific predictions can be made for the 
outcome analysed in the present work.  
Also, to many proportions with large denominators are confusing, as it has been stressed by 
Grimes and Snively (1999). That is exemplified in the words reported by authors (p. 910) and 
attribute to Walker, namely ―To many, 1/400 sounds higher than 1/200 because the denominator 
is bigger‖. Even literature in decision making has disclosed laypeople general incapacity to 
appreciate differences among variations in low probabilities expressed by means of ratios 
employing extremely large numbers at the denominators (e.g., 1000, 10,000, 100,000, a 
million), especially when an assessment of these values in isolation is required. For instance, in 
one study, Kunreuther, Novemsky, and Kahneman (2001) showed that risks of 1 in 100,000, 1 
in 1 million, and 1 in 10 million elicited the same subjective perception in participants. In a 
similar fashion, they also found little difference in probability perceptions for probabilities 
ranging from 1 in 650, to 1 in 6300, to 1 in 68,000. Thus, when assessing ratios using 
denominators of such orders of magnitude, people might well show a relative ―numbness for 
numbers‖, namely a difficulty in grasping the meaning of statistical information.  
Secondly, the difficulty with large numbers might take place ―because direct experience with 
large groups of people is relatively rare both in our evolutionary history and in daily life‖, as it 
has been argued by Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (in press-b, p.1). Indeed, as authors claimed 
referring to the work of Dunbar (1993) in line with the ―frequency hypothesis‖ (e.g., 
Gigerenzer, 1994; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), ―the typical size of human groups in a wide 
range of ancient and modern human societies is 100–200 people‖ (Dunbar, 1993, p. 1). As a 
consequence of that, authors believe, individuals would find it easier to imagine, understand, 
and recall ―smaller, evolutionarily plausible groups of people‖ (Dunbar, 1993, p. 1), than larger 
ones. That is exactly what authors have demonstrated in their study (Garcia-Retamero and 
Galesic, in press-b)
49
.
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 Analyzing the literature on the specific issue addressed in the present thesis (i.e., Chapter 2), only one 
study can be mentioned that dealt with probabilities expressed through ratios employing ―large‖ numbers. 
It is the case of Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole (1995)‘ study, where the ratios tested by means of the usual 
urn-and-ball or lottery scenario were ―1 in 1000‖ and ―10 in 10,000‖ (Study 1 and 2), in a within-subjects 
design. In those experiments, people generally expressed a judgment of higher probability both in self and 
others-perspective for the option whose likelihood was stated in (comparatively) larger (i.e., 10 in 10,000) 
numbers. Nevertheless, in the third study, i.e. when a health outcome was at stake (HIV contamination), 
no effect was found in self-perspective with the same ratio values of the previous two studies. On the 
other hand, if it is true that in studies on the group-diffusion effect, implicit rates using numbers in these 
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Given results obtained in the previous section, intuitively one would have expected that 
the same tendency (i.e., a larger perceived assessment for the ratio expressed by means of 
comparatively larger numbers at the numerator and denominator) be found even when the ratio 
employed a denominator in the 10-thousand-order of magnitude; more precisely: a negatively 
linear relationship between the magnitude of the numbers used at the numerator and 
denominator of the ratios and the level of perceived probability for the ratio. That translated in 
the following first hypothesis for the present study, namely:  
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher magnitude perception for a .005 probability will be found 
when expressed as “1 in 200” than as “5 in 1000”, and when expressed as “5 in 
1000” than as “50 in 10,000”.  
 
Also, another issue was judged relevant for the topic, namely discovering whether the 
effect found in probability perception was moderated by the prevalence of one of the two 
decision styles over the other (i.e., rational vs. experiential- for a characterization, see the 
section on Slovic‘ s theory on the two ways of risk comprehension, in Chapter 2, and that on 
CEST, ibid.). In line with the experiential/ analytical model of risk perception (see Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, 2004; Slovic 
and Peters, 2006) and the System1/ System2 model of decision making (for a characterisation, 
see Kahneman, 2003), it was expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The bias should have been more frequent in those persons who show 
a highly experiential decision style (mainly in the highly-experiential-lowly rational 
individuals) rather than in those who have a highly-analytical decision style.  
 
In order to test this hypothesis, it was decided to use the REI (Rational-Experiential Inventory) 
scale. REI is an inventory designed to assess individuals‘ preferences for information-
processing styles, available in various versions (the original one: Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, 
and Heier, 1995/6; Norris, Pacini, and Epstein, 1998; Pacini and Epstein, 1999-b, with 40-
items). Theoretically motivated by the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, all the versions cited 
above distinguish between the two cognitive styles, namely a rational one, measured by an 
adapted Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (see Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao, 1984), and 
emphasizing a conscious, analytical, intentional, approach, and an experiential one, measured by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
order of magnitude have been used in between-subject designs (e.g., a large group ranging from 100 to 1 
million people), it is also true that those rates were only implicit. 
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the Faith in Intuition (FI) scale (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier, 1996) emphasizing a 
pre-conscious, affective, automatic, holistic approach.  
In this study, the REI version adopted was the 40-item one (Pacini and Epstein, 1999-b), as 
recommended in both ―dmidi.net‖50 and by Pacini and colleague, that used it to corroborate their 
hypothesis on a prevalence of the experiential system in individuals showing the Ratio-bias 
(Pacini and Epstein, 1999-b). Authors judged this version of the inventory as superior to the 
preceding ones they had created, in particular that of ‗96, because: a) in the preceding version, 
contents of the two sub-scales (NFC and FI) did not parallel each other, while in the new 
version they did, as each scale had comparable subscales, namely engagement and ability; b) in 
the preceding version, the NFC scale was more reliable than the FI scale, while in the new 
version they both were; c) in the previous version, the two scales were unbalanced in terms of 
item valence, while now negatively and positively worded items were equally numerous (Pacini 
and Epstein, 1999-b). The inventory includes twenty items measuring rationality, and twenty 
measuring experentiality; each of the scales is constituted by two subscales comprising ten 
items assessing the ability to use each of the systems and ten assessing the engagement in each 
of the systems (i.e., reliance on use and enjoyment in using)- see the section of the Appendix 
corresponding to the present study for full lists of items. 
A third hypothesis concerned the replica of results found in Study 1.1 for what regarded 
ability with the concept of ratio and numbers, i.e., numeracy. Those findings seemed to indicate, 
that the new bias was more likely for highly-numerate individuals. It has to be reminded, that 
such a result would not be, in principle, in contradiction with theories on error-leading 
heuristics. Indeed, highly numerate individuals are not excepted from biased perceptions, 
despite being true that in many tasks they do seem to suffer in a lower extent from well-known 
systematic tendencies (e.g., Reyna, Nelson, Han, and Dieckmann, 2009; Garcia-Retamero and 
Galesic, 2009; Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, and Gigerenzer, in press; Reyna and Brainerd, 2007; 
Reyna and Brainerd, 2008)- see also dedicated paragraph at the beginning of the present 
chapter.  
A different inventory was used to assess numeracy in this study, more precisely an inventory 
measuring the construct in a subjective rather than objective way. To that end, the Subjective 
Numeracy Scale (SNS) developed by Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, and 
Smith (2007) was chosen instead than the objective numeracy inventory (Lipkus, Samsa, and 
Rimer, 2001) used in Study 1.1. The reasons for this substitution are described here following. 
First of all, as the present study included already a long inventory (i.e., the 40-items REI scale), 
the use of this shorter version seemed more appropriate. When they developed the SNS, 
                                                          
50
 The DMIDI (Decision Making Individual Differences Inventory) is a catalogue comprising the main 
individual difference measures commonly used in judgment and decision-making research (over 170, in 
fact), and available at the URL: http://www.dmidi.net/. DMIDI was developed by Kirstin Appelt with 
Kerry Milch, Michel Handgraaf, and Elke Weber.  
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Fagerlin and colleagues‘ aim was to create an easier, shorter, more enjoyable way to assess 
facility with various numerical tasks involving percentages, ratios, and transformations on such 
formats. Authors were successful, as the SNS showed to be a good proxy for the original 
numeracy scale, with the following interesting plus (in comparison): the scale was a) quicker 
(completing time: about 2.5 min less than those who had to complete the objective numeracy 
test); b) less annoying, less stressing, less frustrating; c) it prompted a higher will to repeat a 
similar survey; c) it caused less missing data (Fagerlin et al., 2007).  
Moreover, Keller, Siegrist, and Visschers (2009) also advocated in favour of such scale as it 
measures perceived self-efficacy (i.e., it is a self-report measure of the perceived ability to 
perform some mathematical operations) rather than ability with those operations. The first 
construct seems to be a better predictor than the second of the extent to which people actually 
engage in a particular task. ―Based on the self-efficacy literature, it seems plausible that 
subjective numeracy skills are more important than objective numeracy skills for the successful 
interpretation of risk information‖, authors conclude (Keller, et al., 2009, p. 1256). Finally, 
another positive feature of the SNS consists in the possibility to measure, beside cognitive 
abilities, people‘s preferences for the display of numerical information, an issue not tapped by 
the objective numeracy scale.  
Following findings of Study 1.1, the hypothesis for the present study was: 
 
Hypothesis 3: High-numerate individuals are more likely to show the bias in 
probability perception than low-numerate individuals.  
 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis of this study regarded the possible moderating effect of 
the degree of familiarity with the outcome of the scenario (see Study 1.2). Indeed, as explained 
in the previous study attempting to assess this variable, some literature pointed to a higher 
probability perception for those people who show a certain degree of familiarity with the 
outcome at study (in particular, the greater the availability of examples in the person‘ mind, the 
greater the probability of the outcome in question would seem). The assumption was that, those 
who had a higher familiarity with Down syndrome would have been more likely to process the 
numbers and hence show the bias, than those who had a lower familiarity with the outcome.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Those individuals who are more familiar with the health-related 
outcome depicted in the scenario (i.e., that already have, or know someone who 
has, a disabled child) show the bias to a larger extent. 
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Method 
Participants. Two hundred and forty-eight individuals (138 males and 110 females), from the 
general population took part in the experiment voluntarily, all recruited face-to-face in several 
public locations (e.g., University cafes, library). 
Mean age was 31.91 (SD = 10.97), ranging from a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 60 (5 
participants did not disclose this information). Of the sample, 66.1% (n = 162) had completed 
the high school, 14.7% (n = 36) had a University degree (3/5 years), 3,7% had a higher title like 
Master, PhD, or Specialization, and the 15.5% had a low level of education (―licenza media‖ or 
―licenza elementare‖). A large part of the sample (n = 113), namely almost half of it (45.7%), 
had one or more children, while 134 people stated they did not have any (1 person did not 
answer to this question). Some of the participants (n = 44; 26%) affirmed having being 
communicated by a medical specialist the probability that the future child could have Down 
syndrome (79 people did not answer to this question).  
 
Design and material. Participants read instructions asking them to role-play and imagine 
themselves as prospective parents (i.e., Anna, the mother-to-be, if females, or Luca, the father-
to-be if males) at risk for a child affected with Down syndrome. In the scenario, parents-to-be  
received information from the gynaecologist of their maternal age-related probability of having 
an affected child. Such probability, expressed through a numerical ratio, could assume three 
variants- the single factor manipulated between-subjects in the study- where the magnitude of 
numerator and denominator was modified, thus resulting in 1 in 200, 5 in 1000 (as in previous 
studies), and 50 in 10,000.  
Within that context, participants were asked to rate their subjective perception of the magnitude 
of the probability ratio on a 7-point Likert-scale from ―extremely low‖ to ―extremely high‖. On 
a separate page, then, participants were required to answer the 40-item REI scale of Pacini and 
Epstein (1999-b), translated into Italian- five lists were created where the order of the questions 
was varied to control for possible order effects. Alike in the original version, in the present 
study a 5-point Likert scale from ―definitely not true of myself‖ to ―definitely true of myself‖ 
was available to respondents for each item.  
On a separate page, participants read the 8-item inventory assessing numeracy developed by 
Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, and Smith (2007), that is the SNS (Subjective 
Numeracy Scale), translated into Italian. 
 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the fifteen conditions constructed to 
follow the experimental design. A minimum of 30 participants per ratio format condition was 
necessary to make statistical comparison valid on this variable, but that number was doubled in 
order to be able to dichotomize each group on the basis of the low/high rationality/ 
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experentiality score on the REI scale, in such a way to examine possible effects of these 
thinking-style features on the main dependent variable. Individuals were allowed an unrestricted 
amount of time to complete the questionnaire by themselves.  
 
Results 
Reliability and validity of the REI scales. The reliability and validity of the REI scales 
received little support in the present sample, as well as their orthogonal two-factor structure, 
both necessary prerequisites to their employment for analysis. Nevertheless, some exploratory 
analyses on the basis of the original complete scales were made.  
Table 1 summarises the rather ambiguous results obtained when considering all items of the 
REI. Reliability of both main scales was quite low (Rationality scale, α = .61 almost acceptable; 
Experentiality scale, α = .41, liable to problems)51. Indeed, while each main scale was strongly 
positively correlated with both its Ability and Engagement subscales (in accordance with the 
literature), and the latter were moderately related within each mode, other findings were either 
diverging with those expected theoretically, or unexplainable. For example, the correlation 
between the main scales was significant, even if low, r(246) = .25, p < .001, a data that has 
never been reported in the literature as, in line with the CEST assumption of the existence of 
two parallel but autonomous information-processing modes, the two scales are supposed to be 
independent. The average inter-item correlation was extremely low in both scales (.071 in the 
Rationality scale, and 0.39 in the Experentiality scale), a rather problematic data as it suggested 
that the constructs were not being measured reliably-that is, there were sources of unexplained 
error in the measurement- or, that the instruments were not measuring the intended elements. In 
addition, two rather suspect correlations were found, that were that between Rationality and 
Experiential Engagement, r(246) = .31, p < .001, and that between Rational Ability and 
Experiential Engagement, r(246) = .31, p = .001, which could not be explained- see again Table 
1.  
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 In the original Pacini and Epstein (1999-b) article, both scales reliability were rather high (i.e., α = .90 
for the Rationality scale, and α = .87 for the Experentiality scale), and the same can be affirmed for 
subsequent studies employing the same cognitive style scales, either in the English version (e.g., Marks, 
Hine, Blore, and Phillips, 2008), or translated for use in non-English speaking Countries (e.g., Bjorklund 
and Backstrom, 2008; Shiloh, Salton, and Sharabi, 2002; Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, and Godoy, 
2009). 
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Table 1 
Intercorrelations and Reliabilities of Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) scales 
REI scale 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Rationality (.61) .85°°° .88°°° .25°°° .11 .30°°° 
.31°°° 
. 22 
.81°°° 
.35°°° 
(.05) 
2. Rational Ability  (.41) .50°°° .23°°° .08 
3. Rational Engagement   (.33) .20 .12 
4. Experentiality    (.48) .83°°° 
5. Experiential Ability     (.29) 
6. Experiential Engagem.      
Note. N = 248. Reliabilities appear in diagonal in parentheses. 
°°p = .01 °°° p = .001 
 
Thinking-styles typology. Despite the problems highlighted in the preceding section, 
participants were dichotomized on the basis of the median scores on Rationality and 
Experentiality
52
, with the final aim of performing an exploratory analysis of variance on the 
perceived probability level. Thus, based on the median splits, a substantial equal numerosity 
was obtained in each thinking-style group, with the 27.8% of the sample (n=69) classified as 
low on both scales, the 25.4% of the sample (n = 63) as high on both scales, while the 24.2% (n 
= 60) as high in Rationality but low in Experentiality, and the 22.6% (n = 56) as high in 
Experentiality and low in Rationality.  
 
The Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS). The scale showed satisfactory internal consistency- 
Cronbach α was .88, a very good value. In order to calculate each participant SNS score, the 
same methodology used in Fagerlin et al. (2007) was employed: the ratings across all SNS items 
answered were averaged for all participants who had missing data yet completed more than half 
of the SNS questionnaire.
53
  
Participants‘ scores on the SNS ranged from 1 to 554. Table 2 reports the mean score in the 
entire sample for each item composing the scale, while Fig. 1 reports the distribution of each 
answer for the 8 questions. 
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 Despite being associated with problems such as loss of power, the lack of symmetry in the scales  
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p values < .05), justified the median split approach used to divide the sample- 
MdnRationality = 2.85, MdnExperentiality = 3.25.  
53
 The same results were obtained even when excluding item number 3 from the calculations alike in 
Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, and Godoy (2009), considering that due to cultural reasons the present 
sample could have not had familiarity with the task figured in the question. 
54
 All items in the inventory had six-point Likert scales, but we preferred to reduce them to 5 due to a 
better adaptation with the range of available terms for labels in Italian. While questions n° 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 
ranged from ―not at all‖ to ―extremely good‖, questions n° 6 and 7 ranged from ―always prefer words‖ to 
―always prefer numbers‖. 
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Table 2 
Mean score for each of the eight five-point items composing the SNS inventory (SD in 
parentheses) 
 
Questions Mean score 
1. How good are you at working with fractions?  2.98 (1.01) 
2. How good are you at working with percentages? 3.00 (.93) 
3. How good are you at calculating a 15% tip? 3.10 (.96) 
4. How good are you at figuring out how much a shirt will cost if it 
is 25% off? 
3.21 (.97) 
5. When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables 
and graphs that are parts of a story? 
3.02 (.92) 
6. When people tell you the chance of something happening, do 
you prefer that they use words (‗‗it rarely happens‘‘) or 
numbers (‗‗there‘s a 1% chance‘‘)? 
3.13 (1.05) 
7. When you hear a weather forecast, do you prefer predictions 
using percentages (e.g., ‗‗there will be a 20% chance of rain 
today‘‘) or predictions using only words (e.g., ‗‗there is a small 
chance of rain today‖? 
 2.78(1.09) 
8. How often do you find numerical information to be useful? 3.28 (.86) 
 
 
As it is visible from Figure 2, the trend was very similar for all items of the scale apart from n° 
8 and 7, since answers were distributed normally along the 5-points scale, with the majority of 
people choosing the central answer (= 3, i.e., ―slightly‖). Indeed, the mean score on the scale 
was 3.06 (SD = .72).  
A median split (Mdn = 3.00), was adopted on the SNS score to divide the sample into low (n = 
128) and high (n = 120) numerates. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on perceived probability 
was separately conducted in each numeracy group with ratio format (1 in 200, 5 in 1000, 50 in 
10,000) as between-subjects variable. A significant effect of ratio format was found in high 
numerates, F(2, 120) = 6.71, p = .002, ηp² = .10, while it was not found in low numerates, F(2, 
128) = 1.40, p = .25, ηp² = .02, indicating that only for the former participants the three ratio 
formats evoked different levels of magnitude on the assessment scale. In high numerates, post 
hoc comparisons using Fisher‘s LSD tests on perceived probability for the three ratio formats 
showed that 1 in 200 was perceived as significantly different from 5 in 1000 (p = .04) and from 
50 in 10,000 (p < .001), but 5 in 1000 and 50 in 10,000 were not perceived as significantly 
different (p = .10). Mean measures of perceived probability in each ratio condition are reported 
in Table 3, and visually represented in Fig. 2. Hence, for what regarded subjective numeracy, 
Hypothesis 3 was confirmed by data (obviously, only for the 1 in 200 and 5 in 1000 
comparison).  
Empirical studies 
92 
Table 3 
Mean perceived probability for high and low numerates in the three experimental 
conditions (SD in parentheses) 
 
 Numeracy  
 
Ratio Format 
High 
(n = 120) 
Low 
(n = 128) 
 
Total 
1 in 200 4.23 (1.66) 3.68 (1.49) 3.96 
5 in 1000 3.55 (1.37) 3.27 (1.21) 3.41 
50 in 10,000 2.97 (1.52) 3.24 (1.37) 3.11 
Total 3.62 (1.59) 3.39 (1.37) 3.51 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Perceived probability in the three experimental conditions as a function of 
participants’ (low/high) numeracy level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. (following page) Distributions of answers in each of the 8 items composing the SNS 
scale 
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1. How good are you at working with fractions? 2. How good are you at working with % ?
3. How good are you at calculating a 15% tip? 4. How good are you at calculating a 25% off  price?
5. When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you 
find tables and graphs? 8. How often do yo find numerical information useful?
6. Do you prefer words or numbers for an outcome 
chance?
7. Do you prefer  % or words only in the weather 
forecast?
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The effects on perceived probability. Analyses with the entire REI scale. An analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on perceived probability, with ratio format (1 in 200, 5 in 
1000, 50 in 10,000), rationality score (low/high), experentiality score (low/high), and numeracy 
score (low/high) as between-subject variables. A significant main effect was found for the ratio 
format, F(2, 224) = 5.98, p = .01, ηp² = .05, indicating that different ratio formats evoked 
different levels of probability perception (M1 in 200: 3.94, SD = 1.59; M5 in 1000: 3.41, SD = 1.29; 
M50 in 10,000: 3.12, SD = 1.44). Post hoc comparisons using Fisher‘s LSD tests revealed that 1 in 
200 was perceived as significantly different from 5 in 1000 (p = .001) and from 50 in 10,000 (p 
< .001), but 5 in 1000 and 50 in 10,000 were not perceived as significantly different (p = .20)- 
see Fig. 3. Taken together, these results suggested, that the bias found in preceding studies was 
supported, and they also indicated a formal perceived equivalence among 5 in 1000 and 50 in 
10,000, despite the average perception of 50 in 10,000 was positioned in between 5 in 1000 and 
1 in 200. This result will be commented in a subsequent section. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mean perceived probability in the three experimental conditions 
 
 
Nevertheless, no main effects of the high/low score levels of Rationality and Experentiality 
scales, were detected on probability perception, F(1, 224) = 1.67, p = .20, ηp²
 
 = .01, and F(1, 
224) = .08, p = .78, ηp²
  
= .00, respectively, neither of the mean SNS score (low/high), F(1, 224) 
= 1.30, p =.26, ηp²
  
= .01. Instead, a significant interaction among ratio format and Experentiality 
(low/high) was found, F(1,224) = 5.39, p = .01, ηp² = .05, an interesting result that will be 
commented in a further section, as it will be replicated with the new (refined) Experentiality 
index. 
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The refinement of the scales. As both main scales of the REI were unrealiable, and items not 
internally consistent, the item-to-scale (i.e., item-to-total) correlation was used for scale 
refinement (Nunnally, 1978; Saraph, Benson, and Schroeder, 1989). In other words, those items 
from each scale that did not statistically agree with the other items of the scale were eliminated. 
For a list of the items originating the new Rationality and Experentiality scales, i.e. Rationality2 
and Experentiality2, see Table 4.  
With the scale refinement, reliability of the Rationality2 scale raised to .78. Despite that level 
could be considered satisfactory, as was in fact the average inter-item correlation (.31, 
equivalent to that found in Pacini and Epstein‘s original study), it should not be forgiven that 12 
items had to be erased from the original scale, thus chasing doubts on whether remaining items 
could adequately tap the desired concept. The same considerations are valid for the 
Experentiality2 scale (α = .83, average inter-item correlation = .28) calculated on the basis of 12 
items only.  
 
Table 4 
List of the items retained in the two scales composing the REI after the scale refinement 
Rationality scale Experentiality scale 
1. I try to avoid situations that require thinking 
in depth about something. 
21. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.  
2. I‘ m not that good at figuring out 
complicated problems. 
23. Using my gut feelings usually work well 
for me in figuring out problems in my life.  
4. I am not that good at solving problems that 
require careful logical analysis.  
24. I believe in trusting my hunches. 
5. I don‘t like to have to do a lot of thinking.  25. Intuition can be a very good way to solve 
problems. 
7. Thinking is not my idea o fan enjoyable 
activity.  
26. I often go by my instincts when deciding 
on a course of action.  
8. I am not a very analytical thinker.  27. I trust my initial feelings about people.  
9. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of 
my strong points. 
28. When it comes to trusting people, I can 
usually rely on my gut feelings.  
11. Thinking hard and for long about 
something gives me little satisfaction.  
31. I think there are times when one should 
rely on one‘s intuitions. 
 35. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my 
deepest gut feeling to find an answer.  
 37. My snap judgments are probably not as 
good as most people‘ s. 
 38. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my 
actions. 
 39. I can usually feel when a person is right or 
wrong, even if I can‘t explain why I know.  
 
 
Rationality (M = 2.30, SD = .68) and Experentiality scores (M = 3.70, SD = .59) were now 
reliable (Rationality2, α = .78; Experentiality2, α = .83), and independent, r(248) = .12, p = .05. 
The lack of a correlation between the REI scores for the two scales confirmed the orthogonal 
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structure of the two factors. The low numbers of items composing the new revised scales 
impeded any further analyses (e.g., on subscales).  
 
Thinking-styles types. Similarly to the proceeding adopted for unrefined REI scales, 
participants were dichotomized on the basis of the median scores on the new indexes (i.e., 
Rationality2 and Experentiality2
55
). Groups of unequal numerosities were obtained, namely the 
22.2% of the sample (n = 55) was classified as low on both scales, the 16.9% of the sample (n = 
42) as high on both scales, while the 30.2% (n = 75) as high in Rationality but low in 
Experentiality, and the 30.6% (n = 76) as high in Experentiality and low in Rationality. The 
fact, that now the most ―extreme‖ thinking-style groups (i.e., those with a high score on one 
thinking-style and a low one on the other) were more numerous than the others could be due to 
the scale refinement process. 
 
The effects on perceived probability. Analyses with the refined REI scales. An analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on perceived probability, with ratio format (1 in 200, 5 in 
1000, 50 in 10,000), Rationality2 (low/high), Experentiality2 (low/high)- i.e. dichotomisation of 
participants on the basis of the score obtained on each of the refined scales- and numeracy 
(low/high) as between-subject variables. As before, a significant main effect was found for the 
ratio format , F(2, 224) = 6.93, p = .001, ηp² = .06, indicating that different ratio formats evoked 
different levels of probability perception (M1 in 200 = 3.96, SD = 1.59; M5 in 1000= 3.41, SD = 1.29; 
M50 in 10,000 = 3.12, SD = 1.44)– see Fig. 4 which corresponds to Fig. 3 (i.e., when the entire REI 
scale had been considered). Post hoc comparisons using the Fisher‘s LSD test revealed that 1 in 
200 was perceived as significantly different from 5 in 1000 (p = .01) and from 50 in 10,000 ( p 
< .001), but 5 in 1000 and 50 in 10,000 were not perceived as significantly different (p = .18). 
Thus, even when using refined REI scales it appeared that Hypothesis1 was only partially 
supported by data, in that the effect found in the previous section of this chapter got confirmed 
(i.e., 1 in 200 was irrationally perceived as larger than 5 in 1000) and extended (i.e., 1 in 200 
irrationally perceived as larger than 50 in 10,000), but not for the pair 5 in 1000 and 50 in 
10,000, as indeed it had been expected. In sum, there was not a completely (and perfectly) scalar 
decrease in perceived likelihood as the magnitude of the numbers at the numerator and 
denominator of the ratios increased.  
 
 
                                                          
55
 Despite being associated with problems such as loss of power, the lack of symmetry in the scales  
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p values < .05), justified the median split approach used to divide the sample- 
MdnRationality = 2.29, MdnExperientiality = 3.75. 
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Fig. 4. Mean perceived probability in the three ratio format experimental 
conditions when the REI scale had been refined 
 
No main effect of Rationality2 on the basis of the revised (i.e., α- improved-) REI scale 
was detected on probability perception, F(1, 224) = 2.44, p = .12, ηp²
  
= .01, but a main effect of 
Experentiality2, F(1, 224) = 6.43, p =.01, ηp² = .03. A higher probability perception was found 
in those having a high Experentiality2 score (M = 3.65, SD = 1.52) than in those having a low 
Experentiality2 score (M = 3.37, SD = 1.44., that will be commented in a later paragraph. 
Remarkably, there was a significant interaction between the format employed in the 
ratio and the Experentiality score on the basis of the revised (α-improved-) REI scale, F(2, 224) 
= 6.83, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .06- see Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Mean Perceived probability in the three experimental conditions as a 
function of participants’ (low/high) Experentiality2 level 
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The two-way interaction between Experentiality2 and ratio format was analyzed using simple 
main effect analysis. The ratio format influenced the perceived probability in both 
Experentiality2 levels, namely low, F(2, 242) = 3.61, p = .03, and high, F(2, 242) = 12.79, p < 
.001. 
The significant simple main effects of ratio format were further analyzed by pair wise 
comparison using the Sidak adjustment for multiple comparisons. For those participants 
classified as having a low experientiality processing style, the significant effect on perceived 
probability was due only to the higher perceived probability in the 1 in 200 condition (M= 3.69, 
SD = 1.62) than in the 5 in 1000 one (M = 2.93, SD =.1.16, p= .03). Instead, perceived 
probability in the 50 in 10,000 condition (M= 3.47, SD= 1.44) fell between the other two 
conditions, but was not significantly different from either of them.  
For those participants classified as having a high experientiality processing style, the significant 
effect on perceived probability was due to the 50 in 10,000 ratio format being perceived as 
lower (M = 2.84, SD = 1.41) than both the 1 in 200 (M = 4.34, SD = 1.49, p < .001) and the 5 in 
1000 (M = 3.97, SD = 1.22, p = .001) ratio format conditions. Perceived probability in the 1 in 
200 and 5 in 1000 conditions, though, did not appear as significantly different (p = .60).  
Since the visual representation of the magnitude perceptions given by each group 
seemed anyway to suggest, in high experientials, the presence of a tendency to perceive 1 in 200 
as conveying a higher probability than 5 in 1000 (i.e., in the same direction of the effect found 
for low experientials), further analyses were conducted. To this aim, indexes of Rationality and 
Experientiality were re-calculated, still on the basis of the revised scales, but only for the 1 in 
200 and 5 in 1000 conditions (i.e., n = 167). New dichotomisations- i.e., Rationality3 
(low/high), and Experentiality3 (low/high)- were computed on the basis of those indexes.  
When an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for these individuals on perceived 
probability, with ratio format (1 in 200, 5 in 1000), Rationality3 (low/high), and Experentiality3 
(low/high) as between-subject variables, a significant main effect for the ratio format was found 
as before, F(1, 167) = 7.37, p = .007, ηp² = .04, no main effect of Rationality3, F(1, 167) = .004, 
p = .95, ηp²
 
= .01, but a main effect of Experentiality3, F(1, 167) = 15.42, p < .001, ηp² = .09. 
Remarkably, now no significant interaction between the format employed in the ratio and the 
Experentiality score was detected, F(2, 167) = 2.90, p = .09, ηp
2
 = .02- see Fig. 6- although the p 
value was not that distant from the significance level. 
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Fig. 6. Mean perceived probability in the 1 in 200 and 5 in 1000 experimental 
conditions (n = 167) as a function of participants’ (low/high) Experentiality3 level 
 
To confirm visual impressions generated by the figure, separate t-tests were calculated on low 
and high experientials which showed, that only low experientials evaluated 1 in 200 (M = 3.69, 
SD = 1.62) as higher than 5 in 1000 (M = 2.93, SD = 1.16), t(92) = 2.60, p = .01. Instead, the 
two values did not differ significantly in high experientials, M1 in 200 = 4.34 (SD = 1.49), and M5 
in 1000 = 3.97 (SD = 1.22), t(71) = 1.16, p = .25.  
Thus,  
1) The fact the interaction among Experientiality3 and ratio format was not found when 
only the 1 in 200 and 5 in 1000 conditions were analysed seemed to indicate, that the 
significant effect obtained in the interaction in the previous analyses of variance 
including also the 50 in 10,000 ratio was due exclusively to the intersection of graphical 
lines AFTER the 5 in 1000 value. Thus, it could be affirmed, that both high and low 
experientials manifested the systematic tendency (despite it being non-significant 
among high experientials) to evaluate probability as higher when expressed through a 
ratio in a 1 in 200 rather than in a 5 in 1000 format. 
 
2) For what regarded Hypothesis 1, it could be précised that the scalar decrease in 
probability perception expected as long as the numbers at the numerator and 
denominator of the ratios increased (for 5 in 1000 to 50 in 10,000) hold, but only in 
high experiential individuals. Furthermore, these individuals showed a tendency, albeit 
non significant, in line with the bias observed (i.e., 1 in 200 > 5 in 1000) in low 
experientials. 
 
The influence of familiarity with the outcome at study. Differently from Study 1.2, the 
degree of familiarity was not assessed by means of an explicit question in this study, but a new 
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variable was created ex-post that took into account individual differences on factors significant 
for the construct. Such variable, re-named ―familiarity‖, intended to return a measure of 
participants‘ relative novelty to the situation described in the scenario. People were classified as 
―familiar‖ if at least one of the following two conditions was satisfied: having children, and 
having been communicated the probability of having a Down syndrome child. They were 
classified as ―not familiar‖ if conditions were not both satisfied at the same time, or answers 
were both missing
56
.  
For those (n = 116, 46.8%) that could be classified as familiar with the problem a significant 
effect of ratio format was found on perceived probability, F(2, 113) = 8.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14; 
post hoc comparisons using Fisher‘s LSD test revealed that when described with 1 in 200 
format, the probability was perceived as significantly higher (M = 4.42, SD = 1.73) than both 
when described with the 5 in 1000 (M = 3.23, SD = 1.25, p < .001) and with the 50 in 10,000 (M 
= 3.07, SD = 1.49, p < .001) formats. The latter two formats, though, did not raise significantly 
different probability perceptions. Instead, for those (n = 131, 52.8%) that could be classified as 
unfamiliar, no significant effect of the ratio format was detected on perceived probability, F(2, 
131) = 1.18, p = .31, ηp
2 
= .02. Thus, high familiarity with the outcome under study revealed a 
mediator of the systematic effect found in probability perception, in accordance with Hypothesis 
2. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, a .005 probability expressed as ―1 in 200‖ was subjectively evaluated as 
larger than when expressed as ―5 in 1000‖, as well as larger than when expressed as ―50 in 
10,000‖. Thus, results not only corroborated the effect found in Study 1.1 and 1.2, but extended 
it to a denominator of an even larger order of magnitude. Nevertheless, the perception of ―5 in 
1000‖ and ―50 in 10,000‖ did not differ. Thus, it could not be affirmed, that the relationship 
between the magnitude of the numbers used at the numerator and denominator of the ratios and 
the level of perceived probability for the ratio was negatively linear. All in all, findings seemed 
to imply: 
1) that boundaries were present for the existence of the bias at study, thus not just 
whatever smaller-numbered ratio would have elicited a larger probability perception 
                                                          
56
 It has to be recognized that for a mistake in the construction of the questionnaire, the question on 
having or not been communicated by a specialist the probability of having a child with Down syndrome 
did not allow those who might have received such communication but did not ended up having a child 
due to other reasons (e.g., abortion or miscarriage, sudden death of child) a possibility to declare that 
without somehow appearing irrational (i.e., they appeared to have ignored the logical condition contained 
in the premise to that question, i.e., ―If you answered yes to previous question [..]‖). Only two people 
were in such a condition, therefore the mistake did not pose problems to the analyses 
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than larger-numbered ratios. If that would have been the case, then a difference in 
perceived probabilities conveyed by 5 in 1000 and 50 in 10,000 should have been found 
as well (with the first higher than the second one), but that did not happen, and  
2) that since probability conveyed by 1 in 200 was judged at the same time higher than that 
conveyed by 5 in 1000, and than that conveyed by 50 in 10,000, thus the presence of 1 
in 200 was clearly indispensable for the appearance of the bias defined so far.  
 
Taken together, these considerations suggested that there was something peculiar in the 1 in 200 
format, and that some of its features could be deemed responsible of the bias found in perceived 
probability. These will have been addressed in following studies.  
Several problems occurred in the assessment of the REI scale, and results were difficult 
to interpret without a scale refinement which, anyway, dramatically reduced the number of valid 
items. Explorative analyses on those data highlighted, as expected, a significant association of 
the bias with individuals‘ experientiality score, while the rational thinking-style did not show 
any effect at all on the bias. Nevertheless, contrary to expected findings, those high in 
experientiality did not show a larger bias than those low in experientiality; on the contrary, the 
bias appeared more established among low experientials. Result, awaiting further confirmation, 
that highly experientials perceived a difference between 5 in 1000 and 50 in 10,000 judging the 
first expression as conveying a larger probability than the second, could be explained taking into 
account the possibility, that those high in experientiality might have not actually elaborated the 
ratio expressions. Instead, they could have intuitively assessed the magnitude of the ratio 
expressions taking the size of the denominator as a hint.  
Findings on the degree of individuals‘ numeracy as assessed by the SNS supported 
previous results (i.e., Study 1.1) obtained by means of an objective measure of the construct, 
namely that only highly experientials showed the bias. 
Finally, for what concerned familiarity with the outcome at study, an important 
moderation of the effect was shown, as only individuals so-defined ―familiar‖ with the scenario 
showed the bias in perceived probability. 
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Study 2.2 
 
Goals 
Findings of the previous study indicated that a .005 probability expressed as ―1 in 200‖ was at 
the same time subjectively evaluated as larger than when expressed as ―5 in 1000‖, as well as 
larger than when expressed as ―50 in 10,000‖.  
Despite the rather interesting and surprising nature of the phenomenon described, it had to be 
recognized that results were contingent to specific ratio values. It could well be, that ratios 
whose numbers at the numerator and denominator were, for some reasons, peculiar, had been 
chosen by chance, and that when employing different numbers the same effect would not be 
found. In the conclusions of the past study, it has been pointed at possible specific features 
peculiar of the 1 in 200 ratio that could be deemed responsible of the bias found in perceived 
probability. One of such features could have been the type of format in which the probability 
had been stated: indeed, while ―1 in 200‖ was in a ―1 in X‖ format, the other two ratios 
examined had an ―N in NX‖ format. Could it be possible that the ―1 out of some number‖ 
format might have explained the increased level of probability found for the ―1 in 200‖ ratio 
when compared to the other ratios expressed in different formats? In other words, was a ratio in 
a ―1 in X‖ format generally perceived as higher than a ratio in an ―N in NX‖ format? In order to 
test that, and at the same time to reject the chance, that the effect in probability perception 
would not be found when ratios different from 1 in 200 and 5 in 1000 (or 50 in 10,000) were 
employed, it was deemed necessary to attempt a generalization of results to other conditions. In 
other words, it was necessary to compare the probability perception elicited by ―1 in X‖ formats 
(also different from the one tested until that moment) with that elicited by corresponding 
equivalent ―N in NX‖ formats (also more variants than the two tested until then).  
In this experiment, ratios with denominator 1000 were chosen as ―N in NX‖ formats, for 
mainly two reasons. First of all, because the ―Y in 1000‖ format represented the structure of the 
ratios where the effect had been found until then. Secondly, ratios with 1000 at the denominator 
are frequently used mainly in institutional communications (e.g., sanitary campaigns; scientific 
reports, but also in doctor-patient interactions, e.g., to describe the incidence of a disease in the 
population). Thus, NX was equated to 1000 in the present study. Only with the aim of 
simplifying the description, in this study it will be referred to ―Y in 1000‖ to mean those 
proportions having 1000 as denominator, even if Y would not be an adequate term
57
. 
Drawing from results obtained in previous studies, it was predicted that a probability would be 
judged as higher when the ratio expressing it be in a ―1 in X‖ format rather than in a ―Y in 
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 In fact, as each pair wise comparison of proportions vs. rates corresponds to the same likelihood value, 
and the rate is always a not simplified version of the proportion, the two expressions should always share 
a common variable term (i.e., X, in the cases illustrated above). 
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1000‖ format (i.e., a rate with 1000 as denominator). Therefore, the first specific hypothesis for 
this study was: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A probability expressed in a “1 in X” format is perceived as greater 
than when expressed in a “Y in 1000” format. 
 
Moreover, in accord with Study 1.1, the same trend was expected for worry. Thus, a 
further hypothesis to be tested in the Study was: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A probability expressed in a “1 in X” format induces greater worry 
than when expressed in a “Y in 1000” format. 
 
Furthermore, an additional hypothesis was formulated regarding the degree of 
comprehension of the two formats. Following CEST‘s second principle (i.e., the small-numbers 
effect- see for instance, Pacini and Epstein, 1999-b), prediction should have been, that ratios 
employing smaller numbers would have been more easily understood than ratios employing 
larger numbers, exactly because of their general higher clarity. Such a prediction, nevertheless, 
was unbearable for mainly two reasons. First of all, as it had not yet been demonstrated (and 
indeed, the opposite seems true), that people reason on ratios the same way they do on integer 
numbers. Transferring a rule accounting for how people evaluate integers to the case of 
fractions was in principle not seen as correct. Indeed, numerous findings stemming from the 
literature on mathematical cognition point to the fact, that a) people process numerical 
information expressed through a ratio in a different way to information expressed in integer 
numbers (see, for instance, Bonato, Fabbri, Umiltà, and Zorzi, 2007; Reyna and Brainerd, 
2007), and b) that fractions pose more difficulty than integer numbers (same sources, but see 
also the previous study, i.e., 2.1). 
In second instance, the prediction was unbearable because supporting the hypothesis of a greater 
clarity of ratios employing smaller rather than larger numbers seemed hard in the specific case 
at study: results had showed an opposite tendency to denominator neglect for ratios when in 
single presentation conditions in all experiments described up to the present one, hence 
apparently disconfirming the applicability of the explanation in terms of Ratio-bias to the case 
under study. Moreover, some clear evidence in the literature are present arguing for a lower 
comprehension of proportions rather than of rates (see results described in the first paragraph of 
Chapter 2, e.g., Grimes and Snively, 1999; van Vliet, Grimes, Popkina, and Smith, 2001).  
All these considerations leaded to a forecast opposite to the one stemming from CEST, namely 
that lower comprehension had to be expected for smaller-numbered ratios than for larger-
numbered ones. Hence, the hypothesis predicted, that ratios expressed in (comparatively) 
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smaller numbers (schematised as in ―1 in X‖ format) should have been less understood than 
ratios using (comparatively) larger numbers (i.e., in ―Y in 1000‖ format). Such hypothesis read:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Ratios in “1 in X” format are less understood than ratios in “Y in 
1000” format. 
 
Method 
Participants. A total of 254 pregnant women attending the maternity wards of San Raffaele 
Hospital in Milan (Italy) were contacted by the experimenter during their first visit at the 
gynaecologist. Of these, 54 (21.2 %) refused to take part in the study, while 200 accepted. The 
reasons for refusals were generally not specified or brought back to time constraints and to the 
desire to avoid mathematical tasks. The sample therefore included 200 pregnant women but 1 
was excluded for providing incomplete data, thus additionally reducing the sample to 199 
participants.  
Mean age of participants was 32.77 years, ranging between 18 and 47 years. Most of the 
women had completed high school (44.8%) or had already a University degree (43.3%), while 
only few of them (11.9%) had completed the lowest education level in Italy. The 59.6% of 
them were at their first pregnancy, while the remaining 40.4% of participants had already one 
or more children (one participant did not answer to this question).  
 
Design and material. In the questionnaire, a table was presented summarizing the risk of having 
a child affected by Down syndrome according to the maternal age (from 18 to > 51 years), 
where the maternal age had been classified into twelve 3 year- span groups (e.g., 18-20, 21-
23)
58
.  
The risk was expressed by means of a verbalized ratio, whose superficial format was the single 
factor manipulated in the study. Indeed, the ratio appeared in the entire table either as ―1 in 
every X births‖ or as ―Y in every 1000 births‖- see the Appendix for the two tables employed in 
the material. Therefore two versions of the same questionnaire were elaborated, one where 
numerical risks were expressed in ―1 in X‖ format and the other where they were expressed in 
―Y in 1000‖ formats. The table served as a reference source for the woman to identify her age-
related risk; after having identified it, she was asked to circle it using a pen.  
Three dependent variables were assessed: woman‘s perceived risk of having a child affected 
by Down syndrome given her age, the degree to which she would find this information 
worrisome, and a construct that measured comprehension of the numerical format. 
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Similar intervals have been used, for instance, even in a landmark study (Hook,1981) to indicate the 
rates of all clinically significant cytogenetic abnormalities in live births by 1-year- maternal age intervals 
ranging from ages 15 to 49. 
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The degree of risk had to be judged on a graphical 7-point scale with the two extremes labelled 
as ―not at all high‖ and ―extremely high‖, respectively. The scale was not the typical Likert 
scale, but a visual scale created on purpose for the study, with adjacent steps whose dimension 
was getting steadily bigger and the colour darker as moving towards the right (to symbolize an 
increasing quantity of the dimension assessed)- see the Appendix. 
Perceived worry was measured asking participants to answer the question, ―How worried are 
you concerning the risk you have just circled?‖. Alike the previous question, answers had to be 
provided on a 7-point graphic scale, ranging from ―not worried at all‖ to ―extremely worried‖. 
Finally, participants were asked to answer to a set of 6 questions created on purpose for the 
study, and intended to assess comprehension of the format stating the numerical probability 
value circled in the table -see the results section for the list of questions along with the answers 
available according to the experimental condition. 
 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a paper version of the questionnaire- they were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions stating the risk as a ―1 in every X‖ or as a ―Y in 
1000 births‖. They completed the questionnaire individually and at their pace, namely without 
any time constraints.  
Ethical approval. The study received the approval of the Clinical Ethical Committee of San 
Raffaele Hospital. All participants answering the questionnaire had preliminarily signed an 
informed consent form describing both the purpose and the method of the study, and 
guaranteeing them anonymity and confidentiality in the treatment of data.  
 
Results 
As it is visible from Table 1, three risk classes had no participants (i.e., the 18-20, and the 48-
50, and over 51)
59
. The mode maternal age class was 30-32 years, while the median was still in 
the same class (Mdn = 32.50). Distribution of participants in the 9 risk classes according to the 
experimental condition is illustrated in Fig. 1
60
. The number of participants per risk class was 
equally divided among experimental condition, χ2(8, N = 199)= 7.21, p = .51. 
 
The “1 in X effect”. A multivariate analysis on perceived probability and perceived 
worry with ratio format as between-subjects variable showed a global effect of ratio format, 
F(2,195) = 3.92, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .04. Nevertheless, while the impact of ratio format on the 
probability variable was significant, F(1,196) = 7.61, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .04, the same could not be 
affirmed for the worry measure, F(1,196) = 1.93, p = .17, ηp
2 
= .01. 
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 These data can be considered coherent with the actual trends in human reproductive age. 
60
 The ―1 in every X‖ ratio format condition was presented to slightly more than half sample (n = 101 
women), while the ―Y in every 1000‖ ratio format was presented to 98 women. 
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The mean subjective magnitude of the probability was 3.57 (SD = 1.45) when expressed 
as ―1 in X‖, and 3.03 (SD=1.37) when expressed as ―Y in 1000‖. Hence, overall it could be 
affirmed that Hypothesis 1 was supported by data. The systematic tendency to evaluate a 
probability expressed in a ―1 in X‖ format as greater than the same probability expressed in a 
―Y in 1000‖ format was dubbed the ―1 in X effect‖.  
When looking at the data divided by mother‘s age, as in Table 2, it can be noticed, that 
all the means, except two, went in the predicted direction, even if, due to reduction in 
sample sizes, only two reached significance (1 in 475 vs. 2.1 in 1000, and 1 in 795 vs. 
1.3 in 1000). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of participants in  
the 12 risk classes 
Maternal 
Age 
No. of 
participants 
18-20 0 
21-23 4 
24-26 14 
27-29 25 
30-32 57 
33-35 43 
36-38 37 
39-41 10 
42-44 7 
45-47 2 
48-50 0 
Over 51 0 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Participants’ age class distribution between 
the two experimental conditions 
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Table 2 
Results of the paired Mann-Whitney tests on equality of the means between the two 
experimental conditions for each valid risk class 
 
 
For what regarded perceived worry, overall a mean assessment of 3.95 (SD = 1.69) was 
found for ―1 in X‖ formats, and a mean of 3.60 (SD = 1.87) for ―Y in 1000‖ formats. Perceived 
worry in the two conditions showed the same tendency of perceived probability, despite not 
resulting in a significant difference. However, the correlation between the two variables was 
significant (r199= .65, p < .001), thus, it could be affirmed that data indicated even a 
corroboration of Hypothesis 2. 
 
Comprehension of the format. Participants‘ overall performance on the comprehension 
inventory is presented in Table 3 according to each of the six questions. The general difficulty 
demonstrated in answering apparently simple questions (see the large number of participants- 
50% or more- who found answering to questions number 1, 4, 5, and 6 hard) further 
corroborated the idea that laypeople (i.e., patients) experience difficulties in understanding and 
grasping the meaning of numbers, even more when these are not integer. Two of those 
questions, in particular, (i.e., number 1 and 5) involved calculations which are normally 
required for making sound health decisions (see, for instance the case where patients are 
communicated the rate of success of two different treatments, and have to opt for one of them, 
or that where they are in need to compare rates of success of two alternative treatments). In both 
cases, a sound answer would require that one correctly handles the rules of comparisons 
between ratios; question number 5, moreover, implies exactly the mastery of that skill which 
could prevent people from falling prey to the ―1 in X‖ effect. The fact, that only the 37% of the 
sample could solve the problem posed by that question correctly, is undoubtedly of a certain 
relevance. 
 
Mother’s Age 
1 in X 
format 
n 
Y in 1000 
format 
n 
Mean 
Perceived risk 
1 in x 
Mean 
Perceived risk 
Y in 1000 
Mann-Whitney 
p value 
(2-tail) 
18-20 1 in 1540 0 0.6 in 1000 0    
21-23 1 in 1480 1 0.7 in 1000 3 2.00 1.67 1.00 
24-26 1 in 1350 8 0.8 in 1000 6 2.25 2.17 .852 
27-29 1 in 1120 13 0.9 in 1000 12 2.92 2.08 .406 
30-32 1 in 795 32 1.3 in 1000 25 3.38 2.80 .033 
33-35 1 in 475 25 2.1 in 1000 18 3.88 2.78 .001 
36-38 1 in 240 14 4.2 in 1000 23 4.14 3.65 .077 
39-41 1 in 110 3 9.1 in 1000 7 4.00 4.14 .833 
42-44 1 in 49 4 20.4 in 1000 3 6.00 5.67 .629 
45-47 1 in 21 1 47.6 in 1000 1 4.00 4.00 1.00 
48-50 1 in 8 0 125 in 1000 0    
> 51 > 1 in 6 0 > 166.7 in 1000 0    
  101  98 3.57 3.03 .007 
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Table 3 
Overall participants’ performance in each of the six items of the comprehension scale 
Items % correct 
1. The risk you circled above is: higher/lower  
a. higher than 1 in 250 
b. lower than 1 in 250 
 
40 
2. Compared to the risk of a 23 years old woman, the risk you circled above is: 
a. higher 
b. lower 
c. equal 
 
88 
3. The risk you circled above means that the probability of having a child affected by 
Down syndrome is: 
a. over 50% 
b. below 50%  
86 
4. Imagine that the risk of another woman is double than the one you circled above. 
What would it be? ___________ in ____________ 
49 
5. The risk you circled above is equal to the risk of _______ in 1000 (for condition ―1 in 
X‖) 1 in ________ (for the condition ―Y in 1000‖) 
37 
6. What is the probability that your child will NOT be affected by Down syndrome 
given your age?  
35 
 
 
Overall, mean comprehension score was 3.36 (SD = 1.38), while the median was 3 out of 6 
possible correct answers. 
The distribution of participants according to the number of correct answers they could give in 
the six-item inventory measuring comprehension is represented in Fig. 2, separately showing 
participants who were in a ―1 in X‖ condition from those who were in a ―Y in 1000‖ condition. 
However, it was thought, that a median split on the comprehension index was not appropriate in 
the present case as participants addressed non comparable inventories, and the fact participants 
have answered to the same inventory is a necessary prerequisite for such type of analysis. Some 
exploratory analyses were made, though.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of participants according to the performance in the six-item 
comprehension inventory in the two experimental conditions 
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Overall, a test on the equality of the means between the two groups returned a non-significant 
difference between the mean number of correct answers given, t(197) = 1.44, p = .15. Thus, 
from these data it seemed that Hypothesis 3 was not supported. However, it was also true, that 
the null effect did not allow to state the opposite trend to the one tested and hypothetically 
stemming from CEST‘s second facet for Ratio-bias explanation, namely that ―1 in X‖ formats 
would be more comprehended than ―Y in 1000‖ formats,  
In Table 5, percentages of correct answers by question are reported according to experimental 
conditions. Further explorative analysis segmented by question showed that the two conditions 
did not differ significantly in the number of participants answering correctly for any of the six 
questions, respectively [χ2(1, N = 199) = .965, p = .33] for question number 1, [χ2(1, N= 199) = 
1.41, p = .24] for question number 2, [χ2(1, N = 199) = 1.72, p = .19] for question number 3, 
[χ2(1, N = 199) = 1.12, p = .29] for question number 4, [χ2(1, N =199) = 2.55, p = .11] for 
question number 5, and [χ2(1, N = 199) = .79, p = .38] for question number 6. 
 
 
Table 5 
Percentages of participants’ correct answers to each of the six questions in the two 
experimental conditions  
Items % correct  
 ―1 in X‖* ―Y in 1000‖° 
1. The risk you circled above is: 
c. higher than 1 in 250; 
d. lower than 1 in 250. 
43.5 36.7 
2. Compared to the risk of a 23 years old woman, the risk you circled above is: 
a. higher; 
b. lower; 
c. equal. 
91.1 85.7 
3. The risk you circled above means that the probability of having a child affected by    
Down syndrome is: 
a. over 50% 
b. below 50%  
89.1 82.7 
4. Imagine that the risk of another woman is double than the one you circled above. 
What would it be? ___________ in ____________ 
45.5 53.1 
5. The risk you circled above is equal to the risk of _______ in 1000 (for condition 
―1 in x‖) 1 in ________ (for the condition ―Y in 1000‖) 
42.6 31.6 
6. What is the probability that your child will NOT be affected by Down syndrome 
given your age?  
37.6 31.6 
* = originally out of 101 participants;  ° = originally out of 98 participants 
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Discussion 
Results obtained in the present study demonstrated that the bias in probability perception 
extended well beyond the specific numerical values considered in Section 1 of the present 
chapter (i.e., 1 in 200 and 5 in 1000) and in Study 2.1 (i.e., 50 in 10,000). Individuals showed a 
tendency to perceive a probability as higher when expressed through a proportion (i.e., in a ―1 in 
X‖ format) than through a rate whose denominator was 1000. The tendency was further 
confirmed by a similar, albeit not statistically significant, trend in the degree of perceived 
worry, as showed by a positive correlation with the perceived probability measure.  
Also, overall participants revealed a low degree of comprehension of the meaning of ratios, as a 
high percentage of them made mistakes on relatively simple mathematical questions. The 
hypothesis made on comprehension, namely that ratios in a ―1 in X‖ format employing 
(comparatively) smaller numbers are less clear than ratios in a ―Y in 1000‖ format employing 
(comparatively) larger numbers, did not receive support in the present study. 
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Study 2.3 
 
Goals 
In the previous study, a ―1 in X effect‖ had been established, as probability statements in a ―1 in 
X‖ format increased the probability perception compared with probability statements in ―N in 
NX‖ formats, when NX had been fixed to 1000. What about the effect when the ratio with an 
―N in NX‖ format had a denominator equal to 100? Indeed, a generalization of results of Study 
2.2 to ratios whose denominator be in the teens-order of magnitude or in the hundreds-order of 
magnitude would have not been, in principle, legitimate as those values had not been directly 
compared. However, knowing whether people would still be prone to the bias when rates in 
those formats were used was judged interesting for at least three reasons. 
1) There are several cases, where a doctor might employ a smaller denominator (e.g., 100) 
than those that had been analyzed until then in communicating a probability. An expression 
using such numerical information frame corresponds to ―the typical size of human groups in 
a wide range of ancient and modern human societies‖ (Dunbar, cited in Garcia-Retamero 
and Galesic, in press-b, p. 1), and as such it can be thought as more likely perceived as 
plausible. Plausibility is a determinant feature to generate reliance on the data. A hundred, 
1000, and 10,000 are probably the most frequently used denominators in communication of 
probability by means of ratios. By investigating the order of magnitude of the first one the 
three formats, all of them would have been covered as previous studies already investigated 
the second and third format. 
2) By validating applicability of findings in the missing (i.e., 100) condition, boundaries of the 
bias would have been further specified. 
3) Ratio-bias, that is mainly a within-subject phenomenon (Garcia and Tor, 2009), has mostly 
been found with two ratio values, namely 1 in 10 and 10 in 100 (that is, when participants 
compared a rate out of a 10-denominator with the equivalent proportion out of a 100-
denominator). Testing similar ratio values in a within-subjects design would have further 
examined whether the type of presentation (apart from the type of task) might be 
responsible for the opposite results found in the present dissertation. 
Therefore, the first specific hypothesis for this study was: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A probability expressed in a “1 in X” format is perceived as higher 
than when expressed in a “Y in 100” format or similar magnitude.  
 
Furthermore, object of interest was constituted by the possible influence of ratio format 
on intentions to perform amniocentesis. Behavioural intentions have been indicated by some 
Empirical studies 
112 
scholars (see, for instance, the Health Belief Model, e.g., Rosenstock, 1966) as a better indicator 
of people‘s attitudes. The assumption behind the second research question was, that behavioural 
purposes depend on the degree of probability perceived for the condition to be tested for. Thus, 
the second hypothesis for the study was: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A probability expressed in a “1 in X” format induces more 
participants to hypothetically choose to perform amniocentesis than when expressed 
in a “Y in 100” or similar magnitude format. 
 
Furthermore, the explorative analysis on the degree of comprehensibility of the two 
formats continued also in the present study. The same hypothesis as previous study was stated, 
only it was modified to apply to the case of a ―1 in X‖ versus ―Y in 100‖ or similar format. It 
read, 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ratios using (comparatively) smaller numbers in a “1 in X” format, 
are less comprehended than ratios using (comparatively) larger ones in a “Y in 100” 
or similar magnitude format. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. A total of a hundred individuals (58 women and 42 men) from the general 
population took part in the experiment voluntarily. Mean age was 38.2 yrs. (SD= 12.4), varying 
between a minimum of 19 to a maximum of 69. 
 
Design and material. Participants were asked to read a very similar scenario to that of all 
preceding studies (apart from Study 1.1). The scenario reported the case of Anna, a 48 years-old 
mother-to-be who, after having been waiting for long, became pregnant; at the gynaecologist, 
she got informed of her the age-related probability of having a Down syndrome-affected child. 
Object of experimental manipulation between-subjects was, as in previous studies, the format of 
the ratio expressing such probability. A proportion format whose denominator was in the teen-
order of magnitude (this time: 1 in 12) was compared with a rate format whose denominator 
was in the hundred-order of magnitude (this time: 10 in 120). The round ratios (1 in 10 and 10 
in 100) were judged too easy and were avoided in this study to minimize the likelihood that 
participants could  transform the ratio into another one, which would lead to the impossibility of 
controlling for format effects. Two different questionnaire versions were created to follow the 
experimental design. 
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After having read the scenario, participants were asked to role-play and imagine themselves as 
Anna, the prospective mother described in the scenario. Within this context, they answered two 
questions. The first question tested the subjective evaluation (when role-playing the protagonist) 
of the magnitude of the stated probability of having a child with Down syndrome. Participants 
had to provide an estimation on an 11-point Likert scale whose extremes were labelled as 
―extremely low‖ and ―extremely high‖, while the half-way point was labelled as ―moderate‖.  
The second question assessed participants‘ intentions to perform a diagnostic test (i.e., 
amniocentesis, able to tell with certainty whether the baby had Down syndrome). That invasive 
exam was described in both experimental conditions as carrying a fix additional risk of abortion 
(i.e., the same 1% risk in both conditions). Answer was categorical (i.e., yes/no). 
Finally, to assess comprehension for each format, a different inventory than the one employed 
in the previous study was used in the present one. A set of 5 questions was created on purpose 
for the study. Among other abilities, skills assessed by questions were that of being able to put 
the ratio value in correct comparison with other probability values, and that of performing some 
mathematical operations that are commonly required in everyday life (e.g., redoubling a risk 
value, transforming it into a different mathematical format).  
 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two conditions constructed to 
follow the experimental design. Individuals could complete the questionnaire at their pace, 
without any time constraints.  
 
Results 
For what concerned perceived probability, mean ratings were greater for the 1 in 12 (M = 7.48, 
SD = 2.80) than for 10 in 120 format (M = 6.18, SD = 2.69), t(98) = 2.37, p = .02- see Fig. 1. 
Results corroborated the first hypothesis as when evaluating a probability expressed through a 
numerical ratio people perceived a proportion in a ―1 in X‖ format with a 10 denominator as 
conveying a larger probability than a rate having 100 as denominator. 
 
Fig. 1. Mean perceived probability in the two experimental conditions 
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For what concerned the second dependent variable, instead, no effect of the format of 
the ratio (smaller/bigger numbers) was detected on behavioural intentions. Participants‘ will of 
performing the diagnostic test was always high and did not change when the probability of 
having a child with Down syndrome was stated as 1 in 12 or 10 in 120, χ2(1, N = 100) = .33, p = 
.56, likely because the probability of .083 was perceived high (even in the ―Y in 100‖ format) 
enough to consider doing an amniocentesis as a sort of binding option- see the distribution of 
answers in the two conditions in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Distribution of choices for the intention to perform a risky diagnostic 
test  (i.e., amniocentesis) in the two experimental conditions 
 
 
Condition 
        Perform test? 
yes no Total 
1 in 12 42 8 50 
10 in 120 44 6 50 
Total 86 14 100 
 
 
For what concerned the third variable (i.e., comprehension), exploratory analyses were 
made that did not indicate differences across experimental conditions. Overall, the mean and 
median numbers of correct answers in the total four answers analysed
61
 were 3.36 (SD = .88) 
and 4, respectively, thus very high. Table 2 displays the distribution of the number of correct 
answers according to experimental condition. 
 
Table 2 
Number of correct answers per experimental condition to each 
item of the numerical comprehension inventory 
 
Item n° 
1 in 12 
(n = 50) 
10 in 120 
(n = 50) 
1 41 45 
2 46 50 
4 41 38 
5 33 42 
Total 161 175 
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 Answers to four items only were analyzed. Unfortunately, in question number 3 of the 10 in 120 
condition, the small number ratio format was erroneously employed instead than the large number ratio 
format. Because of that mistake, answers on that item in both experimental conditions were excluded 
from analysis. 
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Visual inspection of the table immediately suggests that the manipulation of the ratio format did 
not influence the number of correct answers participants could give on the inventory. The 
impression was confirmed by an overall test on the equality of the means between the two 
groups, that returned a non-significant difference, t(98) = - 1.60, p = .11. Once again, data did 
not seem to indicate differences in the degree of comprehensibility of the two formats. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was again not confirmed by data. 
 
Discussion 
Results of the present study extended the bias in perceived probability to ratios with a 
denominator in the teen and hundred order of magnitude. That allowed to generalize previous 
affirmation in the following way: a ratio in a proportion format (i.e., ―1 in X‖) is normally 
perceived as conveying a higher probability than the equivalent ratio in a rate format (i.e., ―N in 
NX‖).  
The use of ratios of different superficial appearance did not seem to influence people‘s 
intentions for choice, as the number of people declaring the will of performing amniocentesis 
was always high, and did not change according to experimental condition. Also, the hypothesis 
on a supposed higher difficulty of the ―1 in X‖ format in respect to ―N in NX‖ ones did not 
receive support in the data, as participants showed the same degree of comprehension for both 
formats. The absence of a difference in comprehensibility of the two formats confirmed results 
obtained in the previous study with a different inventory; findings did not bear support to results 
in the literature (see, e.g., Grimes and Snively, 1999) suggesting an advantage of rates over 
proportions in terms of numerical comprehension. However, the absence of an effect could have 
been the result of the questions chosen to measure comprehension. These questions should be 
reviewed and ameliorated. 
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Study 2.4 
 
Goals 
Until now, results seemed to converge on a specific effect of the ―1 in X‖ format. One last 
possibility, though had to be ruled out. In the experiments, frequently (and trivially so) the ―1 in 
X‖ format featured a smaller denominator than any other format (e.g., ―N in NX‖).62 The fact 
that participants perceived ―1 in X‖ as larger than ―N in NX‖ might thus have reflected a 
general focus on the denominator of the ratio
63
, rather than a specific effect of the ―1 in X‖ 
format, and people‘s tendency to provide lower probability judgments as the number of people 
exposed to a threat increases (Yamaguchi, 1998), that is when the denominator increases. 
However, if the effect in probability assessment was due to a phenomenon like numerator 
neglect (i.e., to the magnitude of the denominator and not to the ―1 in X‖ format), the same 
effect should be found even when comparing ratios not featuring 1 at the numerator. In 
particular, a higher probability perception should be found for the ratio having the smaller 
numbered-denominator than for the ratio having the larger numbered-denominator. However, it 
was instead believed, that the effect in perceived probability was not due to participants 
focusing on the magnitude of the denominator, but to the specific format employed (i.e., the ―1 
in X‖ format). In line with this prediction, the hypothesis (to be disconfirmed) for the present 
study was:  
 
Hypothesis: In line with the numerator neglect hypothesis, people give a higher 
judgment of the same probability when expressed in a “N in N*X” format than in a 
“N1 in N1*X” format, if N*X < N1*X and both N ≠ 1 and N1≠ 1. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. A total of a sixty-six individuals
64
 from the general population took part in the 
experiment voluntarily. Mean age was approximately 32 yrs. (SD = 12), varying between a 
minimum of 18 to a maximum of 68. Of the sample, 46.2% (n = 30) had a high school diploma, 
44.6% (n = 29) a University degree/ a higher title, while the others had a low education levels 
(―licenza media‖ and ―elementare‖)- one person did not report this information. The majority of 
participants (72.7%, n = 48) declared not having children, while the 27.3% of them (n = 18), 
had one or more children. 
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 The only exceptions were some of the ratios employed in Study 2.1, precisely those defining the 
mother‘s age-classes from 27-29 downwards (e.g., 1 in 1480 vs. 0.7 in 1000). 
63
 As people might have realized that the division of a number for a sensitively ―large one‖ returns a 
―small number‖. 
64
 For a mistake, the questionnaires did not contain a question assessing the gender of respondents, 
therefore such variable could not be controlled for. 
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Design and material. A scenario similar to that employed in all preceding studies (apart from 
Study 1.1) was used, describing a couple being informed by the gynaecologist on the maternal 
age-related risk of having a child with Down syndrome. The probability, expressed through a 
numerical ratio, could use both comparatively smaller or comparatively larger numbers at the 
numerator and denominator, caring that in none of the formats the number 1 would be employed 
at the numerator. Thus, in one version, the probability was expressed as 3 in 48 (comparatively 
smaller numbers), while in the other as 10 in 160 (comparatively larger numbers).  
After having read the scenario, participants read instructions asking them to role-play and 
imagine themselves as one of the two prospective parents described in the scenario. Within that 
context, they rated the magnitude of the numerical probability of having a child with Down 
syndrome. They had to provide estimation on a graphical 7-point scale with the two extremes 
and the central point labelled as ―low‖, ―high‖, and ―moderate‖, respectively. The scale was 
similar to that employed in Study 2.4- see Appendix. 
 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two conditions constructed to 
follow the experimental design. Individuals could complete the questionnaire at their pace, 
without any time constraints. Anonymity and confidentiality were ensured to them. 
 
Results 
Mean ratings of subjective probability did not significantly differ when the probability was 
expressed as 3 in 48 (M = 3.88, SD = 1.87) or as 10 in 160 (M = 3.67, SD = 1.74), t(64)= .48, p 
= .64. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported by data. 
 
Discussion 
Results showed, that the probability perceptions of two equivalent ratios, none appearing in a ―1 
in X‖ format, but using denominators of different magnitudes (i.e., 48 < 160) did not differ 
significantly. Hence, the tested hypothesis was not supported by data; however, the null result 
(given the rules of inferential statistics) did not allow excluding, that numerator neglect was 
anyway present. However, the fact, that the hypothesis in line with numerator neglect was not 
bear by findings, in any case indicated that results obtained in all experiments presented so far 
could not in principle be explained by an overlook of the numerator. Anyway, these results did 
not allow drawing ultimate conclusions on the fundamental function of the number 1 at the 
numerator of the ratio to obtain the effect of higher probability perception described. With that 
aim, a further experiment had to be carried out (see Study 2.6) in order to perform a direct test 
of the necessity of the ―1 in X‖ format to generate the effect at study. 
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Study 2.5 
 
A special thanks to Alessio Sperlinga and Mariarita Barisione for having advertised our study on their 
web-sites
65 
 
Goals 
Is the ―1 in X‖ format really peculiar? What is/are the specific feature/s of the ―1 in X‖ format 
that can be deemed responsible for the higher perceived probability found compared to ratios in 
―N in NX‖ formats? 
Aim of this short study was that of investigating whether a ratio value prompted a different 
degree of mathematical operations when expressed in a ―1 in X‖ format rather than in its 
equivalent ―N in NX‖ format. In particular, the mental operation analyzed was transformation66, 
and, differently from previous studies, ratio values were not contextualized but they were pure 
mathematical quantities. Potential goal of this investigation was that of isolating some 
peculiarities of the two types of ratio formats. Indeed, intention was that of employing those 
expressions in a further study where they would have conveyed a probability and they would 
have been linked to the usual outcome (i.e., having a Down syndrome affected child)- see next 
study.  
It was predicted that when dealing with the ―1 in X‖ format a large number of people would 
have not operated a transformation, due to its particular character of expressing an irreducible 
fraction
67
. Instead, the opposite was expected for the ―N in NX‖ formats, because of expressing 
reducible fractions
68
. The hypothesis of the study was, 
 
Hypothesis: People do not tend to operate a transformation on a ratio expressed in a 
“1 in X” format, but they do tend to transform ratios expressed in “N in NX” 
formats.  
 
Method 
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 The websites were http://www.bambini.it/ and http://www.ilmondodeigemelli.org/, respectively. 
66
 In Mathematics, a transformation is an equivalent change in an expression or equation resulting from 
the substitution of one set of variables by another. 
67
 An irreducible fraction (or fraction in lowest terms or reduced form) is a vulgar fraction in which the 
numerator and denominator are smaller than those in any other equivalent vulgar fraction. It can be shown 
that a fraction a⁄b is irreducible if and only if a and b are coprime, that is, if a and b have a greatest 
common divisor of 1 (Dodero, Baroncini, and Manfredi, 2001, p. 55). 
68
 As the structure itself shows, i.e. ―N in NX‖ = N(1 in X), ―N in NX‖ ratios are reducible to ratios in a 
―1 in X‖ format by dividing both numerator and denominator by N. 
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Participants. Fifty-eight individuals
69
 from the general population took part in the study 
voluntarily. The data of nine individuals had to be eliminated due to some problems
70
, thus the 
sample employed for analyses comprised 49 people (29 females and 19 males- one person did 
not report the gender).  
 
Design and material. The study manipulated a single factor, namely the format of the numerical 
ratio expressing the same probability (i.e., .04), in a within-subjects design. The ratio was stated 
in four variants, where one had a ―1 in X‖ format (i.e., 1 in 25), while three had an ―N in NX‖ 
format (i.e., 0.4 in 10, 2 in 50, and 10 in 250). The order in which the four variants appeared in 
the questionnaire was fully randomized thus to control for order effects.  
For each format of the ratio, people were asked to report whether they were used to transform it 
(yes/ no answer) - a short example of what was meant with ―transformation‖ was given at the 
beginning of the page.  
 
Procedure. An electronic version of the questionnaire was accessed by participants who were 
randomly assigned by the program to one of the 24 conditions constructed to fully control order 
effects- a minimum of 2 participants per condition was considered necessary in each order 
condition. Individuals were allowed an unrestricted amount of time to complete the 
questionnaire by themselves.  
 
Results and discussion 
Contingencies on whether participants to the study were used to transform the ratios proposed, 
or instead they normally used to consider them the ways they were presented, are shown in 
Table 1. 
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 Mean age was 31.4 years (SD = 5.9) ranging from 22 to 46. Of the sample, 41 individuals (85.4%) had 
a high education level, with 24 (50%) having a (3/5 Years) University degree, and 17 (35.4%), a higher 
title like Master, PhD, or Specialization school diploma, while the 14.6% of them (n = 7) had a high 
school diploma- one person did not disclose information on this question. 
70
 Some participants accessed more than one survey, thus data of the second or third one (individuated 
through data and time of access automatically registered by the program) were erased and only data of the 
first one completed were retained. 
Empirical studies 
120 
Table 1 
Frequencies (% in parentheses) of participants declaring to be used to transform/not 
transform each of the four proposed formats, along with the binomial test results of 
equivalence of distribution 
 
 Do you transform?   
Ratio Format yes no Total Binomial Test 
0.4 in 10 32(65.3) 17(34.7) 49 p = .04 
2 in 50 33(67.3) 16(32.7) 49 p = .02 
10 in 250 39(79.6) 10(20.4) 49 p < .001 
1 in 25 6(12.2) 43(87.8) 49 p < .001 
Total 110(56) 86(44)   196(100)  
 
Overall people showed a tendency to operate transformations on the ratios more frequently (i.e., 
56%) than not operating them, even though the difference was only almost significant, χ2 (1, N 
= 196) = 2.94, p = .08. The number of participants who declared to transform a ratio format and 
that of those who declared not to transform it differed significant for every ratio format 
examined, as showed by results of the binomial tests reported in Table 1.  
Results of the six pair wise comparison using Bonferroni correct p[.05/6=] .0083 were 
performed whose results are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Results of the Mc-Nemar tests performed for each pair wise comparison in the four 
experimental conditions for those participants who did not transform the format (in grey 
the significant comparisons) 
 
  
Ratio Format 
Ratio Format  
1 
2 in 50 
2 
0.4 in 10 
3 
1 in 25 
4 
10 in 250 
1  
2 in 50 
 χ2 = 29.26,  
p = 1.00 
χ2 =23.31,  
p < .001 
χ2 = 29.26, 
p = .07 
2  
0.4 in 10 
  χ2 = 20.83,  
p < .001 
χ2 =29.26,  
p = .12 
3  
1 in 25 
   χ2(49)=29.26,  
p < .001 
 
 
Participants‘ behaviour when dealing with the 1 in 25 format differed from that showed when 
dealing with any of the other ―N in NX‖ formats. Indeed, while the majority of them declared 
not to be used to transform the 1 in 25 ratio format, the majority declared the opposite when 
dealing with 2 in 50, 0.4 in 10, and 10 in 250 ratio formats. Furthermore, the comparison 
between behaviour towards each of the three ratios in an ―N in NX‖ format and any of the 
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remaining two did not give significant results, thus proving that participants‘ behaviour didn‘t 
differ across them. 
Hence, the hypothesis of the study was fully confirmed, and it could be affirmed that while the 
majority of people tended to leave the ―1 in X‖ format untouched, the majority of them also 
tended to transform ―N in NX‖ ratio formats. 
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Study 2.6 
 
A special thanks to Prof. Vittorio Girotto and Stefania Pighin for hints on the implementation of research 
goals of this study  
 
Goals 
Study 2.4 showed, that the probability perceptions of two equivalent ratios, none appearing in 
formats featuring directly a ―1 in X‖ and using denominators of different magnitudes (i.e., 48 < 
160), did not differ significantly. Anyway, these findings did not allow to draw ultimate 
conclusions on the fundamental function of the number 1 at the numerator of a ratio for the 
appearance of the bias at study, namely on the necessity to have number 1 at the numerator for 
the higher probability perception to be elicited. Hence, the present experiment was carried out. 
The specific first hypothesis of the study was the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: People give higher judgments of the same probability when expressed 
in a “1 in X” format than in a “N in NX” format, and the same probability 
expressed as “N in N*X” or “N1 in N1*X” does not evoke different judgments. 
 
Also, in the present study, the investigation on the tendency to transform the ratios that 
had been started in the previous study was continued here. Differently from Study 2.5, however, 
where the investigation occurred for ratio formats manipulated within-subjects, in the present 
study analyses regarded ratio values manipulated between-subjects; not only, as here the 
probabilities referred to a specific outcome, i.e., probability of having a Down syndrome-
affected child. It could have been the case, that people‘s tendencies were different when the 
expressions were not abstracted from an outcome. Hence, in line with findings of Study 2.5, the 
following prediction was made, 
 
Hypothesis 2: When it refers to a specific outcome (i.e., having a Down syndrome-
affected child), people do not tend to operate a transformation on a ratio if it has a 
“1 in X” format, but they do transform it if it has an “N in NX” format.  
 
If verified, Hypothesis 2 would have further confirmed the ―1 in X‖ format idiosyncrasy. 
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Method 
Participants. One-hundred sixty-nine individuals (97 females and 62 males) from the general 
population took part in the study voluntarily, all recruited through online
71
 or word of mouth 
advertisement. The data of 10 surveys had to be eliminated due to sampling problems
72
, thus the 
final sample was constituted by 159 individuals. 
Mean age was 31.56 years (SD = 6.38), ranging from 21 to 60. Of the sample, the large majority 
(n = 123, 77.4%) had a (3/5 Years) University degree (n = 82, 51.6%) or a higher title like 
Master, PhD, or Specialization school diploma (n = 41, 25.8%), while a 22.7% had either a high 
school diploma (n = 33) or a lower title (―licenza media‖). Many (n = 127, 80.4%) did not have 
children - one person did not answer to this question; only ten people (the 6.5% of the sample) 
declared to have been reported by a health specialist the information on their probability of 
having a child affected by Down syndrome. 
 
Design and material. Participants read the same scenario to that employed in Study 2.2 but on a 
web-page, role-playing and imagining themselves as prospective parents. The single factor 
manipulated between-subjects was the numerical ratio expressing the age-related probability of 
having an affected child: the ratio could be expressed in four variants. Only one of the ratios had 
the ―1 in X‖ format (i.e., ―target‖), while the others had a ―N in NX‖ format. Also, in the present 
study, the comparison of a new ―1 in X‖ ratio format was extended to other not previously 
tested ―N in NX‖ formats (one even had a numerator smaller than 1). Thus, the values employed 
were 1 in 25 as ―1 in X‖ format, while 0.4 in 10, 2 in 50, and 10 in 250 as ―N in NX‖ formats.  
Within the described context, participants were asked a subjective magnitude evaluation of the 
probability on a 7-point Likert-scale from ―extremely low‖ to ―extremely high‖. Then, on a 
separate web-page, they were asked to report whether in order to perform the magnitude 
evaluation task required, they had or not transformed
73
 the ratio format. To conclude, the next 
web page addressed the socio-demographic variables. 
 
Procedure. An electronic version of the questionnaire was accessed by participants who were 
randomly assigned by the program to one of the four conditions constructed to follow the 4 
(ratio format) between-subjects design. A minimum of 30 participants per condition was 
necessary to make statistical comparison valid. Individuals were allowed an unrestricted amount 
of time to complete the questionnaire by themselves. 
                                                          
71
 i.e. newsletter or link to potential participants from the University of Trento main internet page. 
72
 The computer server did not allow an individual to submit a completed questionnaire more than once 
per browser session. Still, individuals could submit multiple questionnaires if they closed their browser, 
reopened it, and returned to the Web site. That had been judged unlikely, especially considering that 
participants were informed about the absence of payments or rewards. Nevertheless, this phenomenon 
was showed by participants in 5 cases, thus forcing us to eliminate 10 questionnaires from data analysis.  
73
 A short example of what was meant by ―transformation‖ was given at the beginning of the web-page. 
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Results 
Means for perceived probability in each ratio format condition are given in Table 1 and visually 
represented for an even more immediate comparison in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Mean perceived probability in each of the 
four experimental conditions (SD in 
parentheses) 
 
Ratio Format Mean SD 
0.4 in 10 3.63 1.61 
1 in 25 4.42 1.71 
2 in 50 4.17 1.51 
10 in 250 3.72 1.19 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean perceived probability in the 
four ratio format experimental conditions 
 
The visual inspection of Fig. 1 immediately suggests that a different subjective assessment of 
probability corresponded to the different ratio formats, even though not for all of them. Indeed, 
pair wise comparison confirmed this visual impression only in two cases, i.e., in the comparison 
of mean perceived probability for the 1 in 25 and the 0.4 in 10 formats, t(79) = -2.15, p = .04, 
and in that of the 1 in 25 and the 10 in 250 formats, t(74) = -2.06, p = .04 (see Table 2). These 
results showed that the ―1 in X‖ format was perceived as significantly higher than both that of 
0,4 in 10 and of 10 in 250, but not different from the 2 in 50 format. All the other pair wise 
comparison among formats other than ―1 in X‖ did not return significant differences. Thus, it 
could be affirmed that the first hypothesis of this study was generally supported by data (if we 
exclude the 2 in 50 case mentioned above). 
 
Table 2 
Results of pair wise t-tests on perceived probability for each combination of the four 
experimental conditions (in grey the significant comparisons) 
  
Ratio Format 
Ratio Format 
1. 
2 in 50 
(n = 42) 
2. 
0.4 in 10 
(n = 41) 
3. 
1 in 25 
(n = 40) 
4. 
10 in 250 
(n = 36) 
1. 
2 in 50 
 t(81) = 1.55,  
p = .12 
t(80) = -.73,  
p = .47 
t(76) = 1.43,  
p = .16 
2. 
0.4 in 10 
  t(79) = -2.15,  
p = .04 
t(75) = -.27,  
p = .79 
3. 
1 in 25 
   t(74) = -2.06,  
p = .04 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 in 25 2 in 50 10 in 250 0.4 in 10
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For what concerns the second variable, that was, whether people had transformed the ratio 
format before evaluation, or instead considered it in the way it was expressed, contingencies are 
shown in Table 3. 
Overall, across formats, the majority of participants (i.e., 57.9%) declared having not 
transformed the format they read in the scenario before evaluating its magnitude, a significant 
difference, χ2(1, N = 159) = 3.93, p = .047. Nevertheless, looking at the distributions, in Table 3, 
it appeared evident that this significant result was due to the significantly higher majority of 
people who declared not to have transformed rather than transformed the 1 in 25 ratio format 
(indeed, clearly the other comparisons had not generated any significance, as the distribution of 
answers in the two options was almost the same)- this was confirmed by a z-test for proportions 
between those participants who were given the ―1 in X‖ format condition and those who were 
given one ―N in NX‖ format condition, z = 3.09, 99.9% confidence interval (1-tailed).  
 
Table 3 
Frequencies of participants (% in parentheses) who transformed and did not 
transform the proposed format in the four experimental conditions  
 
 
 
Ratio Format 
Did you transform?  
yes no n 
 1 in 25 8 (20.0) 32 (80.0) 40 
2 in 50 20 (47.6) 22 (52.4) 42 
10 in 250 20 (55.6) 16 (44.4) 36 
0.4 in 10 19 (46.3) 22 (53.7) 41 
Total 67 (42.1) 92 (57.9) 159 (100) 
  
 
When separately comparing the ―1 in X‖ format (i.e., 1 in 25) with any of the other three ―N in 
NX‖ formats, all three z-tests for proportions returned significant values, namely z = 2.28, 
98.9% confidence interval (with 0.4 in 10 as ―N in NX format‖); z = 2.40, 99.2% confidence 
interval (with 2 in 50 as ―N in NX format‖), z = 2.97, 99.9% confidence interval, (with 10 in 
250 as ―N in NX format‖), all 1-tailed. Thus, while for the ratio expressed in the ―1 in X‖ 
format, the majority of people did not tend to operate a transformation, for those ratios 
expressed in an ―N in NX‖ format the majority of them did. Hence, data confirmed the second 
hypothesis of the study even when the ratios where referred to a specific situation.  
 
Further analyses. Here following further analyses made on the basis of a distinction between 
those participants who did and those who did not transform the format received are reported. 
These analyses have only an exploratory value, as indeed the calculations had almost always 
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been made on groups of evidently different numerosities, some of which were definitely too low 
to return reliable measures
74
. 
Table 4 reports the mean perceived probability in each sub-group of the four experimental 
conditions obtained taking into account whether participants declared having transformed or not 
the format received. The same descriptive means reported in Table 4 are also visually 
represented in Fig. 2.  
 
Table 4 
Mean perceived probability in the four experimental conditions separately assessed for those 
who declared to have transformed the format and for those who declared they did not (SD in 
parentheses) 
 
 Ratio Format 
Transf. 1 in 25 2 in 50 10 in 250 0,4 in 10 
Yes 3.62 (1.61) 
n =8 
4.20 (1.44) 
n =20 
3.55 (1.05) 
n =20 
4.16 (1.43) 
n =19 
No  4.62(1.79)  
n =32 
4.14 (1.61) 
n =22 
3.94 (1.34) 
n =16 
3.18 (1.65) 
n =22 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mean perceived probability for each of the four experimental conditions 
distinguishing those who did/ did not transform the ratio format (whose assessments are 
separately represented in the two smaller figures) 
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 Because of the low numerosity (i.e. n < 30) in each experimental condition of the two groups, non- 
parametric tests were used. 
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For participants who declared having not transformed the ratio format received, six pair wise 
independent Mann-Whitney tests were performed whose results are reported in Table 5. Only 
one significant difference was found. 
 
Table 5 
Results of the pairwise Mann- Whitney tests performed on perceived probability in the four 
experimental conditions for those who did not transform the format- in grey the significant 
comparison 
  
Ratio Format 
Ratio Format  
1 
2 in 50 
(n = 22) 
2 
0.4 in 10 
(n = 22) 
3 
1 in 25 
(n = 32) 
4 
10 in 250 
(n = 16) 
1  
2 in 50 
 Z = - 1.95,  
p = .051 
Z = - 1.08,  
p = .28 
Z = - .42,  
p = .693 
2  
0.4 in 10 
  Z= - 2,84,  
p = .01 
Z =- 1.63,  
p = .10 
3  
1 in 25 
   Z = - 1,44,  
p = .15 
 
 
For participants in the second group (i.e., those who declared having not transformed the ratio 
format received), six pair wise independent Mann-Whitney tests were performed whose results 
are reported in Table 6. No significant differences were found. 
The effect of each of two of the socio-demographic variable (i.e., having children/not, and 
having been/not communicated by a doctor the probability of the future child be affected by 
Down syndrome) taken separately was not analyzable, because of the large differences in 
numerosity between the two groups (yes/no) to be compared. The attempt to create a new 
variable (i.e., ―familiarity‖) as in Study 1.2 did not show success.  
 
Table 6 
Results of pairwise Mann- Whitney tests on perceived probability in the four experimental 
conditions for those who did transform the format 
 
  
Ratio Format 
 
 
Ratio Format  
1 
2 in 50 
(n =20) 
2 
0.4 in 10 
(n = 19) 
3 
1 in 25 
(n = 8) 
4 
10 in 250 
(n = 20) 
1  
2 in 50 
 Z= -.16,  
p = .87 
Z= -.73,  
p = .46 
Z= -1.42,  
p = .16 
2  
0.4 in 10 
  Z=-.60,  
p = .55 
Z=- -1.24,  
p = .21 
3  
1 in 25 
   Z= -.29,  
p = .77 
 
 
 
 
Empirical studies 
128 
Discussion 
The present study further corroborated the peculiarity of the ―1 in X‖ format in probability 
perception thanks to the simultaneous demonstration of two phenomena. Indeed, results showed 
that the probability perceptions of two equivalent ratios none of which featuring directly the ―1 
in X‖ format did not differ significantly. At the same time, results proved that people‘s 
probability judgments were systematically higher for the ―1 in X‖ format in two out of the three 
pair wise comparison among ratios where one appeared in the ―1 in X‖ format. Thus, it was 
demonstrated, that the presence versus absence of the ―1 in X‖ format in one term of the pair 
wise comparison could determine the ―1 in X effect‖. 
Findings on the variable transformation further confirmed the idiosyncrasy of the 1 in X format 
found in Study 2.5, as that was the only format tested on which the slight majority of 
participants declared not to have applied the mathematical operation. 
In sum, through this study, the ―1 in X effect‖ received additional corroboration. Its strength 
was additionally raised by findings indicating that the higher probability judgments could be 
obtained despite the 55.6% (in the case of 10 in 250) and the 46.3% (in the case of the 0.4 in 10) 
of the sub-samples declared to have transformed the format received. 
Further investigation of the peculiarities of the 1 in X format could help to discover the 
mechanism at the basis of the ―1 in X‖ effect. Future studies could, for example, identify the 
ratio formats in which the proposed ratios are normally transformed, in order to detect 1) which 
feature, if any, is responsible, in those ratios, for the higher/lower probability judgment; 2) 
which are the clues that could help clarify the mental processes taking place in people‘s mind 
during the probability evaluations process. 
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The effect of individual differences on the bias under study 
 
A growing body of research has documented a variety of individual differences that influence 
decision making accuracy. Even if the specific analyses are not reported, in each of the studies 
described until here both in Section 1 and Section 2, demographical and individual differences 
among participants had been checked for in the extent in which they were affected by the ―1 in 
X‖ bias. Overall the list below summarized results: 
 
 
 Gender (all studies): no effect 
 Age (all studies): no effect 
 Education level (all studies): no effect 
 Familiarity with the scenario (Study 1.2., our question; Study 2.1, ex-post construct): 
the ―1 in X effect‖ was present only on those participants highly ―familiar‖ with the 
outcome at study (i.e., Down syndrome)- in Study 1.2, results obtained only through 
exploratory analyses, as the necessary conditions to test the hypothesis were not present 
 Information-processing style (Study 2.1, REI scale, i.e., Pacini and Epstein, 1999-b): 
―1 in X effect‖ only on low experientials 
 Numeracy: 
 objective measure, that was obtained by means of Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer 
(2001)‘ s inventory; (Study 1.1): ―1 in X effect‖ only on high-numerates 
 subjective measure, that was obtained by means of Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, 
Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, and Smith (2007)‘s inventory; (Study 2.1): ―1 in X effect‖ 
only on high-numerates 
 Having children or not (Study 2.1): having already one or more children was a 
necessary condition for the ratio format effect to appear
75
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 Two One-Way ANOVAs on perceived probability with ratio format as between-subjects variable were 
separately conducted on the those who had declared having children and on those who had instead 
declared they did not have any. Results showed that having already one or more children appeared to be 
necessary condition for the format effect to appear, F(2, 113) = 8.41, p= .000, η2= .133 for those who had 
children, while F(2, 131) = .975, p = .380 (n.s.) for those who did not have children. 
In those participants who had children, Post hoc comparisons using Fisher‘s LSD tests revealed. that the 1 
in 200 format was perceived as significantly higher (M = 4.34, SD =1.70) than both the 5 in 1000 format 
(M = 3.26, SD = 1.25, p = .002) and the 50 in 10,000 format (M = 3.00, SD = 1.43, p = .000), but the latter 
two formats did not differ significantly in terms of perceived probability judgment evoked. 
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SECTION 3, or 
An affective explanation? 
 
The heart has its reasons, of which reason knows nothing.  
Blaise Pascal 
 
An account that has not been examined until now concerns the different degree of 
affective reaction to the numerical expressions of probability compared each time. The 
relevance of such emotional response to stimuli for probability assessment, and in turn to the 
bias at study can be summarized in the following two considerations. 
First of all, Peters, Lipkus, and Diefenbach (2006) had showed in an experiment that the 
superficial features of stimuli are able to shape, among other, people‘ s emotional reactions, and 
that the latter in turn have the power of influencing people‘s assessments and preferences by 
means of the so-called ―affect heuristic‖- see Chapter 2 (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and 
Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, 2004; Slovic and Peters, 2006).  
Secondly, also two of the theories (i.e., CEST theory, and the risk as analysis and risk as 
feelings approach) that have specifically addressed the phenomenon under study, namely 
people‘s evaluative behaviour when ratios of different superficial appearance are employed, 
have explained findings in terms of a prevalence of the experiential system over the rational 
one. Furthermore, some findings (awaiting further confirmation) obtained in the previous 
section (i.e., Study 2.1), namely that rationality was not related with the bias under study, while 
individuals showing a low degree of experientiality were those more prone to the bias, seemed 
to indicate a relevant role of the experiential system in the manifestation of the tendency.  
In light of both theoretical considerations made above, and of the preliminary findings 
just reviewed, it was reasoned, that even in the present case the emotional responses to the 
superficial differences of the ratios might have explained (partly or completely) the differences 
found in participants‘ perceived probability. Hence, aim of studies described in the present 
section was, to inspect if the affective information conveyed by equivalent ratio formats with a 
different superficial structure (namely, ―1 in X‖ and ―N in NX‖ formats) was in fact different. It 
has to be reminded from the characterisation made in Chapter 2, that the experiential system is 
more affective in nature than the analytic one, and it is influenced by emotions, images, and 
intuitions. Possibly, these factors could have explained the different degree of perceived 
probability assessed for the two formats.  
Since both direct and indirect means of measuring affect exist, both were tested. A direct mean 
will be employed in Study 3.1, while an indirect one in Study 3.2. 
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Study 3.1 
 
Goals 
In the field of risk research, affect is normally measured via self-report, that is a direct method 
of assessment consisting in indicating on a scale whether the hazard is judged as good or bad, 
positive or negative (see, for example, Alakhami and Slovic, 1994). In a similar way, in the 
present study the evaluation of the affective answer to stimuli was measured through two direct 
questions, namely by asking participants to separately estimate the degree of positivity and that 
of negativity of their feeling for the uncertain outcome. The specific hypothesis of the 
experiment was,  
 
Hypothesis: When expressed in a “1 in X” format, a probability conveys a higher 
degree of negative feelings [and a lower degree of positive feelings] than when 
communicated in one of the equivalent “N in NX” formats.  
 
Method 
Participants. A total of a hundred and twenty-one individuals (73 women and 48 men) from the 
general population took part in the experiment voluntarily. Mean age was approximately 28.3 
yrs. (SD = 7.2), varying between a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 47- one person did not 
disclose this information. 
 
Design and material. Participants read the usual scenario of a couple of prospective parents 
who received by the gynaecologist the communication of their probability of having a child 
affected by Down syndrome. They were exhorted to role-play one of the prospective parents 
described in the scenario (according to their gender). 
The study manipulated a single factor between–subjects, namely the ratio format employed to 
communicate the probability: the numbers at the numerator and at the denominator of such a 
ratio could be either both comparatively ―smaller‖ or both comparatively ―larger‖ than in the 
other condition, with one ratio in a ―1 in X‖ format and the other in a ―N in NX‖ format. 1 in 12 
and 10 in 120 were the ratio chosen for this study, alike in Study 2.3.  
After having read the scenario, participants answered to two questions, whose order was 
controlled for
76
, separately assessing
77
 the degree of positivity and that of negativity of their 
                                                          
76
 To easily identify the conditions according to the order in which the two questions appeared in the 
questionnaire, the case where the negative question appeared before the positive one has been redubbed 
as ―order 1‖ for the description of the study, while the other as ―order 2‖. 
77
 One question measured the degree of negativity of the feeling, while the other the degree of positivity 
of the feeling.  
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feeling for the probability of ―1 in X‖ [―N in NX‖] of having a Down syndrome- affected 
child. The estimation had to be provided on an 11-point Likert scale anchored to ―not at all 
negative‖ and ―extremely negative‖ in the case of the negative assessment, while to ―not at all 
positive‖ and ―extremely positive‖, in that of the positive assessment, with no verbally labelled 
points in between in both cases. 
 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions 
created to correspond to the experimental design. Individuals could complete the questionnaire 
at their pace, without any time constraints.  
 
Results 
One participant was excluded from the analyses because of not providing an answer to one of 
the two scales. Therefore, analyses were performed on a total of 120 participants.  
No effects were found that could be attributed to the order of the two questions, tneg (118) = - 
.38, p = .71 and , tpos (118) = - .38, p = .62 (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Mean declared degree of negative and positive affect in 
each order condition 
 
 Order n Mean SD 
Neg 1 62 4.26 3.10 
2 58 4.47 2.95 
Pos 1 62 6.90 3.29 
2 58 6.60 3.21 
 
 
A one-way within-subjects (or repeated measures) ANOVA on the effect of ratio format on the 
two measures of affect (negative and positive) returned no significant main effect for the ratio 
format, Wilks‟ λ = .99, F(2, 115) = .12, p = .69, ηp
2 
= .01. No significantly different negative 
affective evaluations were provided in the two ratio format conditions, F(1, 116) = .08, p = .78, 
ηp
2 
= .00; the same had to be affirmed for the positive affective evaluations, F(1, 116) = .63, p = 
.43, ηp
2 
= .01- for exact means see the following Table (i.e., Table 2), while for a graphical 
representation, see Fig. 1.  
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Table 2 
Mean perceived negative and positive affect for the probability in each 
experimental condition 
 
 Ratio format  
 
Affect 
1 in 12 
(n = 61) 
10 in 120 
(n = 59) 
Total 
(n = 120) 
Negative 4.26 (2.87) 4.46 (3.18) 4.36 (3.02) 
Positive 7.00 (3.05) 6.51 (3.44) 6.76 (3.24) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean negative and positive affect in the two experimental conditions 
 
 
Discussion 
No difference was found in terms of positive and negative affect elicited by the ratio between 
the two formats (―1 in X‖ and ―N in NX‖) expressing the same probability of having a Down 
syndrome-affected child. The two null results obtained through a direct testing methodology 
leaded to think that the affective explanation was not the adequate one for the systematic effect 
at study
78
.  
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The same result was obtained even when using the type of measure normally used in decision making 
studies investigating the affect variable, i.e. a single bipolar scale anchored to ―extremely negative‖ and 
―extremely positive‖, with the half-way point labeled ―neutral‖. Indeed, no significantly different ratings 
on the scale were obtained in the two ratio conditions for the 96 individuals of the general population who 
participated in the study, M1 in 10= 3.42 (SD = 1.90) and M10 in 100= 3.96 (SD = 1.70), t(94) = -1.47, p = .14. 
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Study 3.2 
 
Goals 
A direct methodology for assessing affect can sometimes not be the most adequate for some 
decisional situations. It could have been the case of Study 3.1, as social desirability concerns 
might have played a role (Down syndrome can be a displeasing or embarrassing domain for 
some people), making thus participants alter their responses. Or, it might have been the case, 
that in such study individuals had found it hard to recognize their own mental processes since, 
as affirmed by Dohle, Keller, and Siegrist (2010, p. 1117), ―these can lie beyond one‘s 
introspective capability‖. 
In similar cases, implicit measures of attitudes (i.e., an indirect method) represent a valid 
alternative methodology for assessing affective associations. In a study on the potential adverse 
economic impact of a proposed nuclear waste repository site, Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, 
Chalmers, and Gesell (1991), for instance, used an indirect strategy instead than direct questions 
to assess people‘s perceived impact of nuclear facilities on future behaviour. The aim was that 
of avoiding introspective judgments that are often criticized as not trustworthy because of 
people‘s difficulty in foreseeing long distance consequences of events. The study employed a 
version of the ―method of continued associations‖ (Szalay and Deese, 1978) which authors 
described as having been very extensively used by Galton, Wundt, and Freud. Word-association 
techniques are easy and efficient ways of determining the contents and representational systems 
of human minds without requiring those contents to be expressed in the full discursive structure 
of human language. As a consequence, such techniques are thought to be better ways of 
revealing ideas or associations otherwise probably difficult to spell out. In the version modified 
for the experiment, participants of Slovic and others‘ study had to report the first 4-6 thoughts or 
images (normally a word or a very brief phrase) they associated with the target stimulus. After 
having stated their mental associations, participants were requested an evaluation of each image 
in terms of affective meaning on a short (4/5 point) Likert scale, ranging from ―very negative‖/ 
―very bad‖ to ―very positive‖/ ―very good‖.79  
                                                          
79
 In order to obtain an overall imagery index, ―the summation model‖ had been proposed by the authors, 
namely a scoring method consisting in summing and averaging ratings for all the images a respondent had 
produced. Results using this methodology are somewhat mixed. For instance, on the one side, Slovic et 
al. (1991)‘s results showed that image ratings and consequent preference order were predictive of 
people‘s behavior (i.e. ultimate vacation choices, preferences for cities, and states in which to take a new 
job, retire, or site a business). Moreover, when a further survey using exactly the same methodology was 
performed 16-18 months later on smaller samples of the same participants, data confirmed that the 
affective qualities of a person's word-associations were clearly related to the probability that the person 
would subsequently undertake a given behavior. Similar results using the same methodology were 
obtained in a study on adolescents by Benthin, Slovic, Moran, Severson, Mertz, and Gerrard (1995): the 
affective quality of imagery acted as a strong predictor for participation in some health-related behavior.  
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In the present experiment, it was decided to use the same version of the ―method of 
continued associations‖ used by Slovic and colleagues. In accordance with the affect heuristic it 
was expected, that the two superficial ways of expressing the same probability, namely a ―1 in 
X‖ or in a ―N in NX‖ format for the numerical ratios, might have elicited mental images whose 
degree of affective tag could vary, thus indirectly influencing the (different) degree of perceived 
probability in the two cases. In particular, the specific hypothesis for the study was that, 
 
Hypothesis: The negativity of the affect conveyed by an image evoked by a given 
probability is higher when such probability is expressed by a ratio in a “1 in X” 
format than in an equivalent “N in NX” format. 
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-seven individuals from the general population (39 females and 27 males) 
took part in the study voluntarily, all recruited face-to-face in public locations (e.g., libraries, 
town parks). The data of one person had to be eliminated due to some problems in 
comprehension of the Italian language. Thus, the final sample comprised 66 individuals. 
Mean age was 30.25 years (SD = 11.3), ranging from 18 to 65- one person did not report this 
information. Self-reported education level was generally quite high, as the 50% of the sample (n 
= 33) had a (3/5 Years) University degree, 3 people (4.5%) a higher title like Master, PhD, or 
Specialization school diploma, and the 40.9 % of the sample (n = 27) had a high school 
diploma, while only 3 people (4.5%) possessed a lower title (―licenza media‖).  
Only the 24.2% of the sample (n = 16) had one or more children. Among these, only 3 people 
declared to have been reported by a health specialist the information on their probability of 
having a child affected by Down syndrome.  
 
Design and material. The scenario employed was similar to that used in previous studies. The 
maternal age-related probability that the future child would be affected by Down syndrome was 
expressed through a numerical ratio that could be expressed in two variants, namely one using a 
―1 in X‖ format (i.e., 1 in 200) and one using a ―N in NX‖ format (i.e., 5 in a 1000). As in 
previous studies, the single factor manipulated between-subjects was the relative magnitude of 
both numerator and denominator in each ratio. Nevertheless, this time instead than a subjective 
assessment of the probability, participants were asked to report the first image coming to their 
                                                                                                                                                                          
On the other hand, results of a study on financial judgments (MacGregor, Slovic, Dreman, and Berry, 
2000) showed that despite the fact imagery and affective evaluations were highly correlated with one 
another, and with the likelihood of investing, the latter allowed for low degree of predicted actual market 
performance. This could well be a product of the difficulty in forecasting future behavior, which is 
particularly strong for the financial context in which conditions on whose basis decisions have to be taken 
are continuously changing. Anyway, as difficulty in forecasting future behavior is common to other 
fields, it cannot be explained why the variable would not play a role in those other studies. 
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mind when thinking about the specified numerical probability of having a child with Down 
syndrome
80
. Following the elicitation of the image, respondents were asked to rate it on a scale 
ranging from very negative (- 2), somewhat negative (- 1), neutral (0), somewhat positive (+ 1), 
or very positive (+ 2). 
 
Procedure. Each participant received a paper copy of one out of the two versions of the survey 
constructed to follow the experimental design. A minimum of 30 participants per condition was 
necessary to make statistical comparison valid. Individuals were allowed an unrestricted amount 
of time to complete the questionnaire by themselves. Anonymity and confidentiality were 
ensured, as well as a short debrief given to them at the end of data collection.  
 
Results 
A total of 66 mental images was generated (1 each participant), whose complete list is available 
on request from the experimenter. Table 1 shows the distribution of such images in content 
categories created on the basis of a classification scheme developed ad hoc for the study. As the 
nature of the analysis on images was only explorative, and our interest was mainly on the affect 
conveyed by the images, the standard procedure for analyzing qualitative data (i.e., multiple 
coders) was not adopted.  
 The most frequently evoked idea in the sample (n = 15, 22.7 %) was a material image of 
the child him/herself or of a specific physical detail. Nurturance, and need of special care was 
the next thought in terms of frequency (n = 6, 9.1 %), and the idea of a person affected by the 
disease and known by the participant, together with the arousal of difficulties/problems, or the 
association with a specific colour were the images immediately following (n = 5 each; 7.6 %). 
Similarly to Finucane, Slovic, and Mertz (2000), the general affect rating across the images, as 
well as their mean affective valence, was calculated for all the responders. The rating was 
slightly negative (M = -.14, SD = 1.29). The majority of images was negative or very negative 
(n = 33, 50.0%), but a substantial proportion of them was positive or very positive (n = 20, 33.4 
%) or neutral (n = 11, 16.7 %), a result compatible with the positive attitude shown by some 
people. No difference between the two experimental conditions was detected in the number of 
mental images of either valence generated by participants- see Table 2. Figure 1, instead, shows 
the distribution of answers for each affective valence available in the 5-point Likert scale in 
each experimental condition.  
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 An informal definition of what was meant by ―mental image‖ was provided in a footnote, together with 
an example.  
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Table 1 
Images associated with the 1 in 200 [5 in 1000] probability of having a Down 
syndrome-affected child 
 
Category Frequency % 
  Visage, body, physical detail, photo 15 22.7 
Nurturance, care 6 9.1 
Known person 5 7.6 
Difficulties, problems 5 7.6 
Colour 5 7.6 
Positive feeling or attitude 4 6.1 
Hospital, choice, doubt 4 6.1 
Anxiety, worry 3 4.5 
Emargination 3 4.5 
Handicap 3 4.5 
Sadness 2 3.0 
Probable, possible, and contraries 2 3.0 
Total 57 86.4 
 Ambiguous category/ not classified 9 13.6 
Total 66 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Number of images for each valence in the two experimental conditions 
 
 Ratio Format  
Valence 1 in 200 5 in 1000 Total 
Negative 18 15 33 
Positive 11 11 22 
Neutrum 4 7 11 
Total 33 33 66 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the affective valence attached to the 66 images generated as 
function of the experimental condition 
 
A visual inspection of the figure suggests a right shift of the distribution of answers for the 5 in 
1000 condition (more positive average valence) compared with the distribution of answers for 
the 1 in 200 condition (more negative average valence). In order to check this impression, a test 
on the equality of the means between the two groups was performed
81
. The test returned an 
equivalent affective reaction toward the 1 in 200 and the 5 in 1000 conditions, t(64) = .10, p = 
.93, M1 in 200  = .12 (SD = 1.39), M5 in 1000 = .15 (SD = 1.20), therefore the visual impression 
generated by observing the figure was not confirmed. Thus, the main hypothesis was not 
supported by data. Though, the median answer was lower in the 1 in 200 condition (i.e., - 1) 
than in the 5 in 1000 condition (i.e., 0)- see Fig. 2. This tendency was in the expected direction, 
namely a more negative affective valence for the smaller-numbered ratio condition than for the 
larger-numbered one.  
The content of the mental associations was further examined by investigators for the attributed 
valence (positive/negative/neutral). These associations were distinct from the affect ratings 
assigned by respondents to their image. The proportional majority of the images was judged by 
the experimenters as negative (n = 27, 40.9%), with only 13 (19.7%) judged as positive; those 
images which could not be classified, i.e., 6 (9.1%), expressed an ambivalent thought, while 20 
images (30.3% of the sample) were judged neutral, with no clear connotation. No main 
significant differences in the two experimental conditions in the number of images of either 
valence were detected. 
                                                          
81
 See Rubaltelli, Pasini, Rumiati, Olsen, and Slovic (2010). Obviously, the classic summation model 
(Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers, and Gesell, 1991) generally used in similar researches was not 
appropriate here, as more than one image per person would have been necessary to apply it.  
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Fig. 2. Box plots of the affective evaluation in each experimental condition 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the hypothesis of a different affective response to the two ratio 
formats under examination (i.e., ―1 in X‖ and ―N in NX‖) by means of an implicit measure. 
Such diverse emotional reaction was supposed to originate in the mental images evoked by 
either format, and if found, could be attributed the ability to mediate probability perception. 
However, unfortunately results showed that the degree of emotional valence attached to the 
mental images elicited by either format did not differ. A possible problem with the methodology 
might have been the fact, that differently from the original procedure (e.g., Slovic, Kraus, Flynn, 
Chalmers, and Gesell, 1991) only one mental image, instead than 3 or more, had been elicited. 
Another problem could reside in the way the procedure was translated. Participants were not 
asked to read the ratio (―1 in X‖ vs. ―N in NX‖) alone, but the scenario was always given (i.e., 
probability of having a child affected by Down syndrome). In previous studies on images, the 
stimulus was often just a word (e.g., nuclear power) and not a scenario or a phrase. 
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SECTION 4, or 
Test of two practical interventions 
 
 
Studies in Section 2 replicated and generalized the effect observed in Section 1: When the 
probability of a medical risk was expressed as ―1 in X‖, that probability loomed bigger (and the 
risk more alarming) than when it was expressed by the equivalent ratio in ―N in NX‖ format. As 
a consequence of such findings, doctors and health personnel must thus be warned that their 
choice of a ratio format in communicating the probability of a health-related outcome (here, the 
risk of having a Down syndrome-affected child) does not come without consequences on 
patients‘ assessments. Indeed, opting for a ―1 in X‖ format might influence laypeople subjective 
impressions by increasing their probability perceptions in respect to other formats. Nevertheless, 
a question at that point was, Are professionals aware of the bias identified in laypeople? To 
answer such query, in Study 4.1, a group of medical doctors will be studied who will show not 
to be prone to the bias, probably thanks to their higher expertise with the concept of risk and 
probabilities. That will call for an examination of possible communicative interventions able to 
attenuate or even eliminate the ―1 in X‖ effect.  
In order to avoid as much as possible sub-optimal decision that might originate, for instance, in 
inflated assessments two such interventions will be tested. It seemed natural to turn to classic 
interventions aimed at coping with the poor understanding people have of probabilities and 
numbers (Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2009; Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer and Edwards, 
2003; Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer, 2001; Peters, Lipkus and Diefenback, 2006; Peters, Västfjäll, 
Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, and Dickert, 2006). As in the domain of risk communication, it is 
common practice to use verbal analogies (see Barilli, Savadori, Pighin, Bonalumi, Ferrari, 
Ferrari, et al., in press), or visual aids (i.e., graphical representations), they will both be tested. 
Study 1 and 2 will accordingly assess the resistance of the ―1 in X effect‖ to these two 
interventions.  
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Study 4.1 
 
A special thanks to Natasha Cont for collection of data presented in this study 
 
Goals 
Results of Sections 1 and 2 defined a new bias in the probability perception of a health-related 
outcome (i.e., the risk of having a Down syndrome-affected child) when the probability is 
expressed by means of a numerical ratio. When the same probability was expressed in a ―1 in 
X‖ format, it loomed bigger (and the risk more alarming) than when it was expressed in a ―N in 
NX‖ format. Thus, health-care professionals who routinely communicate probabilistic 
information on health-related outcomes must be warned that a probability phrased as ―1 in 200‖, 
for instance sounds bigger to patients than the same probability expressed as ―5 in 1000‖ or ―50 
in 10,000‖. However, it was reasoned that, it could have been not exceptional to discover that 
practitioners were not aware of the fact patients might interpret differently the two probability 
expressions, because either they were as well influenced by the same tendency, or because they 
were themselves de-sensitized to the bias as effect of their expertise (i.e., for them the two ratios 
represent the same probability, thus they do not imagine other people could not think the same). 
In other words, there were reasons leading to think, that practitioners‘ judgment could have 
differed from that of their patients.  
Indeed, literature has in some situations showed a systematic departure of expert judgment from 
that observed in laypeople (i.e., novices to the problem). Reasons for it have been recognized in 
the ability to organize ―[…] cues into larger ‗chunks‘‖, and in that of recognizing ―[…] patterns 
more easily, more accurately and more quickly‖ (Koehler, Brenner, and Griffin, 2002, p. 692) 
provided they are in the domain of expertise. Some authors (e.g., Adams and Smith, 2003, p. 
78) have been referring even to two different ―tribes‖, namely experts (―those people who have 
knowledge of, and usually some responsibility for dealing with, risks in a particular area. They 
may not be responsible for creating the risks, but are charged both with representing those risks 
to others and with influencing their nature and severity‖), and ―consumers‖, (i.e., those who lack 
a scientific or professional knowledge in that field; often, though not always, lay people, as 
―[…] it is quite possible that experts in one type of risk will also be consumers of many 
others‖).  
Following Bonini, Del Missier, and Rumiati (2008), one can define experts those people who 
can make an evaluation or perform a choice in a quick way that most of times represents the 
result of an intuition, of a rapid process based on tacit and implicit knowledge rather than on a 
standardized conscious procedure. This definition allows a more exhaustive recognition of 
experts than each of the separate criteria identified instead by Shanteau, Weiss, Thomas, and 
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Pounds (2003), namely 1) having a relevant number of professional tenure years; or, 2) having 
got formal certification qualifying them as such; or, 3) having been co-opted by people who are 
recognized as experts; or, 4) formulating accurate and stable definitions in their field of 
competence. Bonini and colleagues claimed that experts‘ judgment should not only be 
constantly (stably) accurate, but also valid, namely it should not change as a function of (really 
so or perceived) irrelevant information, like (to quote the case of the present studies) the 
magnitude of the numbers in a ratio conveying a probability.  
In most of cases, the decision of so-called experts are taken following intuitions (see, for 
instance, the finding that expert clinicians can formulate a diagnosis in less than 15 seconds- 
Hamm, 1988) rather than examining situations analytically in depth. Use of heuristics by 
experts would correspond to the functionality of those shortcuts in complex, and uncertain 
situations requiring quick decisions that cannot follow from systematic and complete rational 
analysis (see, for instance, nurses‘ need of speedily identifying a heart attack). This view is 
summarized in Gigerenzer and colleagues‘ idea of ―fast and frugal heuristics‖ (Gigerenzer, 
2008; Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Group, 1999), according to which cognitive shortcuts 
would have an ecological value as in most of the situations they lead to the best solution. In the 
genetic field, for example, Dewhurst, McCarthy Veach, Lampman, Petraitis, Kao, and LeRoy 
(2007), showed in two studies on the methods used to solve (four different) genetic problems, 
that while even the large majority of genetic undergraduate students made use of heuristics, the 
use of mental shortcuts by genetic counsellors resulted in a greater percentage of correct 
answers than in less-experts (see similar results in Smith and Good, 1984, reporting videotape 
analysis of novices and experts solving analogous problems). One of the studies argued, that 
explanations resided in experts‘ better understanding of the rules of probability, perhaps due to 
their clinical experience involving computation and interpretation of risk, beside the statistical 
education received (even though the number of years of experience was not a predictor of 
accuracy in that case). 
Obviously, it is also possible that such cognitive shortcuts, based on intuition, lead to biased 
answers, namely errors. A large body of studies has showed that even experts are prone to some 
of the systematic and predictable cognitive biases that have been detected in laypeople, for 
instance availability and representativeness heuristics, anchoring and adjustment, omission 
fallacy, framing effect (for a review of ―errors‖ in medical experts, see for instance Motterlini 
and Crupi, 2006). Similarly to patients, experts find numbers and probabilities difficult to 
understand (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002), as demonstrated on tests in basic numeracy (Estrada, 
Martin-Hryniewicz, Peek, Collins, and Byrd, 2004; Schwartz, Woloshin, and Welch, 1999). 
An analysis of experts (e.g., medical doctors )‘ perceptions of the same probability 
conveyed in ratios using numbers of different magnitudes not only would have allowed to 
gather further important information on this fundamental subject of the communicative pair, but 
Chapter 3 
143 
also to obtain hints of undoubted useful value for the aims of the present research. Hence, the 
specific hypothesis for this study was the following,  
 
Hypothesis: Health care professionals, differently from laypeople, are not 
susceptible to the “1 in X” bias in perceived probability.  
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-eight medical doctors recruited in hospital wards of a clinic in North Italy 
accepted to take part in the study for free. Seventy-three percent of them (n = 41) were males 
while 27% (n = 15) females- two participants did not disclose their gender. Mean age was 45.9 
years (SD = 8.2) varying from a minimum of 31 to a maximum of 60 (two participants did not 
disclose their age). Practitioners had different specialties (see Table 1), and had a mean of 18.36 
years of tenure (SD = 8.35) ranging from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 35 years. 
 
Design and material. The study manipulated a single factor in a between-subjects design, 
namely the format of the ratio employed to describe the probability of the outcome happening 
(i.e., in smaller numbers vs. larger numbers at the numerator and denominator). Participants 
read a scenario very similar to that used in Study 1: they were asked to role-play, that when 
considering the possibility of buying a trip to Kenya they had received information on the 
statistic of a severe disease. In particular, information regarded the statistics on the possibility of 
contracting a contagious disease in the country
82
. The probability information was expressed by 
means of a numerical ratio in two variants between-subjects, namely using comparatively 
smaller numbers in a ―1 in X‖ format (i.e., 1 in 200), or an ―N in NX‖ format using larger 
numbers at the numerator and denominator (i.e., 5 in 1000). 
Participants were asked to rate their subjective perception of the magnitude of the probability 
presented in the scenario on a 7-point Likert-scale anchored to ―extremely low‖ and ―extremely 
high‖, with all points verbally labelled. 
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 This time the disease at stake was hepatitis A instead than malaria. Also, the attribution of the risk to a 
friend in the scenario was not necessary anymore as no ethical guideline imposed it for the type of 
participants involved in the study.  
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Table 1 
Specialties of Medical Doctors taking part in the study 
Specialty Frequency % % correct 
General Medicine 2 3.4 3.9 
Orthopaedics 10 17.2 19.6 
Cardiology 6 10.3 11.8 
Neurology 2 3.4 3.9 
Otolaryngology 3 5.2 5.9 
Ophthalmology 1 1.7 2.0 
Endocrinology 2 3,4 3.9 
Geriatrics 2 3,4 3.9 
Surgery 9 15.5 17.6 
Gynaecology 4 7.9 6.8 
Anaesthesia 4 7.9 6.8 
Gastroenterology and Dig. 
Endoscopy 
2 3.4 3.9 
Rheumatology 2 3.4 3.9 
Nephrology/Urology 1 1.7 2.0 
Dermatology 1 0.9 1.0 
Partial total 51 87.9 100.0 
Not specified 7 12.1  
Total 58 100.0  
 
 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions constructed to 
follow the experimental design. They were allowed an unrestricted amount of time to complete 
the questionnaire.  
The study did not require an ethical approval because it was not addressed to a special 
population (i.e., children, patients, and humans non capable of informed consent). Anonymity 
and confidentiality were ensured to participants, though.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Contrary to findings on general population, doctors‘ mean probability estimations did not differ 
significantly in the two considered experimental conditions, namely when the ratio format was 
either 1 in 200 or 5 in 1000 (M = 4.53, SD = 1.33), Z= -.01, p = .99. Thus, the hypothesis of 
equality of the means (same perceived probability irrespective of the format of the ratios) 
received confirmation in the data.  
The absence of the effect observed in the other studies in general population could be linked to 
the fact that health professionals are used to perform operations on the mathematical formats 
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they normally read on scientific sources, receive as results of technical tests, and have to 
communicate in clinical consultations. They might be used to execute similar operations across 
formats, and consequentially be more skilled than the average person in those operations. Thus, 
the superficial format conveying a statistical information would not matter very much to them, 
since as long as they had become experts, they might have adopted the habit of standardizing 
every numerical format to the one they ―sense‖ best (e.g., percentages) before evaluating its 
magnitude. Nevertheless, this is only a conjecture, though very likely, as such ability was not 
tested in concomitance with practitioners‘ evaluations. 
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Study 4.2 
 
Goals 
In risk communication to patients, Medical Doctors frequently use metaphors, similes, or 
analogies attempting to enhance the otherwise poor comprehension of small probabilities by 
laypeople (Edwards, 2003). It is generally thought, that analogies
83
, through real (even thought 
imagined) quantitative sets of events, are conceived as ways to better convey the size of a risk or 
the probability of its occurrence, as well as to facilitate people‘s role in grasping the meaning of 
otherwise ―cold‖ numerical values. For instance, the concept of chance is introduced by experts 
as rolling a dice or extracting a lottery ticket; other frequently used analogies are metaphorical 
histories or the ―balls and jar‖ analogy (Edwards, 2003). The latter is a verbal technique where, 
in order to facilitate comprehension of the size of a probability, people are encouraged to 
imagine its magnitude as similar to the chance that an individual has of drawing a ball of some 
given desired features from an urn full of balls. For instance, a 1 in 100 probability of 
contracting a disease can be compared with the chance of extracting the only red ball from a 
hypothetical jar containing 99 white balls and 1 red ball. 
Despite the undoubted great appealing of analogies as aiding communicative 
instruments, we were only aware of one study which tested empirically their influence on the 
subjective assessment of probability (Barilli, Savadori, Pighin, Bonalumi, Ferrari, Ferrari, et al., 
in press). In that study, a significant effect was found on the level of perceived probability when 
a balls and jar analogy was employed in risk communication. Thus, as it was suggested that 
verbal analogies 1) influence the degree of perceived probability of a phenomenon, and 2) help 
people better figuring out the magnitude of those probabilities, it was thought, that they could 
even influence the ―1 in X‖ effect. Indeed, if thanks to the analogy, people would have better 
understood the numerical ratios proposed, it would also have been more probable that they 
could attribute two not significantly different evaluations to the same probability when in a ―1 in 
X‖ or in an ―N in NX‖ format. The analogy would, as such, work as a de-biasing technique. 
Hence, the hypothesis for the current study was: 
 
Hypothesis: Using a verbal analogy like the balls and jar to communicate the 
probability eliminates the “1 in X” effect. 
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 Analogies are comparisons based on alignment and mapping of the underlying structure of two 
represented situations (Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov, 2001, chapt. 6). 
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Method 
Participants. A total of 81 patients (50 women, 23 men, and 8 people who did not disclose their 
gender) of a hospital of North Italy, took part in the experiment voluntarily. The large majority 
of them (n = 62) were recruited at an out-patients‘ (gynaecologist), some of them (n = 15) at the 
Sterility Centre of the hospital, while four people in a maternity ward. 
Mean age was 33.57 yrs. (SD = 4.83), varying between a minimum of 24 to a maximum of 47 
(one participant did not disclose this information). Of the sample, the 51.4% (n = 36) had 
completed high school, the 32.9% (n = 23) had a degree, while 15.7% (n = 11) had the lowest 
education level in Italy (11 people did not disclose their education level). Of the sample, 40.5% 
(n = 30) had already one or more children at the moment of study completion, while the 
remaining 59.5% (n = 44) did not have children (7 people did not answer to this question). 
Indeed, the large majority of participants or their couple- if man- (namely the 84.3%, n = 59) 
was pregnant at the moment of survey completion (eleven people did not disclose this 
information). 
 
Design and material. Participants read a scenario (see Study 1.1) encouraging them to imagine 
that one of their friends had just bought a trip to an exotic country. They were informed of the 
statistics on the risk of contracting malaria in that country, a probability expressed through a 
verbalized numerical ratio that could be expressed in one out of two formats, namely a ―1 in X‖ 
format (i.e., 1 in 200) or a ―N in NX‖ format (i.e., 5 in 1000). After that, they were asked to 
imagine a jar containing a number of balls equal to the denominator of either ratio (i.e., 200 or 
1000); these balls were in two colours. A number of balls equivalent to the numerator of either 
ratio (i.e., 1 or 5) was described as in red colour, while the remaining number of balls (i.e., 199 
or 995) was described as in white colour. People were encouraged to equate the probability they 
had read in the scenario to the probability of drawing a red ball from the jar.  
The only dependent variable assessed in this study was the subjective magnitude of the 
probability of infection. It was measured by asking a personal assessment of the friends‘ 
probability of contracting malaria going to Kenya on a seven-point Likert scale anchored to 
―unimportant‖ and ―almost certain‖ whose points were all verbally labelled.  
 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two conditions constructed to 
follow the experimental design. Individuals could complete the questionnaire at their pace, 
without any time constraints.  
Ethical approval. The study required an ethical approval because it was addressed to a special 
population (i.e., patients recruited in a hospital). Alike Study 1.1., under the requirement of the 
Clinical Ethical Committee, the questionnaire could not include any sensitive question that 
participants might feel unconformable answering. Indeed, the scenario employed in the 
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questionnaire should have included, like others described in this dissertation, the Down 
syndrome disease as outcome, but that had to be substituted with another in order to cause a 
lower degree of anxiety (possibly none) in the already sensitive individuals. For the same 
reason, the risk mentioned in the scenario had to attributed to a participant‘s friend instead than 
to the participant her/himself. Anonymity and confidentiality in the treatment of the data 
gathered were still to be ensured to participants. 
 
Results 
A test on the equality of means showed that subjective probability perception was still greater 
when the probability was expressed as 1 in 200 (M = 3.73, SD = 1.30) than as 5 in 1000 even 
when the scenario included an analogy of the jar and ball type (M = 3.12, SD = 1.02), t(79) = 
2.33; p = .02- see Fig.1. In Study 1.1, where the scenario was the same apart from the fact that 
visual analogy was not present, the means were very similar (i.e., M = 3.84; SD = 1.08 for 1 in 
200, and M = 3.10; SD = 1.27 for 5 in 1000), thus the decrease in perceived probability expected 
for both formats did not take place. The ―1 in X‖ effect, instead, was still present. Thus, it could 
not be affirmed that the hypothesis of this study was verified. The verbal analogy did not seem a 
good debiasing technique in helping the ―1 in X‖ effect disappear.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean perceived probability in the two experimental conditions 
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Discussion 
Verbal analogies are techniques frequently used in risk communication to patients in the attempt 
to enhance the otherwise poor comprehension of small probabilities by laypeople (Edwards, 
2003). The only study testing experimentally the efficacy of a verbal analogy in conveying the 
size of a risk or the probability of its occurrence (i.e., Barilli, Savadori, Pighin, Bonalumi, 
Ferrari, Ferrari, et al., in press) found that a ball-and-jar analogy could influence the degree of 
perceived risk for the probability of the outcome happening. The present study originated in the 
need to verify the possible debiasing effect of employing a similar analogy when the probability 
was expressed through a ratio in either a‖1 in X‖ or an ―N in NX‖ format. Such issue was 
interesting for two reasons: 1) analogies are among the suggested communicative interventions 
to ease the patient comprehension of a risk, thus their study had an ecologic value; and 2) since 
it had been showed that the ―jar and ball‖ analogy could influence probability perception, it was 
reasonable to expect an effect of such technique when the probability was conveyed in ratios of 
different formats.  
Results of this study showed that the ―1 in X‖ effect was resistant to the introduction of 
a verbal analogy for the numerical probability. Indeed, people still showed a tendency to 
perceive a probability expressed in a ―1 in X‖ format as larger than when expressed in an ―N in 
NX‖ format. Contrary to what hypothesized, thus, the jar and balls analogy didn‘t prove an 
useful mean to make the ―1 in X‖ effect disappear.  
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Study 4.3 
 
Goals 
Visual displays are frequently employed in communication, and the health domain is not an 
exception. Indeed, beside classical visual means of representing probability (e.g., vertical bars, 
pie-charts, icon arrays), some researchers have even developed specific graphical aids to help 
doctors and health personnel communicating the probability of medical events, like, for 
instance, the Paling Palette (Paling, 2003).  
Graphical displays can help people making decisions based on an accurate understanding of risk 
information, and they are useful in enhancing comprehension even of health messages (see, for 
instance, Fagerlin, Wang, and Ubel, 2005; Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, and Gigerenzer, 2009; 
Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, and Gigerenzer, in press; Lloyd and Reyna, 2001; Okan, Garcia-
Retamero, Cokely, and Maldonado, in press; Paling, 2003; Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Smith, Derry, 
McClure, Stark, et al., 2008). Indeed, visual aids benefit of the positive features of visual 
information, namely saliency and being relatively easy to understand (Jarvenpaa; Woloshin, 
Schwartz, Byram, Fischoff, and Welch; both cited in Burkell, 2004), thus they improved 
people‘ degree of comprehension and recall of information.  
As argued by Okan et al. (p. 16), ―Visual aids can also improve understanding of risks 
associated with different medical treatments, screenings, and life-styles (Ancker, Senathirajaha, 
Kukafka, and Starren, 2006; Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2010; Lipkus, 
2007), and promote consideration of beneficial treatments that have side effects (Waters, 
Weinstein, Colditz, and Emmons, 2007)‖. Not only, they can eliminate errors induced by 
anecdotal narratives (Fagerlin, Wang, and Ubel, 2005), and, more importantly for the case of the 
present dissertation, reduce biases (see framing effect, Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, in press-a; 
or denominator neglect, Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, and Gigerenzer, in press; Garcia-Retamero 
and Galesic, 2009
84, and Stone, Sieck, Bull, Yates, Parks, and Rush, 2003). Even in the case of 
the ―1 in X effect‖ reviewed in the present dissertation, it could have been that the employment 
of a visual aid might have helped reducing (or even eliminating) the bias at stake. Thus, it was 
decided to investigate effects of the use of icon array on probability perception. Icon arrays are 
graphical representations consisting of a number of circles or other icons symbolizing 
individuals who are affected by some risk. The choice of that particular aid was done for the 
following reasons:  
1) As suggested by Hawley, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jancovic, Lucas, and Fagerlin (2008), in 
the wake of, among others, Price, Cameron, and Butow (2007), pictographs or icon arrays 
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 All these paper had still to be published at the moment of experiment design, data collection, and data 
analysis. 
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should be preferred by providers of probability information in shared decision making 
environments. Hawley and colleagues found, indeed, following an examination of six 
different formats of graphical presentation (bar graph, pictograph, modified pictograph- 
―sparkplug‖- pie chart, modified pie-chart- ―clock graph‖, and table) on health-related 
knowledge and treatment behaviour, that pictographs were the aids most effectively 
conveying both types of knowledge (i.e., the gist and the verbatim one) across numeracy 
levels; moreover, pictographs were trusted by participants who felt the nature of the 
information they conveyed as scientific. Furthermore, Feldman-Stewart, Brundage, and 
Zotov (2007) suggested, that icon arrays (i.e., the so-called ―systematic ovals‖) are among 
the most easily processed visual aids, after vertical bars, thus they should be preferred in 
communications with patients, especially the low numerate individuals and the older ones.  
2) Icon arrays had been previously employed in the study of phenomena similar to that 
investigated in the present dissertation, e.g., Ratio-bias (see Rudski and Volksdorf, 2002; but 
also Stone, Sieck, Bull, Yates, Parks, and Rush, 2003). 
In line with what stated by Ancher, Senathirajaha, Kukafka, and Starren (2006, p. 616), i.e., that 
―Part-to-whole bar charts and part-to-whole sequentially arranged icon arrays probably invoke 
automatic visual area processing
10
 and proportion judgments
11
 and can be used to help viewers 
attend to the mathematical proportion.
34,53,54‖
, it was predicted that the visual representation 
could induce participants to properly consider both numerators and denominators of the ratios, 
and hence the usual ―1 in X effect‖ would not materialize. Thus, the specific hypothesis for this 
study was the following: 
 
Hypothesis: When a probability expressed through one out of two numerical ratios 
(“1 in X” or “N in NX”) is further illustrated through a visual aid (e.g., a 
pictogram), the usual “1 in X” effect disappears.  
 
Method 
Participants. A total of a hundred and ninety-two individuals from the general population took 
part in the experiment voluntarily.  
The 65.5% of the sample was constituted by women (n = 126), mean age was 25.87 yrs. (SD = 
9.69), varying between a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 69 (one participant did not disclose 
his/her age). 
 
Design and material. Questionnaires employed the usual scenario (see e.g., Study 2.4). 
Participants read instructions asking them to role-play and imagine themselves as Anna, the 
mother-to-be described in the scenario as at risk for a child affected by Down syndrome. The 
probability of having a child with that disease was expressed through a numerical ratio either in 
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the ―1 in X‖ or in the ―N in NX‖ format (1 in 10 versus 10 in 100). Moreover, according to the 
experimental condition, the probability could be either stated using the numerical ratio only or 
the numerical ratio followed by a graphical representation (i.e., pictogram). In the ratio plus 
pictogram conditions, according to the magnitude of the ratio employed, the pictogram depicted 
either 10 or 100 dots symbolizing the denominator of the numerical ratio, with either 1 red dot 
or 10 red dots symbolizing the numerator of the ratio (i.e., affected children), and 9 or 90 white 
ones symbolizing healthy children
85
- see here below in Fig. 1 the pictogram for the 1 in 10 
condition, while refer to the Appendix for both visual displays employed in the study. Thus, 
four different questionnaire versions were build up to follow the 2 x 2 between-subjects 
experimental design. 
 
          
 
Fig. 1. The pictogram (i.e., icon array) used in the 1 in 10 condition 
 
 
Within this context, participants were asked a subjective evaluation of the magnitude of the 
stated probability of having a child affected by Down syndrome on an 11-point Likert scale 
from ―extremely low‖ to ―extremely high‖, with the half-way point labelled ―moderate‖.  
 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions constructed to 
follow the experimental design. Individuals could complete the questionnaire at their pace, 
without any time constraints.  
 
Results 
Figure 2 displays the mean values of subjective probability in the four experimental conditions. 
As it can be anticipated from the figure, participants in the control condition (without visual aid) 
showed the classic ―1 in X‖ effect, but this effect completely disappeared for participants who 
were provided with a visual aid, namely an equivalent probability perception was attributed to 
the two format conditions. 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on subjective probability returned no significant main effects of the ratio 
format, F(1; 188) = 2.67, p = .10, ηp
2 
= .01, and of the representational format, F(1; 188) = .71, p 
= .40, ηp
2 
= .01, on the perceived probability (and a non-significant interaction, F(1; 188) = 2.83, 
p = .09, ηp
2 
= .02). Subsequent contrast analyses confirmed that participants in the control 
condition provided greater ratings for the 1 in 10 ratio (M = 7.04, SD = 3.08) than for the 10 in 
100 ratio (M = 5.65, SD =2.56), t(94) = 2.41, p = .02. However, participants who were given a 
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 The size of the pictogram was 9 x 0.9 cm for the small number ratio condition, and 9 x 9 cm for the 
large number ratio condition. 
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visual aid provided remarkably similar ratings for the 1 in 10 ratio (M = 5.98, SD = 3.08) and 
for the 10 in 100 ratio (M = 6.00, SD = 2.92), t(94) = - .03, p = .97. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was 
confirmed by data. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Subjective ratings of probability, with and without visual aid, 
for the two ratio format conditions 
 
 
Discussion 
A simple visual aid like a pictogram where an instance was represented by a coloured dot made 
the ―1 in X‖ effect disappear. It is not clear, whether the ―1 in X‖ format yields an 
overestimation of the probability, or whether the ―N in NX‖ yields an underestimation of the 
probability. The present study, though, suggested that the first of these propositions is correct. 
Participants who were provided with a visual aid gave similar assessments of the 1 in 10 and 
―10 in 100‖. It turned out that these assessments were significantly lower than that provided 
about 1 in 10 by participants in the control condition. If one assumes that the assessments given 
with a visual aid were better calibrated, then the results of the present study suggest that the 1 in 
X ratio leads to overestimate the probability it expresses. 
Although further research will be needed to identify the boundary conditions of this 
intervention, its effectiveness might be due to the way it transformed probability ratios in 
readily identifiable, visualised natural frequencies (see Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 
1994). Also, as suggested by Ancher, Senathirajaha, Kukafka, and Starren (2006), as well as by 
Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, and Gigerenzer (in press), icon arrays were successful in eliminating 
the bias probably because, alike similar graphs, they made part-to-whole relations visually 
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available, thus inducing individuals to properly consider both numerators and denominators of 
the probability that was depicted. Fuzzy-Trace theory account that ―visual displays can help 
people represent superordinate classes (e.g., the overall number of patients who did and did not 
receive a treatment).‖ (Garcia-Retamero et al., in press, p. 2), received support in this study. 
Finally, pictographs demonstrated particularly useful in another situation not previously 
reviewed in the literature, thus broadening their relevance and usefulness in medical risk 
communication.  
As per the case of neglect of the denominator, the recent set of investigations just cited has 
showed that the bias would be lessened when the information becomes easier to process, as 
when the probability is visually represented by means of icon arrays. Garcia-Retamero and 
colleagues found support for those accounts of the denominator neglect, like, for instance that of 
Reyna (1991), which stressed on the particular difficulty in ratio evaluation caused by the need 
of integrating information across multiple classes (i.e., the comparison of the number of people 
getting a disease to both those getting and those not getting the disease). Indeed, if usually 
individuals would simplify the judgment by focusing on the salient class (i.e., the numerator), 
instead when probability had been represented by means of icon arrays ―people [would have] 
attend[ed] to the relationship between the numerator (i.e., the number of treated and nontreated 
patients who are affected) and the denominator (i.e., the entire population at risk; see also 
Lipkus, 2007)‖ (Garcia-Retamero, Galesic and Gigerenzer, in press, p. 10, information in 
squared brackets by the writer), thus showing a lessened bias.  
 
General short discussion of the section 
The question posed at the beginning of this section (whether or not the ―1 in X‖ effect would be 
resistant to classic communicative interventions) did not show, as expected, an answer that 
could be generalised to different types of interventions. Indeed, while a verbal analogy based on 
urns and balls did not help participants to overcome the bias, a dot-type graphical aid made the 
effect disappear. It is not clear whether the ―1 in X‖ format yields to an overestimation of the 
probability, or whether the ―N in NX‖ yields an underestimation of the probability. The present 
study, though, suggested that the first of these propositions is correct. Participants who were 
provided with a visual aid gave similar assessments of the 1 in 10 and 10 in 100 ratios. It turned 
out, that these assessments were significantly lower than that provided about 1 in 10 by 
participants in the control condition, and broadly similar to that provided about 10 in 100 by 
participants in the control condition. If we assume that the assessments given with a visual aid 
were better calibrated, then the results of the third experiment suggest that the ―1 in X‖ ratio 
leads to overestimate the probability it expresses. Very interestingly, doctors are not affected by 
the bias. Thus the bias seems to be domain-dependent (as expertise is domain dependent by 
definition) and part of the laypeople‘s perceptions of clinical conditions.  
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The present thesis was designed to investigate how the use of superficially different but 
mathematically equivalent ratio formats affects the magnitude perception of the probability that 
is conveyed. In particular, focus of investigation was the influence that those expressions, when 
employed in risk communication of prenatal screening test results, have on prospective parents‘ 
perceptions of the chance of having a Down syndrome-affected child. The issue was, in the 
choice of a ratio format to state the probability, would the magnitude of the numbers employed 
in the ratio (smaller, e.g., 1 in 10, or larger, e.g., 10 in 100) matter in terms of probability 
perception? Answering such question was the main aim of the present work. 
Research originated from both a theoretical and a practical question. As it has been 
explained (see beginning of Chapter 3), from a theoretical standpoint studying format effects is 
one way to validate theories on how the mind processes information about risk, specifically dual 
process approaches postulating the existence of both an analytical and an experiential way for 
information-processing. From a practical side, instead, format effects have concrete 
consequences on individuals‘ judgments and decisions which are of particular relevance for life, 
especially in the case they deal with health issues. Hence, results of the investigation could be 
used to promote health care. 
Close inspection of the literature on laypeople‘s comprehension of different ratio 
formats revealed individuals‘ tendency to make less mistakes in operations of the kind that 
might arise in medical decision making, when handling rates, namely, frequencies of events per 
unit of population exposed to the risk (e.g., 12 in 100), rather than proportions with a numerator 
of 1 and shifting denominators (e.g., 1 in 8). At the same time, though, evidence was also found 
of a habit diffused among health practitioners to privilege ―1 in X‖ formats to ―Y in 100/1000‖ 
formats in risk communications with patients. While it was apparent that both types of formats, 
namely rates and proportions, are normally employed in medical practice, it appeared less 
evident how they can impact laypeople‘s probability assessments.  
With the aim of ascertaining such issue, a variety of approaches in the risk literature 
was examined- then reviewed in Chapter 2- which have specifically tackled the subject of 
probability perception as a function of its expression through ratios using smaller or larger 
numbers. Theories point in two diverging directions that can be summarised in a propensity to 
either, on the one side, attribute a higher probability judgment to ratios with larger rather than 
smaller numbers (i.e., denominator neglect, or Ratio-bias: 10 in 100 > 1 in 10), or vice- versa, 
on the other side, to judge probability as higher when expressed by ratios using larger rather 
than smaller numbers (i.e., group-diffusion effect: 1 in 10 > 10 in 100). However, implications 
of both groups of theories could not entirely be transferred to the domain of interest of the 
present work, the risk of having a Down syndrome-affected child, mainly because of problems 
of ecological validity. These problems were also those which prompted us to test empirically 
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the applicability of predictions derived from the reviewed approaches to the specific case under 
study, provided that the necessary adjustments to the original experimental designs be made. 
Twelve main studies were conducted testing a total of 1673 individuals, employing a between-
subjects rather than a within-subjects presentation of superficially different but substantially 
equivalent ratio formats contextualised in scenario paradigms; a separate rather than joint 
evaluation of the formats was required to participants, and numerator and denominator of the 
ratios were both explicitly stated. Main objectives of the investigation were the following: 1) 
ascertaining whether denominator neglect (i.e., Ratio-bias) or, on the opposite, numerator 
neglect (i.e., group-diffusion effect) would occur when the probability of having a Down 
syndrome-affected child was expressed by means of a ratio in single presentation conditions 
using (comparatively) smaller or larger numbers; 2) delineating boundaries of the bias; 3) 
testing an explanation for the bias stemming from dual-process theories, i.e., the affective 
hypothesis; 4) examining potentially corrective communication measures. Analyses focused 
mainly on the magnitude of perceived probability of the ratios as assessed on Likert scales by 
participants.  
 
Summary of main empirical results 
The first section of the chapter dedicated to the empirical investigations illustrated an 
irrational tendency found in study participants to evaluate the same .005 probability of a 
clinical condition (malaria, in Study 1.1, while Down syndrome, in Study 1.2) as higher when 
expressed as ―1 in 200‖ rather than as ―5 in 1000‖. The higher subjective assessment found for 
ratios employing (comparatively) smaller rather than (comparatively) larger numbers was in 
line with results of group-diffusion studies (i.e., numerator neglect), hence, at the same time, it 
disconfirmed the applicability of an explanation in terms of Ratio-bias (or denominator 
neglect) to the case examined. Nevertheless, as the group-diffusion effect explanation had been 
validated with very different scenarios (see, for instance, bacteria, or carcinogen scenarios), it 
could well have been that such rationale for the effect did not hold in the condition at study.  
The degree of worry for the condition showed the same trend of perceived probability, but 
since the former was showed to depend on the latter, it was decided that in the next studies the 
focus be mainly on perceived probability for the condition.  
In the second section of the chapter, boundaries of the identified bias were delineated. 
Along studies, it was observed that laypeople perceived the probability of having a Down-
syndrome-affected child as higher when it was expressed, respectively: 
- as 1 in 200 than both as 5 in 1000, and as 50 in 10,000, while these last two formats did 
not evoke different probability assessments- Study 2.1; 
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- in formats using 1 at the numerator and a shifting denominator (i.e., ―1 in X‖) rather 
than in formats using 1000 at the denominator and a shifting numerator (i.e., ―Y in 
1000‖)- Study 2.2; 
- as 1 in 12 rather than as 10 in 120, i.e. in hundred-sized denominators (i.e., ―Y in 100‖)- 
Study 2.3; 
- as 1 in 25 rather than 0.4 in 10, and as 1 in 25 rather than 10 in 250- Study 2.6. 
Altogether, these evidences seemed to point to some specific features of the ratio format using 1 
at the numerator in respect to ―N in NX‖ formats. The tendency to judge a probability as higher 
when expressed in a ―1 in X‖ format rather than in a generic ―N in NX‖ format could be dubbed 
the ―1 in X effect‖. However, as it has been observed in the summary of Section 2, it was 
deemed necessary to exclude, that the higher probability perception found in ―1 in X‖ formats 
reflected a more general focus on the denominator of the ratio. Thus, it was showed, that 
comparison of average probability perceptions of two equivalent ratios, none appearing in 
formats featuring directly a ―1 in X‖, but with denominators of different magnitude, did not 
differ significantly. 
Then, a short explorative study (i.e., 2.5) was carried out with the aim of potentially 
isolating one of those facets that were supposed to distinguish the ―1 in X‖ format from the 
others, i.e., the degree to which they prompted individuals to operate mathematical 
transformation on their superficial appearance. A discrepancy between the two types of formats 
was found in the fact, that while the majority of participants declared to be used to transform ―N 
in NX‖ formats, the majority also declared not to be used to that when dealing with ―1 in X‖ 
expressions. Such idiosyncrasy of the ―1 in X‖ format received additional confirmation in the 
following study, i.e. 2.6, which compared evaluation of the probability elicited by that ratio 
when in the usual Down syndrome risk scenario with other not previously tested ―N in NX‖ 
formats. Results showed, that the presence of the ―1 in X‖ format in the paired comparisons 
between different ratios was the condicio sine qua non for the occurrence of the bias in 
perceived probability.  
Having established the effect, in the subsequent section of the chapter (i.e., the third 
one), we dealt with an affective explanation for the bias under study (see, e.g., Slovic and 
Peters, 2006) stemming from literature on dual-process approaches, namely that the ―1 in X‖ 
format evokes a different degree of emotional response than any ―N in NX‖ format. Neither an 
explicit (i.e., self-report, see Study 3.1) nor an implicit (i.e., elicitation of mental images, see 
Study 3.2) measure of the emotional answers prompted could support the affective hypothesis 
of those theorists. Data of the second of these studies, furthermore, evidenced a tendency 
opposite to that documented in Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor (2000, see Chapter 2, 
paragraph 1.2.3.1), namely the theory of the ―imaginability of the numerator‖. If on the one 
hand, then, confirmation of two-system views of risks received direct support in the study (i.e., 
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2.1) which showed a strong relation between appearance of the bias and a mainly experiential-
way of reasoning, on the other hand, in this third section the ad hoc explanation elaborated by 
Slovic and colleagues to account for Ratio-bias did not show success. However, some 
methodological problems could have played a role in the absence of the detection of any 
difference at all between ratio formats in the emotional answer elicited.  
 
An explanation for the “1 in X effect” 
 
You may say, it‟s one in a hundred. But what if I’m that one? 
Van Steenkiste, Van der Weijden, Timmermans, Vaes, Stoffers, and Grol (2004, bold font added) 
 
It is our impression, instead, that overall results could rather reflect the idea that the ―1 
in X‖ format conveys more identifiable information than any other format. Indeed, the very fact 
that people did not transform the ―1 in X‖ format might mean that it is considered ―satisfactory‖ 
to produce a judgment or to take a decision (in terms of ―satisficing‖, Simon, 1955). One not 
tested hypothesis then, is that people do somehow ―like‖ the ―1 in X‖ format as it is, because 
they can easily ―see‖ their case in the ―1 case over X cases‖. It is possible in fact, that the 
presence of the number 1 at the numerator of a ratio expressing the probability of an event in 
single presentation conditions, as in the cases here analysed, becomes a highly salient feature at 
the eyes of individuals, given laypeople‘s difficulties in forming a judgment of probability when 
evaluating its numerical expression in isolation. As such, that facet would receive special 
attention and it would indirectly work as a warning sign for the person, denoting the possibility 
of being that ―1‖ individual experiencing the bad consequences of the negative event described. 
It is apparent, that the effect postulated is opposite to CEST ―experiential-learning‖ principle 
(e.g., Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992). 
In light of these considerations, it could be reasonable to attend, that those participants to this 
thesis experiments who were assigned a ―1 in X‖ format condition more easily imagined their 
future son/daughter identified with that single instance at the numerator than those participants 
who were assigned an ―N in NX‖ format condition. That identification, in turn, could have 
resulted in an increase of the ―experiential‖ sensation of risk in those persons (here, 
―experiential‖ has to be intended as the ―experiential route vs. ―analytical route‖, à la Slovic, 
Peters, Litchenstein, and McGregor, 2004). The augmented affective reaction, in turn, could 
have induced a higher perception of the probability, compared to the conditions where a 1 in the 
numerator was not present (i.e., ―N in NX‖ conditions). 
This causal relation between affective reaction and augmented perception of the probability has 
been explained by some scholars in slightly differing versions of what has then come to be 
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known as the ―identifiable victim effect‖ (Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; 
Schelling, 1968; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). 
According to this effect, people would react in a different way to identifiable rather than to 
statistical victims, an idea originally introduced by Schelling (1968). He noticed, that while the 
death of a particular individual invokes ―[...] anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe, 
responsibility and religion, most of this awesomeness disappears when we deal with statistic 
death‖. In his view, the explanation of this phenomenon had to be researched in the degree of 
emotional responses stimulated by identifiable rather than statistical victims. Small and 
Loewenstein (2003) demonstrated, that such different reaction to identifiable rather than 
statistical victims depends on the stronger affective reactions provoked by the identifiable target 
(not a victim, but the victim). In fact, this identifiability can provoke the adoption of the other‘s 
perspective, namely ―imagining how that person perceives the situation and how he or she feels 
as a result (Davis, 1994, Batson, Klein, Highberger, and Shaw, 1995)‖ (Kogut and Ritov, 2005, 
p. 158). Indeed, the adoption of the other‘s perspective ―[...] is likely to evoke, in the perceiver, 
feeling of empathy (sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm, softhearted, etc.) and 
also feelings of distress for that other person (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997)‖ (Kogut and 
Ritov, 2005, p. 158)
86
. In the last resort, hence, arouse of empathic emotions is deemed as the 
cause of the higher judgment of probability for the single identifiable victim (―1 in X‖ format, in 
the present case) than for the statistical one (―N in NX‖ format) – see the schematic 
representation here below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The “1 in X effect” in perceived probability as a 
function of increased empathy with the “1” victim 
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 Two rather different examples of empathy aroused by single identifiable victims and not by statistical 
victims are exemplified in the following two quotations, 1) Nobel laureate Albert Szent-Gyorgi (quoted in 
Featherstonehaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich, 1997, p. 283) stated, ―I am deeply moved if I see one 
man suffering and would risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the possible pulverization 
of our big cities, with a hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one man‘s suffering by a hundred 
million.‖ and 2) Anne Dillard (quoted in Slovic, 2007) affirmed, ―There are 1,1985,000 people alive in 
China. To get a feel for what this means, simply take yourself- in all your singularity, importance, 
complexity, and love- and multiply by 1,1985,000. See? Nothing to it.‖ 
―1 in X‖ probability 
 
 
―Oh! It could be me!‖ 
 
 
Higher empathy 
(experiential sensation) 
 
 
Higher perceived probability 
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Deahene and Melher (1992)‘s affirmations (summarised here below) come in support of this 
hypothesis of a higher identifiability of the information conveyed by the ―1 in X‖ format, 
provided that one spouses the view considering the Fechner‘ law (see Fechner, 1860) and the 
existence- even among numbers- of points of reference (see, Rosch, 1975; but also Milikovski 
and Elshout, 1994; 1995) as correctly characterising how the mind encodes numerical 
magnitudes
87
. Deahene and Melher found, that those number-words used for precise denotation 
of numerosity and to express those reference numbers suited for use in estimates (in particular, 
1, 10, 12, 15, 20, 50, and 100), are more frequently used than the others in several different 
languages. Thus, we can think of these numbers-words as representing more available, and then 
more likely evoked, examples of some numerosities in people‘s mind. In particular, authors not 
only observed a decrease of frequency in the use of number-words with the increase in 
numerical magnitude (with local increase for the above mentioned reference numerals), but also, 
they highlighted, that number one is the most frequent in absolute of all numbers-words 
employed by people. Thus, it is our suggestion, that it could well be the case, that when people 
evaluate a ratio using a 1 as numerator, such number implicitly evokes the highest number of 
mental instances
88
 compared to (almost) all other possible numerators of ―N in NX‖ formats. 
This unconscious availability of more mental examples (similarly, to some extents, to 
Kahneman and Tversky‘s availability heuristic) arouses in turn the higher probability 
―sensation‖ -in terms of, for instance, Slovic, Peters, Litchenstein, and McGregor (2004)‘s 
experiential feeling- and hence prompts individual to express the higher judgment of 
probability, as observed in the data. 
 
Other explanations for the “1 in X effect” 
On another vein, the bias might be the results of another factor as well, as we do not 
think a systematic tendency originates from only one factor, but there could be different co-
occurring factors causing it. The erroneous attribution of different probability assessments  to 
superficially different but substantially equivalent formats could arise in those individuals 
motivated to process the information. Indeed, much of the studies pointed to a motivational 
explanation of the bias, in other words it seems, that only those individuals that truly processed 
the numerical information (because they were familiar with it, because they were capable of, 
because they had children or were parents-to-be, for any other motivational reason) were subject 
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 There is no universal agreement on that explanation, as Peters, Slovic, Västfjäll1, and Mertz (2008, p. 
620) have clearly expressed, ―Although competing mathematical formulations of the precision of mental-
number-line [MNL] representations exist (Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Gallistel & Gelman, 2005) […]‖. 
Nevertheless, authors also observed (ibid.), that broadly speaking the two competing views on the MNL 
―[…] make similar behavioral predictions in number comparison studies and (we believe) in decision 
making.‖ 
88
 Our deduction, however, is different from the ―experiential-learning principle‖ of CEST, which instead 
is more coherent with Deahane and Melher‘s findings, in that both addressed integer numbers. 
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to the bias. Therefore, it should be thought that there is a sort of processing threshold which 
needs to be exceeded in order for the bias to emerge. This threshold, anyway, needs effort to be 
overcome, as some of the literature on numerical processing seems to indicate (for implications 
in decision making, see Peters, Slovic, Västfjäll, and Mertz, 2008). Indeed, despite it is clear 
since time (see, e.g., Dehaene, 1996), that in the presence of numeric information nonverbal 
representations of numerosity (i.e., intuitive representations of the mental number line) are 
spontaneously activated regardless of format (e.g., dots, Arabic number, number word), 
―Number intuitions, however, are limited in their representational power and do not directly 
support concept of fractions, probabilities, or even the precise numbers important to many 
decisions‖ (Peters et al. 2008, p. 619). Given the particularly difficult nature of ratio concepts, 
thus, it might have well been the case that only those individuals motivated to process the ratio 
information (for many reasons, as seen) could overcome the necessary threshold to make the 
(biased) representation of the ratio possible, i.e. to somehow sense the numerical expression. 
The last affirmation could be tested in future studies manipulating, for instance, the motivation 
to elaborate the information by means of monetary reward (i.e., comparing the performance of 
individuals in a condition where they received payment with that of participants in a condition 
where they did not receive payment); or by means of different levels of incentives to 
participants in such a way that only some participants would be motivated to process 
information, hence would exceed the processing threshold. Also, since the issue of how the 
concepts of ratios and fractional numbers are represented in our mind has only very recently 
started to receive attention from researchers (see, for instance, Bonato, Fabbri, Umiltà, and 
Zorzi, 2007), it is possible that while plugging that dramatic gap existent in the literature more 
precious indications will become available for researchers in judgment and decision making. 
Another result in the thesis was coherent with this threshold motivation hypothesis, 
although it should be replicated, given that several problems occurred in the assessment of the 
REI scale from which it follows. The result is, that the ―1 in X‖ bias was associated with a 
prevalence of the experiential thinking style, though mainly with a low-experiential instead than 
high-experiential decision style. Indeed, results on lowly experientials, exactly because of their 
moderate degree of experentiality in making evaluations and taking decisions, denoted that they 
probably elaborated at least to some extent the ratio on which they were asked a magnitude 
assessment. On the contrary, results on highly experientials leaded to think that these 
individuals, who normally process information in an intuitive way, did not reach the above-cited 
threshold, in that they did not really process the numbers; in other words they seemed to base 
their evaluations on some gross clues in the ratios, like the presence of great-sized 
denominators.  
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A convergence of the two factors? 
 The two factors could also converge: The ―1 in X‖ format conveys a more identifiable 
meaning than other formats (like the ―N in NX‖) for the individual which, hence, is more likely 
to process it, thus leading to higher judgments of probability.  
Results of a recent study (i.e., Timmermans and Oudhoff, in press, personal communication) 
render this interpretation credible as authors would highlight the importance of the advantage 
that smaller denominators have over larger ones in ratios, in that the former are easier to 
visualize than the latter
89
 (see, on this regard, the literature on the mental representation of 
integer numbers, becoming fuzzier as numbers get bigger i.e., Weber‘s law; but also Moyer and 
Landauer, 1967). According to Timmermans and Oudhoff, since risk needs to be concrete (i.e. 
to refer to concrete events or people), if one wants to ease patient‘s grasp of the probability 
meaning, smaller denominators are advantageous compared to larger ones. Not different is the 
take-home message of another very recent publication (i.e., Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, in 
press-b), in that authors urged health practitioners to avoid expressing probability in ratios using 
large denominators because the latter especially favour more biased interpretations (like 
denominator neglect); while, instead, they suggest to use ratios employing smaller, more 
plausible denominators.  
Further studies should then address the easiness to process the ratio information in isolation 
when in smaller and larger numbers trough standard two task paradigms, namely making use of 
cognitive load, for instance, or inducing participants in conditions of time pressure.  
 
Implications for practice 
It is apparent, that present findings have a particular relevance for doctors and health 
personnel in charge of risk communication. These experts should be warned, in light of these 
results, that their choice of a ratio format rather than another to express the probability of a 
health-related outcome (here, having a Down syndrome-affected child) does not come without 
consequences on patients‘ assessments. In line with literature on expertise, Study 4.1 showed 
that medical doctors were not to prone to the bias, probably exactly because of their expertise in 
the field of application, and/or because they are individuals more used to perform operations on 
mathematical formats, as their profession requires on a daily basis. The same expertise that 
seems to prevent them from the bias could however be the one responsible of making them 
insensitive to issues of formats effects in risk communication. Therefore, the decision to test 
communicative interventions able to attenuate or even eliminate the ―1 in X‖ effect.  
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Obviously, authors must start from the assumption (empirically proven, or only theoretical, it is not 
known) that individuals mainly focus on denominators in the ratios to draw some clues for intuitively 
assessing their magnitude. 
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Results of Study 4.2 showed that the bias persisted when adding the balls and jar verbal 
analogy to the numerical risk presentation, a technique that is common practice in risk 
communication and that consists in encouraging people to build a visual representation of the 
probability. Instead, the bias disappeared when individuals were showed a visual depiction of 
the probability by means of a pictogram where an instance was represented by a dot (Study 4.3). 
Effectiveness of the latter intervention might reside in the fact, that icon arrays- as suggested by 
Ancher, Senathirajaha, Kukafka, and Starren (2006), as well as by Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, 
and Gigerenzer (in press) in the wake of Fuzzy-Trace theory (see, e.g., Reyna and Brainerd, 
1995)- alike similar visual aids, make part-to-whole relations visually available. Thus, they 
would induce individuals to consider both numerator and denominator of the ratio. Despite the 
need of more evidences, on the basis of these results it can be tentatively argued, that providing 
icon arrays in addition to numerical information would be an effective method of preventing 
difficulties in understanding health relevant risk communications. 
 
Limitations 
The most evident concern for the studies included in this thesis is the fact, that the bias 
is not a systematic tendency, as small changes in superficial details could easily attenuate or 
remove the effect; in other words, the disclosed tendency is rather weak. Anyway, we think that 
this is intrinsic in a bias of that type, in that, indeed, it is based on simple changes in the 
magnitude of numbers, namely a facet that can be reached by definition in an unlimited number 
of even minuscule modifications. This is not a justification of course; however it does testify the 
difficulty of implementing a conclusive research in this area. In an effort to give a little 
contribution, with no claim of being complete, we decided to follow some avenues, thus 
obviously leaving other ones unexplored. For instance, it could have been useful to study 
whether the bias is present with higher probability values that those examined, like 30%, 50%, 
70%, 90% (in the wake of, for instance, Pacini and Epstein‘s study, 1999-b). That would have 
allowed to define whether the tendency is for some reasons unique to low and very low 
probabilities like the ones tested in this research work (i.e., 10%, 1%, or lower), or instead 
extends to other probability magnitudes. Hence, it goes without saying, that there is still a vivid 
need for further investigation that can explore, describe, and account for the bias studied.  
A second concern for the studies included in this thesis is, that only one methodology 
was used, namely questionnaires or paper-and-pencil tasks
90
 focused mainly on one dependent 
measure, i.e., perceived probability. While it is surely true that the number of studies performed 
and that of the individuals tested made results obtained from that methodology appear very 
strong, it is also true that crossed verification by means of different methodological paradigms 
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 Two of these studies, indeed, were collected on the Web, but the type of task required was the same of 
real paper-and-pencil tasks (i.e., answering to a set of questions). 
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could as well have strengthened the validity of findings. For instance, as already affirmed, using 
time-pressure paradigms could have helped, as well as the employment of eye-tracking 
techniques, to detect which is the focus of patient‘s attention. Similarly, other measures (i.e., 
dependent variables, for instance Willingness to Pay or Willingness To Risk) could have offered 
interesting hints on the trend of the bias. Nevertheless, it has to be argued that, for the specific 
aims of the present investigation, analyses of judgment on the level of probability of occurrence 
of the event appeared as the most appropriate, also in line with literature on decision making, 
and on risk in particular. 
Another concern for the studies included in this thesis regarded the type of sample 
adopted. Indeed, while it is true that participants of possibly different ages and occupational 
sectors were recruited, nevertheless it has to be recognized, that they still were convenience 
samples. It can be said, however, that 1) since practically all adult individuals in the population 
until a certain age (different for men and women) are possible prospective parents, and since no 
main individual differences related to demographics have been found, it can be affirmed that the 
present findings are not misleading of the general population‘s way of judging; 2) importantly, 
patients in the specific condition at stake (i.e., parents-to-be, or individuals that have just 
become mother/father, hence namely those who have to evaluate/ have just evaluated screening 
test results on the risk of having a Down syndrome-affected child) have been tested in two 
studies.  
As a final consideration, future research could aim to enhance the validity of findings of 
the present work. It has to be noticed that, apart from one study (i.e., the first) which addressed 
the perception of probability referred to contracting malaria, all others studies analyzed the risk 
of having a Down syndrome-affected child, and as such the instrument and the materials used 
focused on that medical domain. Hence, it is not clear a) whether the ―1 in X effect‖ occurs 
mainly for the clinical condition analyzed (i.e., the Down-syndrome risk), and b) if the bias can 
influence risky decision making competence in other important domains. For what regards the 
first point, one can ask, in other words, whether the ―1 in X effect‖ always occurs when the 
probability is referred to medical conditions other than the risk of having a Down syndrome-
affected child. Are there diseases, that for some intrinsic features, lead individuals to judge in a 
way that disconfirms the ―1 in X effect‖? Thus, another avenue for future research would be to 
replicate the finding of this thesis on other medical domains.  
Not only, as for what concerns the second point, it would be extremely interesting to investigate 
even non-medical outcomes, both negative and positive ones- one promising avenue is, for sure, 
the field of marketing/advertising/promotion, that of protective measures/insurance/life saving, 
but maybe also that of investments. In such a way, boundaries of the bias would be further 
delineated and the way in which individuals evaluate ratio formats would be further disclosed.
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SECTION 1. 
 
Study 1.1 
 
Legga lo scenario e risponda alle domande: 
 
Immagini che un suo amico abbia comprato una vacanza per il Kenya. Lei ha appena letto 
che in Kenya il rischio di contrarre la malaria è di 1 su 200 [5 su 1000]
91
.  
 
1) Secondo lei, se il suo amico va in Kenya, la probabilità che contragga la malaria è: 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          assolutamente   molto bassa        bassa             media             alta           molto alta     prossima alla 
            trascurabile                                                                                                                     certezza 
 
2) Secondo lei la malaria è una malattia: 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Gravissima               molto grave        abbastanza grave         poco grave           per nulla grave 
 
 
3) Se lei andasse in Kenya, quanto la preoccuperebbe la possibilità di contrarre la 
malaria? 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             per niente    molto poco     poco    mediamente  abbastanza       molto       moltissimo 
 
 
Legga e risponda alle seguenti domande: 
 
5) Immagini di lanciare 1000 volte un dado con sei facce non truccato. Facendo 1000 lanci, 
quante volte ritieni che il dado potrebbe dare come esito un numero pari (2, 4, 6)?  
|________| (500 su 1000) 
 
6) Nella BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, le probabilità di vincere un premio di $10 sono pari 
all‘1%. Secondo te quante persone potrebbero vincere $10 se 1000 persone comprano un 
singolo biglietto della lotteria a testa? |________| (10 persone su 1000) 
 
7) Nell‘ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES la probabilità di vincere una macchina è 
pari a 1 su 1000. Quale percentuale di biglietti dell‘ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES 
vince una macchina? |_________| % (0.1) 
 
8) Quale dei seguenti numeri rappresenta la probabilità più alta? 
 1 su 100 
 1 su 1000 
 1 su 10 
(1 su 10) 
 
 
                                                          
91
 In all studies, the expression/s employed in experimental condition/s alternative to that written in black 
font appears/appear in light blue font and enclosed in rectangular brackets; also, correct answers (when 
existent) to questions are in italics and enclosed in round brackets. 
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9) Quale dei seguenti numeri rappresenta la probabilità più alta?  
 1% 
 10% 
 5% 
(10%) 
 
10) Il rischio della persona A di contrarre una malattia nei prossimi 10 anni è pari all‘1%, e 
quello della persona B è il doppio di quello della persona A; qual è il rischio della persona B 
di contrarre una malattia? |_________| % (2) 
 
11) Il rischio della persona A di contrarre una malattia nei prossimi 10 anni è pari a 1 su 100, 
e quello della persona B è il doppio di quello della persona A; qual è il rischio della persona 
B di contrarre una malattia? |_________| su |__________| (2 su 100) 
 
12) Se la probabilità di contrarre una malattia è pari al 10%, quante persone in un campione 
di 100 ci si deve aspettare che contrarranno la malattia? |__________| (10) 
 
13) Se la probabilità di contrarre una malattia è pari al 10%, quante persone in un campione 
di 1000 ci si deve aspettare che contrarranno la malattia? |__________| (100) 
 
14) La probabilità di contrarre una malattia è pari a 20 su 100; ciò dovrebbe essere uguale ad 
attendersi una probabilità pari al |__________| % di contrarre la malattia. (20) 
 
15) La probabilità di contrarre un‘infezione virale è .0005. Su 10 mila persone, quante di 
esse ci si deve aspettare che contrarranno l‘infezione? |__________| (5 persone) 
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Study 1.2 
 
Legga il seguente scenario, provando ad immedesimarsi in uno dei due protagonisti 
(cioè Anna, se Lei è una donna, oppure Luca, se Lei è un uomo): 
 
Anna e Luca sono una coppia che aspetta un bambino.  
I due si recano insieme alla prima visita medica di controllo. Il ginecologo 
conferma lo stato di gravidanza di Anna e li informa che, considerata l‘età di 
Anna, la loro probabilità di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down è 
approssimativamente di 1 su 200 [5 su 1000].  
 
 
Ora risponda alla seguente domanda: 
 
Se fosse nei panni di Anna (oppure di Luca, se Lei è un uomo) riterrebbe la probabilità di 1 
su 200 [5 su 1000] di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down 
 
       
       
Estrema- 
mente 
bassa 
 
Molto 
bassa 
 
Bassa 
 
Moderata Alta Molto  
alta 
Estrema- 
mente 
alta 
 
 
(on the following page) 
 
Secondo Lei, la sindrome di Down è una malattia genetica 
 
 
               
 Per 
nulla 
grave 
Un po‘ 
grave 
Abbast
anza 
grave 
Molto 
grave 
Graviss
ima 
 Non so 
 
 
(on the following page) 
 
Quale tra queste affermazioni La rappresenta meglio? (indichi una sola risposta) 
 Non ho mai sentito parlare della sindrome di Down  
 Ho sentito parlare/letto della sindrome di Down, ma non ho mai visto 
direttamente persone affette da tale malattia 
 Ho visto direttamente persone affette da sindrome di Down, ma non ho mai 
interagito con loro 
 Ho interagito con persone affette da sindrome di Down, ma solo saltuariamente 
 Ho interagito spesso con persone affette da sindrome di Down 
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SECTION 2. 
 
Study 2.1 
 
Legga il seguente scenario, provando ad immedesimarsi in uno dei due protagonisti 
(cioè Anna, se Lei è una donna, oppure Luca, se Lei è un uomo): 
 
Anna e Luca sono una coppia che aspetta un bambino.  
I due si recano insieme alla prima visita medica di controllo. Il ginecologo 
conferma lo stato di gravidanza di Anna e li informa che, considerata l‘età di 
Anna, la loro probabilità di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down è di 1 
su 200 [5 su 1000, 50 su 10000]. 
 
 
Ora risponda alla seguente domanda: 
 
 
Se fosse nei panni di Anna (oppure di Luca, se Lei è un uomo) riterrebbe la probabilità di 1 
su 200 [5 su 1000, 50 su 10,000] di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down: 
 
 
       
       
Estrema- 
mente 
bassa 
 
Molto 
bassa 
 
Bassa 
 
Moderata Alta Molto  
alta 
Estrema- 
mente 
alta 
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(on the following page) 
 
Per ognuna delle affermazioni sulla sinistra, indichi, per cortesia, in che misura La 
descrive segnando una crocetta nella casella corrispondente. 
Cerco di evitare le situazioni in cui è necessario riflettere a fondo 
Non sono molto bravo a risolvere problemi complicati 
Mi piace basarmi sulle mie impressioni intuitive 
Mi piacciono le sfide intellettuali 
Non possiedo un gran intuito 
Nel risolvere i problemi della mia vita di solito mi trovo bene ad usare l‘istinto 
Non sono molto bravo a risolvere problemi che richiedono un‘attenta analisi logica 
Credo che sia importante fidarsi delle proprie intuizioni 
Usare l‘intuito può essere molto utile per risolvere i problemi 
Non mi piace dovere riflettere molto 
Spesso mi baso sulle mie intuizioni nel decidere il corso di un‘azione 
Mi piace risolvere problemi che richiedono di pensare molto 
Mi fido delle mie prime impressioni sulle persone 
Pensare non è il mio ideale di attività piacevole 
Non sono una persona che riflette in modo molto razionale 
Quando si tratta di fidarsi delle persone, posso di solito basarmi sulle mie sensazioni 
istintive 
Se dovessi basarmi sui miei sentimenti istintivi, commetterei spesso degli errori 
Ragionare con attenzione sulle cose non è uno dei miei punti forti 
Preferisco i problemi complessi a quelli semplici 
Non mi piacciono le situazioni nelle quali devo basarmi sull‘intuito 
Non ragiono bene quando sono sotto pressione 
Riflettere a fondo e a lungo su un problema mi dà poca soddisfazione 
Penso che ci siano delle situazioni nelle quali bisognerebbe fidarsi del proprio istinto 
Sono molto più bravo a risolvere un problema in modo logico rispetto alla maggior 
parte delle persone 
Penso che sia sciocco prendere decisioni importanti sulla base delle impressioni 
Ho una mente logica 
Non penso sia una buona idea affidarsi alle proprie intuizioni per prendere decisioni 
importanti 
Mi piace pensare in termini astratti 
Generalmente non faccio affidamento sulle mie sensazioni per aiutarmi a prendere una 
decisione 
Difficilmente mi sbaglio quando ascolto i miei sentimenti istintivi più profondi per 
trovare una risposta 
Non ho problemi a ponderare le cose con attenzione 
Non vorrei dipendere da nessuno che si descriva come una persona intuitiva 
Nel risolvere i problemi della mia vita di solito mi trovo bene ad usare la logica 
Per me è sufficiente conoscere la risposta ad un problema senza dovere capire il 
ragionamento che ci sta dietro 
Probabilmente i miei giudizi istantanei non sono buoni quanto quelli della maggior parte 
della gente 
Tendo ad usare il mio cuore come guida per le mie azioni 
Di solito le mie decisioni hanno ragioni chiare e comprensibili 
Di solito riesco a percepire se una persona ha ragione o ha torto, anche se non so 
spiegare come lo avverto 
Sarebbe interessante per me imparare nuovi modi di pensare 
Sospetto che le mie intuizioni siano inesatte tanto spesso quanto esatte 
The 40-items of the REI scale used in the study translated into Italian and readapted from those of 
Pacini and Epstein (1999-b)- here in order 1.  
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The scale available for response to each item of the 40-item REI scale above: 
     
Assolutamente 
falso per me 
Piuttosto 
falso per me 
Né vero né falso  
per me 
Piuttosto vero  
per me 
Assolutamente 
vero per me 
 
(on the following page) The 8 items of the SNS scale used in the study, translated into Italian 
and readapted from those of Fagerlin et al. (2007): 
 
Quanto si ritiene brava/o a fare operazioni con le frazioni? 
 
Per niente 
 
Un po‘ 
 
Abbastanza 
 
Molto 
 
Estremamente 
 
 
Quanto si ritiene brava/o a fare operazioni con le percentuali? 
 
Per niente 
 
Un po‘ 
 
Abbastanza 
 
Molto 
 
Estremamente 
 
 
Quanto si ritiene brava/o a calcolare una mancia pari al 15% del conto? 
 
Per niente 
 
Un po‘ 
 
Abbastanza 
 
Molto 
 
Estremamente 
 
 
Quanto si ritiene brava/o a calcolare il prezzo finale di una maglia su cui va 
applicato lo sconto del 25%? 
 
Per niente 
 
Un po‘ 
 
Abbastanza 
 
Molto 
 
Estremamente 
 
 
Quando legge il giornale, quanto considera utili le tabelle con i numeri ed i grafici 
che fanno parte di un articolo? 
 
Per niente 
 
Un po‘ 
 
Abbastanza 
 
Molto 
 
Estremamente 
 
 
Quando una persona Le vuole spiegare che qualcosa ha una certa possibilità di 
accadere, preferisce che quella persona usi le parole (―succede raramente‖) oppure i 
numeri (―esiste l‘1% di possibilità‖)? 
 
Preferisco 
sempre le parole  
 
Preferisco le 
parole, nella 
maggior parte 
dei casi  
 
Metà delle volte 
preferisco le 
parole e metà i 
numeri 
 
Preferisco i 
numeri, nella 
maggior parte 
dei casi  
 
Preferisco 
sempre i numeri  
 
 
Quando ascolta le previsioni del tempo, preferisce quelle che usano le parole (―oggi 
c‘è una bassa probabilità che piova‖) oppure quelle che usano le percentuali (―oggi 
c‘è un 20% di rischio che piova‖)? 
 
Preferisco 
sempre le parole  
 
Preferisco le 
parole, nella 
maggior parte 
dei casi  
 
Metà delle volte 
preferisco le 
parole e metà i 
numeri 
 
Preferisco i 
numeri, nella 
maggior parte 
dei casi  
 
Preferisco 
sempre i numeri  
 
 
In generale, quanto considera utile l‘informazione numerica? 
 
Per niente 
 
Un po‘ 
 
Abbastanza 
 
Molto 
 
Estremamente 
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(on the following page) Among socio-demographic variables, the two questions used to create 
the measure of familiarity with the outcome: 
 
Ha figli?  Sì  No 
 
 
 
 
 
Se sì, Le è mai stata comunicata da uno specialista medico la probabilità che il nascituro 
fosse affetto da sindrome di Down? 
 
   Sì   No 
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Study 2.2  
 
Nella tabella presentata qui di seguito, è indicato il rischio di avere un figlio affetto 
dalla sindrome di Down in base all’età materna. Le chiediamo cortesemente di 
cerchiare il rischio relativo alla sua età. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
(“1 in X” format) (“Y in 1000” format) 
 
Età materna  Rischio 
18-20 1 ogni 1540 nascite 
21-23 1 ogni 1480 nascite 
24-26 1 ogni 1350 nascite 
27-29 1 ogni 1120 nascite 
30-32 1 ogni 795 nascite 
33-35 1 ogni 475 nascite 
36-38 1 ogni 240 nascite 
39-41 1 ogni 110 nascite 
42-44 1 ogni 49 nascite 
45-47 1 ogni 21 nascite 
48-50 1 ogni 8 nascite 
51 e oltre > 1 ogni 6 nascite 
 
Età materna Rischio 
18-20 0.6 ogni 1000 nascite 
21-23 0.7 ogni 1000 nascite 
24-26 0.8 ogni 1000 nascite 
27-29 0.9 ogni 1000 nascite 
30-32 1.3 ogni 1000 nascite 
33-35 2.1 ogni 1000 nascite 
36-38 4.2 ogni 1000 nascite 
39-41 9.1 ogni 1000 nascite 
42-44 20.4 ogni 1000 nascite 
45-47 47.6 ogni 1000 nascite 
48-50 125 ogni 1000 nascite 
51 e oltre > 166.7 ogni 1000 nascite 
 
 
 
D1. Quanto giudica elevato il rischio da lei cerchiato di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome 
di Down? Segni una x all‘interno della casella corrispondente alla sua valutazione. 
 
                           
Per nulla          
elevato 
    Elevatissimo 
 
 
D2. Quanto la preoccupa tale rischio? Segni una x all‘interno della casella corrispondente alla 
sua valutazione. 
                                     
  Per nulla          
elevato 
    Elevatissimo  
 
  
 
D3. Il rischio da lei cerchiato è: 
 superiore a 1 su 250 
 inferiore a 1 su 250 
Experimental material employed in the studies 
 
194 
 
D4. Rispetto al rischio di una donna di 23 anni, il rischio da lei cerchiato è: 
 superiore 
 inferiore 
 uguale 
 
D5. Il rischio da lei cerchiato significa che la probabilità di avere un figlio affetto dalla 
sindrome di Down è:  
 maggiore del 50%  
 minore del 50% 
 
D6. Immagini che il rischio di un‘altra donna in gravidanza sia il doppio rispetto a quello da 
lei cerchiato. Quanto sarebbe questo rischio? ________ su _______. 
 
D7. Il rischio da lei cerchiato equivale ad un rischio di _______ su 1000. 
 
D8. Qual è la probabilità di avere un figlio NON affetto dalla sindrome di Down considerata la 
sua età? __________ su _____________. 
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Study 2.3 
 
Legga il seguente scenario e risponda alle domande.  
 
 Anna è una donna di 48 anni, sposata da quando ne aveva 29. Lei e il marito da tempo 
desideravano un figlio ma problemi di fertilità dovuti a cause non evidenti hanno 
impossibilitato l‘inizio di una gravidanza. Nel momento in cui Anna e Luca si erano 
rassegnati alla situazione, Anna scopre di essere incinta. Si reca dal ginecologo per una 
visita di controllo. Il medico le conferma lo stato di gravidanza e la informa che, data la sua 
età, il rischio di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down è di circa 1 su 12 [10 su 
120].  
 
1. Se lei fosse nei panni di Anna, come valuterebbe la probabilità di 1 su 12 [10 su 120] di avere 
un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
                               
Estremamente bassa     Media     Estremamente alta 
 
 
2. Per sapere con certezza se il figlio di Anna ha un‘anomalia cromosomica è necessario che Anna 
svolga un test gratuito, l‘amniocentesi, che però comporta un rischio aggiuntivo di aborto di 
circa 1 caso su 100. Se lei fosse nei panni di Anna, farebbe l‘amniocentesi? 
 
 sì                      no 
 
 
(on the following page). Provi ora a rispondere alle seguenti domande il più velocemente 
possibile: 
 
3. A quale delle seguenti percentuali corrisponde la probabilità di 1 su 
12 [10 su 120] ? 
(circa 10%) 
 Circa 1% 
 Circa 10% 
 Circa 100% 
 
4. Quale dei seguenti numeri rappresenta la probabilità più alta? 
(10%) 
 0.1% 
 1% 
 10% 
 
5. La probabilità di 1 su 12 è maggiore o minore della probabilità del 
50%? (minore) 
 maggiore 
 minore 
 
6. La probabilità di 1 su 12 [10 su 120] corrisponde circa a:  
(10 su 100/ 1 su 10) 
 
 10 su 100 
 10 su 1000 
 1 su 100 
[ 1 su 10 
 10 su 1000 
 1 su 100] 
 
7. Se la donna A ha la probabilità di 1 su 12 [10 su 120] di avere un 
figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down e la donna B ha una 
probabilità doppia rispetto alla donna A, qual è la probabilità della 
donna B? (2 su 12/ 20 su 120) 
 2 su 6 
 1 su 24 
 2 su 12 
[ 2 su 60 
 10 su 240 
 20 su 120] 
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Study 2.4 
 
Immagini il seguente scenario:  
 
 
Anna e Luigi stanno aspettando un bambino. Anna ha 45 anni. Si recano dal ginecologo 
per la prima visita ed il medico li informa che data l‘età di Anna, il rischio per la coppia 
di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down è di circa 3 su 48 [10 su 160]. 
 
 
Si metta nei panni di Anna (se lei è una donna) o nei panni di Luigi (se lei è un uomo). 
 
 
D1. Quanto giudica elevato il rischio di 3 su 48 [10 su 160] di avere un figlio affetto dalla 
sindrome di Down? Segni una x all‘interno della casella corrispondente alla sua valutazione. 
 
                                                     
                                                    Basso            Medio            Alto 
 
 
D2. Per sapere con certezza se il figlio di Anna e Luigi ha la sindrome di Down è necessario che 
Anna svolga un test, l‘amniocentesi, che però comporta un rischio aggiuntivo di aborto di 
circa 1 caso su 100. Se lei fosse nei panni di Anna e Luigi, farebbe l‘amniocentesi? 
 
 sì, certamente  
 tendenzialmente sì 
 tendenzialmente no  
 assolutamente no  
 non so 
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Study 2.5 
 
Alcune statistiche sono semplici e altre più complesse. Quelle più semplici tendiamo 
a non trasformarle. Per esempio “1 su 10” normalmente non viene trasformato, 
mentre “3 su 30” tende ad essere trasformato in “1 su 10”. 
 
 
(here in order 1) 
0.4 su 10 
è una statistica che Lei tende a trasformare in un altro formato, oppure che tende 
a considerare così come Le viene presentata? 
  
  
Tendenzialmente 
la trasformo 
Tendenzialmente 
la considero  
così com‘è 
 
1 su 25 
è una statistica che Lei tende a trasformare in un altro formato, oppure che tende 
a considerare così come Le viene presentata? 
  
  
Tendenzialmente 
la trasformo 
Tendenzialmente 
la considero  
così com‘è 
 
2 su 50 
è una statistica che Lei tende a trasformare in un altro formato, oppure che tende 
a considerare così come Le viene presentata? 
  
  
Tendenzialmente 
la trasformo 
Tendenzialmente 
la considero  
così com‘è 
 
10 su 250 
è una statistica che Lei tende a trasformare in un altro formato, oppure che tende 
a considerare così come Le viene presentata? 
  
  
Tendenzialmente 
la trasformo 
Tendenzialmente 
la considero  
così com‘è 
Experimental material employed in the studies 
 
198 
Study 2.6 
 
Legga il seguente scenario, provando ad immedesimarsi in uno dei due 
protagonisti (cioè Anna, se Lei è una donna, oppure Luca, se Lei è un uomo): 
 
Anna e Luca sono una coppia che aspetta un bambino.  
I due si recano insieme alla prima visita medica di controllo. Il ginecologo 
conferma lo stato di gravidanza di Anna e li informa che, considerata l‘età di 
Anna, la loro probabilità di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down è 
di 0.4 su 10 [1 su 25, 2 su 50, 10 su 250].  
 
 
Ora risponda alla seguente domanda: 
 
Se fosse nei panni di Anna (oppure di Luca, se Lei è un uomo) riterrebbe la 
probabilità di 0.4 su 10 [1 su 25, 2 su 50, 10 su 250] di avere un figlio affetto dalla 
sindrome di Down: 
 
       
       
Estrema- 
mente 
bassa 
 
Molto 
bassa 
 
Bassa 
 
Moderata Alta Molto  
alta 
Estrema- 
mente 
alta 
 
 
(on the following page) 
 
Alcune statistiche sono semplici e altre più complesse. Quelle più semplici tendiamo 
a non trasformarle. Per esempio “1 su 10” normalmente non viene trasformato, 
mentre “3 su 30” tende ad essere trasformato in “1 su 10”. 
 
Ripensi alla statistica ―0.4 su 10‖ [―1 su 25‖, ―2 su 50‖, ―10 su 250‖] che ha incontrato 
nello scenario. 
Nel rispondere alla domanda, l‘ha trasformata in un altro formato oppure l‘ha considerata 
così come Le era stata presentata? 
 
  
L‘ho trasformata in 
un altro formato 
L‘ho considerata 
così com‘era 
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SECTION 3. 
 
Study 3.1 
 
Legga il seguente scenario e risponda alle domande.  
 
Anna è una donna di 48 anni, sposata da quando ne aveva 29. Lei e il marito da 
tempo desideravano un figlio ma problemi di fertilità dovuti a cause non evidenti 
hanno impossibilitato l‘inizio di una gravidanza. Nel momento in cui Anna e Luca 
si erano rassegnati alla situazione, Anna scopre di essere incinta. Si reca dal 
ginecologo per una visita di controllo. Il medico le conferma lo stato di gravidanza 
e la informa che, data la sua età, il rischio di avere un figlio affetto dalla Sindrome 
di Down è di circa 1 su 12 [10 su 120]. 
 
 
Provi a mettersi nei panni di Anna. 
 
Quanto è negativo il sentimento che prova pensando alla probabilità di 1 su 12 [10 su 120] di 
avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
           
Per nulla 
negativo 
    Neutro     Estremamente  
negativo 
 
Quanto è positivo il sentimento che prova pensando alla probabilità di 1 su 12 [10 su 120] di 
avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
           
Per nulla 
positivo 
    Neutro     Estremamente  
positivo 
 
 
 
Following Study (with a single bipolar scale) 
 
Legga il seguente scenario e risponda alla domanda.  
 
Anna è una donna di 45 anni che scopre di essere incinta. Si reca dal ginecologo 
per una visita di controllo. Il medico le conferma lo stato di gravidanza e la informa 
che, data la sua età, il rischio di avere un figlio affetto dalla Sindrome di Down è di 
circa 1 su 10 [10 su 100]. 
 
Che tipo di emozione prova pensando alla probabilità di 1 su 10 [10 su 100] di avere un figlio 
affetto dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
           
Estremam. 
negativa 
    Neutra     Estremam. 
positiva 
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Study 3.2 
 
Legga il seguente scenario, provando ad immedesimarsi in uno dei due 
protagonisti (cioè Anna, se Lei è una donna, oppure Luca, se Lei è un uomo): 
 
 
Anna e Luca sono una coppia che aspetta un bambino. 
I due si recano insieme alla prima visita medica di controllo. Il ginecologo 
conferma lo stato di gravidanza di Anna e li informa che, considerata l‘età di Anna, 
la loro probabilità di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down è di 1 su 200 [5 
su 1000].  
 
 
 
(on the following page) 
 
Qual è la prima immagine* che le viene in mente quando pensa alla probabilità di 1 su 
200 [5 su 1000] di avere un figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
 
Immagine ___________________________________________________-2    -1     0    +1    +2 
 
 
* Per “immagine” intendiamo i pensieri o le associazioni mentali che le vengono in mente. Per 
esempio, se qualcuno menziona la parola “calcio”, Le potrebbero venire in mente i Mondiali, 
Francesco Totti, il derby, o anche un prato verde. A noi interessa la prima immagine che Le 
viene in mente.  
 
 
(on the following page) 
 
Come avrà notato, sulla destra della riga su cui ha scritto i Suoi pensieri c’era una scala da 
-2 a +2. Per favore, ora torni indietro e, usando la scala, valuti le emozioni ed i sentimenti 
che prova nei confronti dell’immagine che ha scritto. Fornisca la Sua valutazione facendo 
una “X” su uno dei punti della scala, ricordando che ciascun valore corrisponde alle 
etichette qui sotto: 
  
 
Assolutamente 
negativo 
 
Abbastanza 
negativo 
Neutro 
Abbastanza 
positivo 
Assolutamente 
positivo 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
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SECTION 4. 
 
Study 4.1 
 
Immagini il seguente scenario: lei sta valutando la possibilità di fare un viaggio in 
Kenya e la informano che la probabilità di contrarre l‘epatite A per chi viaggia in 
Kenya è di 1 su 200 [5 su 1000].  
 
 
Secondo lei, questa probabilità è:  
-  
       
estremamente 
bassa 
molto 
bassa 
bassa media alta molto          
alta 
estremamente 
alta 
 
 
 
 
Study 4.2 
 
Legga lo scenario e risponda alla domanda: 
 
Immagini che un suo amico abbia comprato una vacanza per il Kenya. Lei ha appena 
letto che in Kenya il rischio di contrarre la malaria è di 1 su 200 [5 su 1000].  
Per comprendere meglio il rischio, provi ad immaginare di avere un contenitore con 
200 [1000] palline di cui 199 [995] bianche e 1 rossa [5 rosse]. Immagini di infilare 
una mano nel contenitore e di estrarre una pallina. La probabilità di contrarre la 
malaria equivale alla probabilità di estrarre la [una] pallina rossa. 
 
 
Secondo lei, se il suo amico va in Kenya, la probabilità che contragga la malaria è: 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          assolutamente   molto bassa        bassa             media             alta           molto alta     prossima alla 
            trascurabile                                                                                                                     certezza 
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Study 4.3 
 
Legga il seguente scenario e risponda alle domande. 
 
Anna è una donna di 45 anni che scopre di essere incinta. Si reca dal ginecologo 
per una visita di controllo. Il medico le conferma lo stato di gravidanza e la informa 
che, data la sua età, il rischio di avere un figlio affetto dalla Sindrome di Down è di 
circa 1 su 10 [10 su 100].  
 
(In the graphical condition, the following textual part was added) 
Volendo agevolare la comprensione di tale valore di rischio, il medico fornisce ad 
Anna la seguente figura: (either a or b, according to the experimental condition) 
 
 
          
a. The pictogram used in the 1 in 10 condition 
 
 
 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
 
b. The pictogram used in the 10 in 100 condition 
 
 
 
Provi a mettersi nei panni di Anna e a rispondere alle seguenti domande: 
 
D1. Come valuterebbe la probabilità di 1 su 10 [10 su 100] di avere un figlio affetto dalla 
sindrome di Down? 
 
                               
Estremamente 
bassa 
    Media
mente 
    Estremamente 
alta 
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D2. Quanto la preoccuperebbe la probabilità di 1 su 10 [10 su 100] di avere un figlio affetto 
dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
                               
           Per nulla     Mediamente     Moltissimo         
 
 
 
 
D3. Che tipo di emozione prova pensando alla probabilità di 1 su 10 [10 su 100] di avere un 
figlio affetto dalla sindrome di Down? 
 
 
                               
Estremamente 
negativa 
    Neutra     Estremamente 
positiva  
 
 
